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Abstract
The realm of this thesis is cryptographic protocol theory in the quantum world. We study the
security of quantum and classical protocols against adversaries that are assumed to exploit
quantum effects to their advantage. Security in the quantum world means that quantum
computation does not jeopardize the assumption, underlying the protocol construction. But
moreover, we encounter additional setbacks in the security proofs, which are mostly due to
the fact that some well-known classical proof techniques are forbidden by certain properties
of a quantum environment. Interestingly, we can exploit some of the very same properties to
the benefit of quantum cryptography. Thus, this work lies right at the heart of the conflict
between highly potential effects but likewise rather demanding conditions in the quantum
world.
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Introduction
1.1 On Cryptography
The multiple human needs and desires that demand privacy among two or more people
in the midst of social life must inevitably lead to cryptology wherever men thrive
and wherever they write.
— David Kahn
Cryptography is the art of secret writing (from Greek κρυpiτoς and γραϕω) and may be
considered almost as old as writing itself. Cryptography played a crucial role throughout the
history of any society that depended on information, from the Greek Scytale and the Roman
Caesar cipher, over the Vigene`re cipher, electromechanical rotor machines and encryption
standards, to forming the backbone of electronic infrastructures in modern life (see e.g. [Sin00]
for a historic survey of cryptography).
The first cryptographic methods are known as secret-key cryptography, based on one
secret key shared between the communicating parties and used both for encryption and
decryption. Already apparent from this description derives its main problem, which lies in
the logistics of distributing the key securely: Prior to any secret communication, the involved
parties must be in possession of the same secret key. Nevertheless, secret-key cryptography
was in use for thousands of years, adjusting its complexity to ever-increasing developments
in technique and technology.
Public-key cryptography was the technological revolution, solving the key distribution
problem. The idea was independently discovered by Diffie and Hellman in [DH76] with
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman, providing the first implementation [RSA78], and slightly
earlier but in secrecy, by Ellis, followed by Cocks’ and Williamson’s practical application
(e.g. [Coc08]). Public-key cryptography is based on a pair of keys for each communicating
party, namely a public key for encryption and a corresponding secret key for decryption,
where it must hold that it is computationally infeasible (in polynomial time) of deriving the
secret key from the public one. Then, we require a family of trapdoor one-way functions
defining the encryption and decryption procedure. Informally, that means that encryption
is a one-way operation, which is efficiently computable, given the public key, whereas the
decryption function is hard to compute, unless the trapdoor is known, i.e. the secret key.
Thus, the public key can be published without compromising security, and hence, public-key
cryptography does not suffer from key distribution problems. Due to that and to the fact that
the technique additionally allows for digital signatures that are verifiable with the public key
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and yet unforgeable without the secret key, the concept of public-key cryptography is highly
used and required in the age of the Internet and the proliferation of electronic communication
systems.
New potential in cryptography emerged with quantum cryptography, starting with Wies-
ner’s groundbreaking paper [Wie83]1, suggesting that “quantum mechanics allows us novel
forms of coding without analogue [in classical physics]” (p. 78). His approach of conju-
gate coding did not only lay the foundations of the new cryptographic technique but also
suggested a system for sending “two mutually exclusive messages” (p. 83), which is to-
day known as the powerful primitive of oblivious transfer. It took several years (and the
Caribbean sea) to establish quantum cryptography as a scientific discipline, accomplished by
Bennett and Brassard, mainly by the BB84-protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD)
in [BB84] after preceding work such as [BBBW82, BB83], culminating in the first practical
realizations [BB89, BBB+92]. An alternative QKD scheme was independently proposed by
Ekert in [Eke91], based on a different approach using quantum entanglement. Since then,
QKD was further researched, both on a theoretical and an experimental level. Today, conju-
gate BB84-coding also forms the basis for various more general quantum cryptographic tasks
other than key distribution.
Modern cryptography concerns, besides the secrecy and authenticity of communication,
also the security of various other task. For instance, theoretical research in the sub-field of
cryptographic protocol theory covers cryptographic primitives with fundamental properties
for secure multi-party computation. Each primitive can be seen as a building block that
implements some basic functionality. Composition of such primitives within outer protocols
yield applications that implement a specific task securely over a distance.
1.2 On the Quantum World
Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it.
— Niels Bohr
In the quantum world, we consider the behavior of systems at the smallest scale, which
cannot be explained nor described by classical physics. A quantum2 is the smallest unit of
a physical entity, and the fundamental concept in quantum information theory is a quan-
tum bit, or short, a qubit. Quantum information theory was established at the beginning
of the last century, but has been subject to different interpretations ever since—both sci-
entific and philosophical. This thesis is divided into two subareas of quantum information
theory, constituting the following two main parts, Part II and Part III (Part I is dedicated
to preliminaries).
Part II is in the realm of quantum cryptography, where—informally speaking—the trans-
mission of qubits followed by some classical post-processing is employed to accomplish a
cryptographic task. The security is mainly derived by the special properties of the qubits
during and after transmission, and therewith, directly from physical laws.
1The paper was written in the early 1970ies but rejected and only published retroactively in 1983.
2quantus (Latin) - how much
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Part III on cryptography in a quantum world refers to the study of cryptography with
completely classical messages exchange, but where the environment around is quantum.
In other words, the security of the classical schemes must withstand powerful quantum
computing capabilities.
We now present—in brief and on a (counter-)intuitive level—the aspects unique to the
quantum world, which are relevant in the context of this work. Interestingly, these quantum
features can be exploited to the benefit of quantum cryptography. However, the very same
properties impose intriguingly new challenges in classical cryptography. In other words,
“what quantum mechanics takes away with one hand, it gives back with the other” [NC00,
p. 582]. And so, this work lies right at the heart of the conflict between highly potential
effects, but likewise rather demanding conditions.
Information gain vs. disturbance. This aspect might be argued to constitute the
most outstanding advantage of quantum cryptography over the classical world, and forms
“the engine that powers quantum cryptography” [Fuc96, p. 1]. In the classical case, a bit can
simply be read in transmission, and the information gain solely depends on the security of the
respective encryption used. In quantum cryptography, information is typically encoded in
two complementary types of photon polarization or, in other words, a qubit is prepared in one
out of two conjugate bases with orthogonal basis states. To gain information about such an
unknown qubit, it must be observed, but observing in the quantum world means measuring.
Measuring, or more precisely distinguishing between two non-orthogonal quantum states, is
destructive and therewith any measurement disturbes the system. This is explained in the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that certain pairs of quantum properties are
complementary in that measuring one of them necessarily disturbs the other.
Consequently, eavesdropping on a qubit transmission disturbs the system, and can there-
fore be noticed in a statistically detectable way. Moreover, the quantitative trade-off between
information gain and disturbance is useful not only against an external adversary, but it is
also a main ingredient when proving security against a dishonest player. This fact is inher-
ent in the basic security aspects of all our quantum two-party protocols, discussed later in
Part II.
An unknown quantum state cannot be copied. This fact—unheard of in the case
of classical data—is formalized in the no-cloning theorem [WZ82]. The peculiar property
constitutes another major security feature in quantum communications and underlies all
our quantum protocols in Part II. However, it also sets severe restriction in the theory of
quantum computing. This becomes apparent in Part III, where the commonly used classical
proof technique rewinding, which is also shortly discussed below, requires to copy certain
data, and so has to be carefully reviewed in the quantum world.
Quantum memory is limited. A more practical issue concerns the limitation of the
amount of qubits that can be stored and then retrieved undisturbed. This may be seen as
a snapshot of current state of the art. However, ongoing research strongly suggest that it
is—and will be—much easier to transmit and measure qubits than it is to store them for a
non-negligible time.
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We will make use of this given fact in our quantum protocols in Chapter 6, which are de-
signed such that dishonest parties would need large quantum memory to attack successfully—
a security property that classical protocols cannot achieve. Yet, we do not exclusively rely on
this condition only, but investigate a wider diversification of security that is not threatened
by potential breakthroughs in developing quantum storage.
Quantum rewinding is tricky. As already indicated, this statement is a key aspect
in Part III, and originates from most of the above mentioned properties “all wrapped up
together”. Rewinding is a very powerful technique in simulation-based proofs against a
classical dishonest party: We can prove security against a cheating player by showing that
a run of a protocol between him and the honest player can be efficiently simulated without
interacting with the honest player, but with a simulator instead. A simulator is a machine
which does not know the secrets of the honest party but yet it sends messages like the honest
player would do but with more freedom, e.g. in how and when to generate these. Then to
conclude the proof, we have to show that the running time of the simulation as well as the
distribution of the conversation are according to expectations. A simulator basically prepares
a valid conversation and tries it on the dishonest party. Now, in case this party does not
send the expected reply, we need the possibility to rewind him.3
Unfortunately, rewinding as a proof technique can generally not be directly applied in
the quantum world, i.e., if the dishonest machine is a quantum computer. First, we cannot
trivially copy and store an intermediate state of a quantum system, and second, quantum
measurements are in general irreversible. In order to produce a classical transcript, the sim-
ulator would have to partially measure the quantum system without copying it beforehand,
but then it would become impossible to reconstruct all information necessary for correct
rewinding.
Due to these difficulties, no simple and straightforward security proof for the quan-
tum case was known. However, Watrous recently showed that in a limited setting an ef-
ficient quantum simulation, relying on the newly introduced quantum rewinding theorem
(see [Wat09] and Section 3.5.2), is possible. We will discuss this aspect in more detail in
Chapters 8 and 9: We will show that the quantum rewinding argument can also be applied
to classical non-constant round coin-flipping in the quantum world, and propose a framework
to weaken certain assumptions on the coin, in quest for a quantum-secure constant round
protocol.
Spooky actions at a distance. This famous naming by Einstein4 describes the phe-
nomenon of entanglement. Informally, two qubits are called entangled, if their state can only
be described with reference to each other. This has the effect that a measurement on one
particle has an instantaneous impact on the other one—despite any distance separating the
qubits spatially.
Entanglement is definitely a unique resource to the quantum world only. In the words of
3More precisely, we model the player—similar to the simulator—as a machine, and thus, we can just set
back this machine to an earlier status, i.e., erase parts of the memory and start a new conversation. In that
sense, rewinding can be thought of as, for instance, rebooting a computer after it crashed.
4“Spooky actions at a distance” was put down originally as “spukhafte Fernwirkung” in [Ein71].
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Schro¨dinger, entanglement is not “one but rather the characteristic trait of quantum mechan-
ics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical lines of thought” [Sch35, p. 555].
Besides constituting a disturbing aspect—intuitively and philosophically, entanglement opens
up for interesting applications such as quantum teleportation [BBC+93] and superdense cod-
ing [BW92], as well as for various aspects in quantum cryptography and computing. We
will use entanglement as a thought experiment in our quantum protocols when analyzing an
equivalent purified EPR-version5 (Chapter 5).
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation is based on research done during the three years of my PhD studies at the
Department of Computer Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. Part of the research was
conducted while visiting Universite´ de Montre´al, Que´bec, Canada. The realm of this work is
quantum cryptography and classical cryptography in the quantum world. More specifically,
the thesis covers aspects of (quantum) cryptographic protocol theory, based on cryptographic
primitives. The main results are outlined in the following sections and pictorially represented
in Figure 1.1.
1.3.1 The Importance of Mixed Commitments
Classical mixed (or dual-mode) commitments are of great significance for most constructions
discussed in this work. Here, we explain the challenges that the quantum world imposes on
commitments in general and summarize the results of [DFL+09,DL09,LN10] in that aspect.
Security for classical constructions in the quantum world means that quantum computa-
tion does not jeopardize the underlying mathematical assumption that guarantees the secu-
rity, for instance, in the context of commitments, the hiding and binding property. However,
we encounter even more setbacks in the context of actually proving such constructions secure
in an outer protocol, which, in regard of this work with its main focus on simulation-based
security, are mostly due to the strong restrictions on rewinding in the quantum world.
The first difficulty in any attempt to rewind the adversary regards the fact that the
reduction from the computational security of an outer protocol to the computationally binding
property of a commitment does not simply translate from the classical to the quantum
world. Computational binding means that if a dishonest party can open a commitment
to two different values, then the computational assumption does not hold. In the classical
case, a simulator simulates a run of the outer protocol with the committer, such that the
latter outputs a valid commitment at some point during the execution. Later in the protocol
he must then provide a correct opening. The simulator has the possibility to rewind the
player to any step in the protocol execution, e.g. to a point after the commitment was
sent. Then it can repeat the simulation of the outer protocol, which can now be adapted
to the simulator’s knowledge of the committed value. If the dishonest committer opened
5An EPR-pair denotes a pair of entangled qubits. The name (ironically) originates from the paper [EPR35]
by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, in which they criticized quantum mechanics as an incomplete theory—due
to entanglement.
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the same commitment to a different value than previously, he could break the underlying
assumption guaranteeing computational binding. In other words, two valid openings of the
same commitment imply the inversion of the underlying one-way function, which concludes
the proof. Such a technique, however, is impossible to justify in the quantum world, since
we cannot trivially copy and store an intermediate state, and measurements are in general
irreversible. In order to succeed, the simulator would have to partially measure the quantum
system without copying it beforehand to obtain the first transcript, but then it would become
impossible to reconstruct all information necessary for correct rewinding.
The second challenge we encounter is to prove an outer protocol with an embedded
computationally hiding commitment secure. Generally speaking, in a classical simulation of
the outer protocol, the simulator aims e.g. at hitting an ideal outcome to a function of which
it then commits. Then, if the reply from the possibly dishonest counterpart matches this
prepared function such that both sides conclude on the ideal value as their result and the
transcript is indistinguishable from a real run of the protocol, the simulation was successful.
Otherwise, the simulator rewinds the dishonest player completely and repeats the simulation.
We show a natural and direct translation of this scenario to the quantum world in Chapter 8,
where we use a technique that allows quantum rewinding in this very setting when using bit
commitments (see Section 1.3.3). In case of string commitments however, we cannot rewind
the other player in poly-time to hit the guess, since that guess consists of a bit-string. A
possible solutions for simulating against a classical adversary is to let him commit to his
message before the simulator commits. Then the player’s message can be extracted and the
simulation can be matched accordingly. This technique, however, is again doomed to fail in
the quantum realm, since it reduces to the previous case where the simulator cannot preserve
the other party’s intermediate status as required during such a simulation.
We will circumvent both of the above aspects by introducing mixed commitment schemes
in our protocols. Generally speaking, the notion of mixed commitments requires some trap-
door information, given to the simulator in the ideal world. Depending on the instantiation,
the trapdoor provides the possibility for extraction of information out of the commitments
or for equivocability when opening the commitments. This allows us to circumvent the neces-
sity of rewinding in the proof, while achieving high security in the real protocol. The idea of
mixed commitment schemes is described in more detail in Section 4.1.2 and a quantum-secure
instantiation is proposed in Section 4.1.3. Various extensions are then discussed to match
the construction to respective requirements in different outer protocols (Sections 4.1.4, 7.2,
and 7.3).
1.3.2 Improving the Security of Quantum Protocols
The following results are joint work with Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFL+09]
and will be addressed in detail in Chapter 5.
We propose a general compiler for improving the security of a large class of two-party
quantum protocols, implementing different cryptographic tasks and running between mutu-
ally distrusting players Alice and Bob. Our main result states that if the original protocol
is secure against a so-called benign Bob, who is only required to treat the qubits “almost
honestly” but can deviate arbitrarily afterwards, then the compiled protocol is secure against
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a computationally bounded quantum Bob. The unconditional security against Alice is pre-
served during compilation and it requires only a constant increase of transmitted qubits and
classical messages.
The consequences of such a compiler are twofold. First, the basic assumption in designing
new protocols for any two-party functionality is reduced to the relatively weak assumption
on benignity. On the other hand, the proofs for already existing protocols within the specific
class typically go through under the assumption (at least after some minor adaptions). And
second, security in the bounded-quantum-storage model implies benign security. Therefore,
by compilation of such protocols, we can achieve hybrid security, which means that the
adversary now needs both large quantum memory and large quantum computing power to
break these new protocols.
In more detail, the protocols we consider here start with a qubit transmission from Alice
to Bob, where each qubit is encoded in one of two conjugate bases. This implies that,
whenever Bob measures in the complementary basis, he obtains a random outcome. The
second part of the protocol consist of arbitrary classical messages and local computations,
depending on the task at hand but typically relying on the fact that a dishonest Bob has
high uncertainty about a crucial piece of information.
The basic technique to construct the compiler was already suggested in the first quantum
oblivious transfer protocol [CK88]. We want to force Bob to measure by asking him to
commit (using a classical scheme) to all his basis choices and measurement results, and
then require him to open some of them later. While classical intuition suggests that the
commitments should force Bob to measure (almost) all the qubits, it was previously very
unclear what exactly it would achieve in the quantum world. To our best knowledge, it was
never formally proven that the classical intuition also holds for a quantum Bob. We now give
a full characterization of the commit&open approach in general quantum settings, namely
that it forces Bob to be benign.
We propose a formal definition for benignity, which might be of independent interest. A
benign Bob is characterized by the following two conditions, which must be satisfied after the
qubit transmission. First, his quantum storage is very small, and second, there exists a basis-
string such that the uncertainty about Alice’s encoded bit is essentially one bit whenever
the encoding basis does not match the basis indicated in that string. These two conditions
imply that a successfully passed opening of his commitments for a random test subset puts
Bob in a situation, which is close to a scenario in which he measured as supposed to: His
quantum memory is essentially of size zero, and furthermore, measuring the untested qubits
in a basis complementary to the one Bob (claims to have) used, leads to a result with large
uncertainty. The bounds on Bob’s uncertainty and his quantum memory are proven for an
ideal state that is negligible close to the real state. For the ideal state, we can then show that
the remaining subsystem after the test is a superposition of states with relative Hamming
distance upper bounded by the test estimate.
To conclude the proof, we assume that the original protocol implements some ideal func-
tionality with statistical security against benign Bob. Then we show that the compiled
protocol with the commitments also implements that functionality but now with security
against any computationally bounded (quantum) Bob. To preserve the unconditional secu-
rity of the original protocol, we require an unconditionally hiding commitment scheme. Since
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the common reduction from the computational security of the protocol to the computational
binding property of a commitment would require rewinding, we use a mixed dual-mode
commitment, which allows us to avoid rewinding Bob in this step (see also Section 1.3.1).
We generalize our result to noisy quantum communication and show that the compilation
does not render sequential composability insecure. We then extend the underlying commit-
ment scheme for a more general composability guarantee and obtain that any compiled
protocol computationally quantum-UC-emulates its corresponding ideal functionality.
1.3.3 Classical Coin-Flipping in the Quantum World
The result on quantum-secure single coin-flipping is based on [DL09], co-authored with
Damg˚ard, and will be fully discussed in Chapter 8. The proposed amplification framework
for obtaining strong coin-strings from weak initial assumption on the coins is joint work with
Nielsen [LN10] and will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 9.
We first investigate the standard coin-flipping protocol with classical messages exchange
but where the adversary is assumed to be capable of quantum computing. The output
of the protocol is a uniformly random unbiased bit, and the construction does not require
any set-up assumptions. Therewith, the communicating parties can interactively generate
true randomness from scratch in the quantum world. Our result constitutes the most direct
quantum analogue of the classical security proof by using a recent result of Watrous [Wat09]
that allows for quantum rewinding in this restricted setting and when flipping a single coin.
The full potential of coin-flipping lies in the possibility of flipping a string of coins instead
of a bit, such that the parties can interactively generate a common random string from
scratch. Therewith, it is possible, for instance, to implement the theoretical assumption of
the common-reference-string-model, which then implies that various interesting applications
can be realized in a simple manner without any set-up assumptions.
We show that with our definitions, the single coin-flipping protocol composes sequentially.
Additionally, we sketch an extended construction of the underlying commitment scheme, al-
lowing for efficient simulation on both sides, with which we achieve more general composition
guarantees. Both compositions, however, are not fully satisfactory. Sequential coin-flipping
allows for implementations without set-up assumptions but leads to a non-constant round
application. In contrast, parallel composition achieves much better efficiency with constant
round complexity but requires some set-up assumptions in our proposed construction here.
Unfortunately, we do not know how to extend Watrous quantum rewinding to the case of
bit-strings, while keeping the running time of the simulator polynomial. The proof tech-
nique in the purely classical setting is impossible to apply in the quantum world (see also
Section 1.3.1). Other techniques to achieve constant round coin-flipping are not known to
date.
Our framework in Chapter 9 can be understood as a step towards constant round coin-
flipping. We first investigate different security degrees of a string of coins. We then propose
protocol constructions that allow us to amplify the respective degrees of security such that
weaker coins are converted into very strong ones. The final result constitutes an amplification
towards a coin-flipping protocol with long outcomes, which is fully poly-time simulatable on
both sides against quantum adversaries. The protocol can be implemented with quantum-
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computational security in the plain model without any set-up assumptions. It only assumes
mixed commitment schemes, which we know how to construct with quantum security, and
no other assumptions are put forward. With this solution, we still have to compose the single
coin-flip as sketched above sequentially to obtain long outcomes, but we achieve coins with
stronger security.
Our method of amplifying the security strength of coins also applies to potential constant
round coin-flipping. If the underlying weak protocol already produces string outcomes and
is constant round, then the resulting strong protocol is also constant round, and we consider
it a contribution in itself to define the weakest security notion for any potential candidate
that allows to amplify to the final strong protocol using a constant round reduction.
1.3.4 Applications
We consider our applications in both parts of the thesis (Chapters 6 and 10) well suited as
examples for the respective precedent main results, since they all have some special proper-
ties. Depending on the context they are proposed in, they appeared in [DFL+09,DL09,LN10].
The first quantum protocol in Section 6.1 implements oblivious transfer (OT), which
constitutes a highly relevant cryptographic primitive that is complete for general two-party
computation. Interestingly, the idea behind this primitive was introduced in the context of
quantum cryptography, namely, in the pioneering paper of Wiesner [Wie83] that also paved
the way for quantum cryptography by introducing the concept of conjugate coding. The very
nature of conjugate coding implies oblivious transfer, and with that, it can be understood
as a natural quantum primitive.
Classical and quantum OT cannot be implemented without any additional restrictions.
However, in contrast to classical OT, quantum OT reduces to classical commitment. The
idea of using a classical commitment within quantum protocols was already suggested in the
first quantum oblivious transfer protocol [CK88] and its follow-up work in [BBCS91]. Various
partial results followed, such as assuming a perfect ideal commitment [Yao95,May96,Unr10]
or a (theoretical) quantum string commitment [CDMS04]. Based on the analysis of our
compilation (sketched in Section 1.3.2), we can now rather simply apply our compiler to (a
variant of) the original quantum OT-protocol, and therewith, give a complete proof for a
concrete commitment scheme.
In a rather straightforward way, oblivious transfer as a building block easily extends to
password-based identification, which is needed for any authenticated set-up. The quantum
identification scheme in Section 6.2 allows for identification by solely proving the knowledge
of a secret password without actually announcing it in clear. Furthermore, it has some
special properties, which indicates its utility value in practice. First, the only option without
being in possession of the password is to guess it, which implies that the same password
may be safely reused for a long time. Second, the scheme tolerates a possibly non-uniform
password, which translates to a realistic assumption of user-memorizable passwords. And
last, a typical setting for identification is not necessarily required to run over large distances to
be considered useful, and as such, it can actually be implemented with existing technology.
Naturally, an identification scheme, secure under diversified assumptions and against any
external adversary, is an important step towards an actual implementation.
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The classical generation of commitment keys in Section 10.3 nicely combines the above
applications with the results on quantum-secure coin-flipping, fulfilling the requirement on
our mixed commitment construction. By running a coin-flipping protocol as an initial step
in the quantum protocols above, the communicating players can interactively generate their
commitment keys for compilation. This allows us to avoid the common-reference-string-
model and yields implementations of entire protocols in the quantum world without any
set-up assumptions.
The two application in the context of zero-knowledge are interesting in that the interac-
tive generation of coins at the beginning or during outer protocols allows for quantum-secure
realizations of classical schemes from scratch. First in Section 10.1, we show a simple trans-
formation from non-interactive zero-knowledge to interactive quantum zero-knowledge. Then
in Section 10.2, we propose a quantum-secure zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, which relies
not only on initial randomness but also on enforceable randomness and is based on a witness
encoding scheme providing a certain degree of extractability, defined for the quantum context
to resemble special soundness of classical schemes. Both zero-knowledge constructions nicely
highlight that the realization of coin-flipping as a stand-alone tool allows for using it rather
freely in various contexts.
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Cryptographic Toolbox
In this work, we are interested in classical and quantum cryptographic two-party protocols,
i.e., our focus lies on enabling two players to accomplish a specific task securely by communi-
cating over a distance. In a perfect world of gentlemen, we could, of course, just communicate
over a distance without using cryptographic security precautions. In an ideal world, we can
simply assume a “black-box” that solves what we want while not leaking anything of impor-
tance. However, we operate in the real world. This means that we do not only have to take
various dishonest players into account when implementing our protocols, but also that we
have to work within a restricted framework of given conditions and existing resources.1
In the following sections we formalize this intuitive description in cryptographic terms.
The chapter is not intended to provide a full introduction to cryptographic protocol theory,
but rather to give a brief but complete overview of notation, tools, conditions, and settings
we will use, and to fix terminology that may vary in standard literature. In short, we are
setting the stage for the results in this thesis.
2.1 Players
Our main characters are Alice and Bob, who are subject to different roles and cheating
capabilities. The correctness of our two-party protocols is ensured, if they implement the
task at hand in the desired way. This scenario only concerns honest parties Alice and Bob,
who may have different roles, such as sender, receiver, committer, verifier, user and server,
depending on the respective functionality to be carried out. An honest player is denoted
by P.
Security is shown by investigating the case where one of the parties is dishonest . More
precisely, a dishonest party P′ can try, for instance, to bias the outcome of the protocol or
to succeed illegitimately.
Between these two extremes, there are various nuances of cheating. For instance, the com-
mon notion of semi-honest describes an “honest-but-curious” player who is curious enough in
trying to gain additional information while following the protocol honestly. We will in Chap-
ters 5 and 6 use another intermediate notion that captures benignly dishonest behavior in
quantum protocols. The protocols consist of a quantum transmission phase and some classi-
cal post-processing. A benign receiver of qubits is assumed to treat these “almost honestly”,
1Note that, throughout this work, we will use the terms ideal world and real world also in the more formal
context of the so-called two-world paradigm (see Section 2.3) for simulation-based proofs.
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which means he immediately measures most of the qubits upon reception in the specified
bases. Afterwards during the classical post-processing, he can deviate arbitrarily. Thus, in
some sense, he wants to cheat but is incapable of mastering the quantum information in any
other way than simply measuring it. We will define this newly introduced notion in greater
detail later on, as it forms the foundation of our improved quantum protocols.
A very different external adversary is the so-called man-in-the-middle Eve (denoted by E),
who tries to eavesdrop on the classical and quantum communication between Alice and Bob,
with the intention to break the protocol—or at least gain some information—without being
detected. Quantum cryptography provides its protocols with automatic intrusion detection,
due to the fact that here any kind of intrusion will inevitably disturb the system. However,
we have to thoroughly implement the testing of qubits for interference as well as investigate
the potential information leakage of the classical communication.
2.2 Security Flavors, Assumptions, and Models
The purpose and objective of theoretical cryptography is to design protocols with the highest
security possible under any condition, this means without any restriction on adversarial
resources such as computing power and memory size. However, this unconditional security is
extremely hard to obtain for both players simultaneously in the classical and in the quantum
world. In fact, some tasks are proven to be impossible to achieve with unconditional security
for both players. The most well-known example thereof might be the impossibility results on
unconditionally secure classical and quantum bit commitment (proven in the quantum case
by [May97, LC97]). Furthermore, for two distrusting parties, the only applications actually
proven to be unconditionally secure regarding confidentiality are Vernam’s symmetric one-
time pad encryption [Ver26,Sha49] as well as quantum key distribution [BB84,SP00].
Thus, the level of security has to be lowered for implementing other functionalities, and
we have to achieve a reasonable balance between realistic assumptions under consideration of
current and future technology—as weak as possible—and yet meaningful security—as strong
as possible. For that purpose, we specify cryptographic models to capture various notions of
security and to impose realistic restrictions on the adversary. To mention just a few, such
models consider limited computing power, limited memory size [Mau92,DFSS05], a common
resource with special properties (e.g. initially shared randomness), noisy storage [WST08] or
restricted quantum measurement (e.g. a limited set of measurements [KMP04] or a limited
set of qubits to be measured at the same time [Sal98]).
Computational Security. Restricting the adversarial classical computing power and
time is currently the most applied model in practical public-key cryptography. Thus, it
is known as the plain model , achieving computational security based on classical hardness
assumptions that some problems are computationally infeasible to solve in polynomial time2.
Usually, security is shown by reducing the security of the actual scheme to that of a well-
known mathematical problem. However, the hardness of such complexity assumptions is
2An algorithm is poly-time, if its running time is upper bounded by a polynomial in the size of its input,
i.e. O(nc). In more detail, there exist constants c > 1 and n0 such that poly(n) ≤ nc for all n > n0. As
synonyms, we often use feasible or efficient.
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unproven.
It should also not go unnoted that with the emergence of quantum computers which, due
to their speed-up in running time, have great potential to solve several of the basic assump-
tions in polynomial time, security of various crypto-systems would fold. To give examples,
Shor showed algorithms for efficiently factoring large integers [Sho97], which would jeop-
ardize the RSA assumption, and for the related problem of computing discrete logarithms
underlying e.g. the ElGamal encryption system. Grover’s algorithm for conducting a search
through some unstructured search space shows a quadratic speed-up over classical computa-
tion. This, for instance, also affects the time of performing exhaustive search over the set of
possible keys, used in symmetric crypto-systems (e.g. DES). Of course, these algorithms only
yield profitable results, if large-scale quantum computers can be built. Interestingly, the very
quantum effects that makes them so powerful, also makes them so difficult to control—so
far.
Quantum-Computational Security. Recently, the new sub-field of so-called post-quant-
um cryptography has emerged within public-key cryptography.3 There, the focus lies on
researching assumptions which are believed to be hard even on a quantum computer, and
thus, on achieving quantum-computational security. Post-quantum crypto-schemes include,
for instance, the McEliece crypto-system based on a coding-theoretic problem [McE78] and
lattice-based crypto-systems (e.g. [Ajt96,Reg05]). The latter provide, besides good efficiency
when en- and decoding, the merit that breaking the security of such protocols implies to
solve a hard lattice problem in the worst case. However, we should stress also in this context
that this hardness is again assumed; formal proofs are still to come. In this work, we will
use lattice-based crypto-systems for implementing mixed commitment schemes, secure in the
quantum world (Chapters 5 and 9).
Quantum Security. In contrast to security through mathematical hardness assumptions
in classical cryptography, the security in quantum cryptography is based on quantum me-
chanical laws. Proofs for physical limitations are not by reduction as for computational
limitations but in information-theoretic terms. That means that in such models, an adver-
sary does not learn any information, except with at most negligible probability.4
Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model. In the quantum cryptographic setting, one such
physical limitation is formalized in the bounded-quantum-storage model (BQSM), proposed
in [DFSS05]. The intuitive idea behind the model is that the most sensitive information is
encoded in qubits that are transmitted in the first phase of the protocol. Then, at some
later point, typically an announcement of the encoding bases follows to complete the task
at hand. Now, under the assumption that an adversary’s quantum memory size is limited,
he cannot store all of the qubits but has to measure some fraction. Thus, by converting
3The common classification might be slightly confusing, in that the notion “post-quantum” relates to the
time after the successful development of large-scale quantum computers as opposed to quantum cryptography.
4Negligible in n means that any function of n is smaller than the inverse of any polynomial, provided n is
sufficiently large, i.e., for all constants c there exists a constant nc such that negl (n) ≤ n−c for all n > nc.
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quantum information into classical information without complete knowledge of the right
bases, information gets irreversibly destroyed.
The protocols in this model achieve unconditional protection against cheating by one of
the players, while if the other is corrupted, the protocols are secure under the sole assumption
that his quantum storage is of limited size, namely of size at most a constant fraction of
the qubits sent. Such a bound can also be applied to an external eavesdropper’s quantum
memory by slightly extending the respective original protocol. The underlying motivation
for the BQSM is the fact that transmission and measurement of qubits is well within reach of
current technology. Storing quantum information however requires keeping the qubit state
stable under controlled conditions for a non-negligible time, which still constitutes a major
technological challenge, and an attack would require large quantum storage with a long
lifetime. In contrast, honest parties, following the protocol, do not need quantum memory
at all. Furthermore, neither honest nor dishonest parties are bounded with respect to their
classical storage or computing power. We want to stress that the impossibility results against
the bounded-classical-storage model (see e.g. [Mau90, Mau92, CCM98, DM04]) do not hold
in the quantum setting.5 Hence, the BQSM is realistic for fundamental physical reasons and
potentially useful in practice.
Many two-party applications investigated in the BQSM (like identification) are not nec-
essarily required to run over large distances to be considered useful. Thus, such protocols
can actually be implemented with existing devices, and many applications have been proven
BQSM-secure [DFSS05,DFSS07, Sch07]. We will work in this model in Chapter 6, where it
constitutes one of the security layers in our quantum protocols.
Common-Reference-String-Model. Another useful model, which we will consider, is
the common-reference-string-model (CRS-model). In this model, as the name suggests, the
parties are provided with a classical common public string before communication, taken
from some fixed distribution that only depends on the security parameter. For efficiency
and composability, we will often assume the model to allow for techniques, which require an
initially shared random string. However, we consider a random string “in the sky” a set-up,
which is only theoretically useful. To meet more practical demands, we suggest in Chapter 8
a quantum-secure implementation of the CRS-model “from scratch”.
2.3 Worlds
Classical vs. Quantum World. We are interested in cryptography in the quantum
world, covering both quantum and classical cryptographic protocol theory, which is evident
in the separation of the thesis in the two main parts, Part II on quantum cryptography and
Part III on classical cryptography in the quantum world. Thus, throughout this work, we
consider quantum potential—achieving very high security in the first case but also imposing
new demands in the latter. In contrast, the (pure) classical world of cryptography does
traditionally not assume adversarial quantum effects. However, we emphasize our very strong
5The bounded-classical-storage model ensures security as long as the adversary’s memory size is at most
quadratic in the memory size of the honest players. A favorably larger gap between the storage assumptions
on honest and dishonest parties was shown to be impossible [DM04].
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requirement also for all classical protocols and proofs to be quantum-computationally secure,
which implies both the exclusive use of post-quantum crypto-schemes, and the avoidance or
carefully adaption of classical proof techniques.
Ideal vs. Real World. For the definition of security, we work in two different worlds,
which are captured in the two-world paradigm of simulation-based proofs. The basic idea of
the paradigm is to first specify the ideal functionality F that models the intended behavior
of the protocol, or in other words, the properties we would have in an ideal world. The ideal
functionality can be thought of as a trusted third party or simply a black-box that gets private
inputs from the players, accomplishes a specific task without leaking any information, and
then outputs the result to the respective player. Honest and dishonest players in the ideal
world are modeled by probabilistic poly-time machines, denoted by Pˆ and Pˆ′, respectively.
The real world captures the actual protocol Π, consisting of message exchange between the
parties and local computations. Recall that real-world players are indicated by honest P and
dishonest P′.
Now, the input-output behavior of F defines the required input-output behavior of Π.
Intuitively, if the executions are indistinguishable, security of the protocol in real life fol-
lows. In other words, a dishonest real-world player P′ that attacks protocol Π cannot achieve
(significantly) more than an ideal-world adversary Pˆ′, attacking the corresponding ideal func-
tionality F . We will make this aspect more formal in Section 3.6.
2.4 Primitives
In the following, we will describe those two-party cryptographic primitives, along with some
known facts about them, that are relevant in the context of this work. Primitives are fun-
damental problems that are later used as basic building blocks in larger outer protocols.
Discussed on their own, primitives might seem to be somewhat limited but still constitute
intriguing thought experiments. For clarification, an identification scheme, as discussed in
Section 2.4.3, may commonly not count as a primitive per se, although it may well consti-
tute a building block in a larger outer protocol. Our prime purpose for introducing it in the
context of primitives, however, is the close relation to oblivious transfer in its construction.
2.4.1 Commitments
Commitment schemes constitute a very important building block within cryptographic pro-
tocols. In fact, all our protocols proposed here implementing a wide range of cryptographic
tasks, make use of various types of commitment schemes, which may indicate the significance
of the construction. Commitments can be realized with classical schemes or through quan-
tum communication. Here, we will only discuss and construct commitments from classical
crypto schemes, but with a strong requirement of quantum-computational security.
Intuitively, a commitment scheme allows a player to commit to a value while keeping it
hidden (hiding property), yet preserving the possibility to reveal the value fixed at commit-
ment time later during the so-called opening phase (binding property). More formally, a basic
commitment scheme commit (m, r) takes a message m and some random variable r as input.
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Depending on the respective scheme, the message m can be a single bit (bit commitment) or
a bit sequence (string commitment). The length of the randomness r is polynomial in the
security parameter. It is also possible to construct a so-called keyed commitment schemes of
the form commitK (m, r) , which takes key K as additional input. The most common way of
opening commitment commit (m, r) to reveal the committed message m when time is ripe,
is to send values m and r in plain, so that the receiver of the commitment can check its
validity. In Chapter 9, we will change this way of opening a commitment, due to the special
requirements of the particular construction there.
The hiding property is formalized by the non-existence of a distinguisher able to distin-
guish with non-negligible advantage between two commitments, i.e., we have indistinguisha-
bility between two commitments with commit (m1, r1) ≈ commit (m2, r2) . The binding
property is fulfilled, if it is infeasible for a forger to open a commitment to more than one
valid value, i.e., we have commit (m1, r1) 6= commit (m2, r2) for m1 6= m2. Each property,
hiding and binding, can be satisfied unconditionally or subject to a complexity assumption.
The ideal case of unconditionally secure commitments, i.e. unconditionally hiding and uncon-
ditionally binding at the same time, is impossible. Consequently, we have to decide on one
of the two flavors of commitment schemes, namely unconditionally hiding and computation-
ally binding or unconditionally binding and computationally hiding.6 For completeness, it is
worth noting that the same applies in quantum cryptography [May97,LC97], where perfect
commitments can only be achieved when assuming some restrictions on the adversary, for
instance, the BQSM-model [DFSS05,DFR+07].
In the context of oblivious transfer (OT; see Section 2.4.2), we know that a classical
commitment does not imply classical OT without any additional requirement (such as key
agreement). In contrast, a classical commitment implies quantum OT, which is all the more
interesting as OT is complete for secure two-party computation. This implication in the
quantum case was realized in [CK88] and proven partially in [Yao95,May96,CDMS04]. We
will give the first full proof in Section 6.1.
Commitments are equivalent to one-way functions, i.e., a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗
for which it is easy to compute f(x), given x. But given only y = f(x) where x is ran-
dom, it is computationally infeasible in poly-time to compute any element in f−1(y). Thus,
from an appropriate one-way function, secure against quantum adversaries, we can construct
quantum-secure commitment schemes (e.g. [Nao91]). Bit commitments, in turn, imply a
quantum-secure coin-flip, which we will show in Chapter 8. Naturally, the hiding, respec-
tively binding, property holds with unconditional security in the classical and the quantum
setting, if the distinguisher, respectively the forger, is unrestricted with respect to his (quan-
tum) computational power. Recall that in case of a poly-time bounded classical distinguisher,
respectively forger, the commitment is computationally hiding, respectively binding. The
computationally hiding property translates to the quantum world by simply allowing the
distinguisher to be quantum. However, the case of a quantum forger cannot be handled in
such a straightforward manner, since the commonly used classical proof technique relies on
rewinding the possibly dishonest committer, which is in general prohibited by the laws of
quantum mechanics.
6Note that certain applications—beyond the scope of this work—have computational security simultane-
ously for both properties hiding and binding.
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Another restriction on rewinding occurs when committing to a string instead of a single
bit. Solutions for proving string commitments secure are known for the classical case, but
they cannot be adapted to the quantum world. Thus, solutions for quantum-secure constant
round coin-flipping are yet to come (see Chapter 9 and also Section 2.4.4).
2.4.2 Oblivious Transfer
As already indicated, another highly relevant primitive in cryptography is oblivious transfer,
commonly abbreviated by OT. Interestingly, the basic idea for OT was first proposed by
Wiesner in the context of quantum cryptography, where he suggests conjugate coding as ”a
means for transmitting two messages either but not both of which may be received” [Wie83,
p. 79]. OT as a cryptographic concept was then introduced by Rabin (Rabin–OT in [Rab81])
and Even, Goldreich, and Lempel (1–2 OT in [EGL85]). OT is a complete cryptographic
primitive, i.e., it is sufficient for secure two-party computation [Kil88], meaning that secure
1-2 OT allows for implementing any cryptographic two-party functionality.
In this work, we are mainly interested in 1–2 OT `, i.e. one[message]-out-of-two[messages]
oblivious transfer, with message length `. In an 1–2 OT ` protocol, the sender sends two `-bit
strings s0 and s1 to the receiver. The receiver can choose which string to receive, i.e. sc
according to his choice bit c, but does not learn anything about the other message s1−c. At
the same time, the sender does not learn c, i.e., he does not learn which string the other
party has chosen.
As in the classical case, quantum OT cannot be implemented without any additional re-
strictions, such as bounded quantum memory in the BQSM [DFSS05,DFR+07]. However, in
contrast to classical OT, quantum OT reduces to classical commitment, as already discussed
before (more in Section 6.1).
Rand–OT is a randomized variation of general 1–2 OT and essentially coincides, except that
the sender does not input the two messages himself, rather they are generated uniformly at
random during the protocol (and then output to the sender). For completeness, we note
that Rabin–OT is another slightly varied but equivalent version of 1–2 OT , where the sender
transmits a message s with probability 1/2. However, he remains oblivious about whether
or not the receiver actually got s. Thus, Rabin–OT can be seen as a secure erasure channel.
We conclude this introduction by mentioning two natural generalizations of 1–2 OT . First,
1–n OT allows the receiver to obtain exactly one element out of a set of n elements. This
application is similar to private information retrieval in database settings but constitutes a
stronger notion than the latter, as it additionally requires that the user is oblivious to all
other items (as in database privacy). An even further generalization is m–n OT , in which
the receiver can choose a subset of m elements out of the entire set of size n. Interestingly,
1–n OT underlies the construction of a quantum identification scheme in [DFSS05], which
exemplifies the significance of the primitive. More details on this transformation are given
in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.3 Password-Based Identification
A password-based identification scheme (ID, in short) allows a user to identify himself to
a server by proving his knowledge of a previously agreed secret password. In addition, we
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will put forward the following security requirement: Any party that is not in possession of
the valid password can (essentially) not succeed by any other means but trying to guess.
This means that a user without password—or in other words, a user who pretends to be
someone else—cannot delude the server with a probability that exceeds the probability of
guessing the respective password. Similarly, the server can only guess a user’s password
and then learn whether the guess is correct or not—but no information beyond that. This
in particular implies that the same password may be safely reused in further runs of the
protocol. Furthermore, our aim is to develop a scheme that tolerates a possibly non-uniform
password, or in short, a realistic user-memorizable password (such as a PIN code) without
jeopardizing security.
For reasons of their significance in any authenticated set-up, a wide range of classical
and quantum ID-schemes can be found in the literature (see Section 6.2). Here, we will
however focus on the quantum identification scheme, proposed in [DFSS05] and proven secure
against any dishonest server with bounded quantum storage. Interestingly, in the context of
primitives, it is constructed out of an extension of a randomized 1–2 OT ` to a randomized
1–n OT `. We will briefly sketch the intuitive idea here: Recall that such a 1–n OT ` supplies the
user with n random `-bit strings but yields only one of the strings on the server’s side. Such a
scheme can then be used for the purpose of identification, when the server “chooses” the one
specific string indexed by the password, and the user proves which of the n strings obtained
is the one with indices matching the password. Note that this last step of comparison must
be secured by another cryptographic technique such as a hash-function and the strings must
have large Hamming distance, which is not covered by the OT application itself. However,
by the nature of secure OT, a dishonest user does not gain any information on the server’s
choice and thus, does not know which string is the one getting accepted. A dishonest server
can likewise not do better than guessing a choice, and so the string he later receives from the
user is most probably random to him and hence, contains no information on the password.
We want to stress again that for simplicity, we skip many subtle but important details of the
final ID-scheme as well as the means regarding better efficiency. More details are given in
Section 6.2, where we propose an extension of the scheme towards higher and more diverse
security.
2.4.4 Coin-Flipping
True randomness is a crucial ingredient in cryptographic applications. Therefore, coin-
flipping (or coin-tossing) is yet another essential primitive in this work. Secure coin-flipping
allows two parties to agree on a uniformly random bit in a fair way, which means that neither
party can influence the value of the coin to his advantage. Intuition suggest that this should
be easily obtainable for an actual coin-toss if the parties met, flipped a coin together and
simply looked at the outcome. Now, we want to achieve a similar fairness even when the par-
ties are communicating over a distance. This problem was first formalized in cryptographic
terms by Blum as coin-flipping by telephone [Blu81].
An ideal coin-flip can be modeled as follows: Each player inputs a bit of his choice,
independently of each other, and the box then outputs the exclusive disjunction of the two
bits as the coin. When implementing the primitive however, we must consider that one party
must make a first move during communication, and therefore the other one may choose his
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bit accordingly. The most straightforward way to achieve fairness also over a distance is by
bit commitments as follows. The first player chooses a random bit x1 and commits to it, the
other one then sends his bit x2 in plain, then the commitment is opened, and the resulting
coin is x1 ⊕ x2. Thus, bit commitment implies secure coin-flipping, since the first player is
bound to his bit, but can still keep it hidden until the second player makes his move.
Secure implementations for coin-flipping have been proposed also by means of quantum
communication. For instance, solutions for a strong coin-flip with a potential, optimal coin
bias of approx. 0.2 and for the weaker notation with arbitrary small bias. Note that in the
quantum literature, “strong” or “weak” indicates weather the dishonest party cannot bias
the coin more than specified or the dishonest party can influence the coin entirely towards one
outcome but only by the specified bias towards the other value, respectively (see e.g. [Weh08]
for an overview). We want to stress that throughout this work, we use the (intuitive) literal
interpretation of a “weak” and “strong” coin, indicating its degrees of security.
We are interested in the standard coin-flipping protocol with classical messages exchange,
but where the adversary is assumed to be capable of quantum computing. Even when
basing the embedded commitment on a computational assumption that withstands quantum
attacks, the security proof of the entire coin-flipping and its integration into other applications
could previously not be naturally translated from the classical to the quantum world. We
will propose a solution based on Watrous’ quantum rewinding in Chapter 8. Certainly, the
desirable protocol would be constant round, meaning that a string of coins can be flipped in a
constant number of rounds, instead of having the number of rounds depending on the number
of coins. Towards this aim, we present a framework that transforms weaker demands on the
coins into very strong properties, with the final result of a fully simulatable coin-flipping
protocol, secure against poly-sized quantum adversaries, which can be implemented in the
plain model from scratch (see Chapter 9). On a side note, implementing constant round
coin-flipping is an open problem in the quantum setting. Interestingly, the first quantum
application, namely quantum key distribution (QKD), enables two parties to produce a secret
random bit-string (which is then used as a key in symmetric crypto-systems). However,
by assumption on its purpose, the QKD-setting does not have to hold against an internal
dishonest party. The requirements for secure coin-flipping are much stronger in this sense,
and it turns out that in a typically QKD-protocol, the key could theoretically always be
biased by one of the parties.
We conclude here by stressing the importance of truly random, fair coins for crypto-
graphic purposes. Namely, by producing a string of coins, the communicating parties can
interactively generate a common random string from scratch. The generation can then
be integrated into other (classical or quantum) cryptographic protocols that work In the
common-reference-string-model. This way, various interesting applications can be imple-
mented entirely in a simple manner without any set-up assumptions. We will discuss some
examples thereof in Chapter 10.
2.4.5 Zero-Knowledge
Informally, a zero-knowledge (ZK) proof system is “both convincing and yet yield nothing
beyond the validity of the assertion” [Gol10][p. 1]. Thus, only this one bit of knowledge
is communicated from prover to verifier. Such building blocks are typically used in outer
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cryptographic protocols for enforcing that potentially dishonest players behave according to
the protocol specification, namely, they are required to prove in zero-knowledge the correct-
ness of a secret-based action without leaking the secret. As examples, we want to mention
zero-knowledge proofs for Graph Isomorphism and Graph 3-Coloring, proven secure in the
classical and quantum setting by [GMW91] and [Wat09], respectively. For a survey about
zero-knowledge, we refer e.g. to [Gol01,Gol02,Gol10].
On a very intuitive level, such proof systems typically proceed in several rounds of a
protocol. In each round, the prover must answer a challenge from the verifier which he does
not know beforehand. In order to be able to answer all challenges in all rounds, the prover
must know whatever he claims. We differentiate between proofs and proofs of knowledge.
The respective definitions are given by two properties, which vary and are informally stated
below. Loosely speaking, the distinction between proofs and proofs of knowledge is drawn
in the content of the assertion: In a proof the prover claims the existence of an object. In
contrast, in a proof of knowledge, he claims knowledge of an object. We stress that a proof
of existence cannot be modeled via an ideal functionality in the natural way, whereas a proof
of knowledge can. The third property of zero-knowledge does not differ in both systems.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Informally, a zero-knowledge proof for set L on common
input x yields no other knowledge than the validity of membership x ∈ L, which holds if
the following three requirements are satisfied. First, if the statement is true, i.e. x ∈ L,
an honest verifier will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover, and thus accept the
proof (completeness). This holds with overwhelming probability. Second, if the statement
is false, i.e. x /∈ L, a dishonest prover cannot convince an honest verifier of the contrary,
except with low probability (soundness). And last, if the statement is true, a dishonest
verifier learns nothing beyond this fact (zero-knowledge). The latter is shown by formally
arguing that, given only the statement, a simulator can (by itself) produce a transcript that
is indistinguishable from a real interaction between honest prover and dishonest verifier. The
degree of indistinguishability then specifies the flavor of zero-knowledge. Note also that the
first two properties are general aspects of interactive proof systems. However, in this context,
they are defined in probabilistic terms, and we require the completeness and the soundness
error to be negligible, at least after sufficient (sequential) repetitions.
The notion of (interactive) zero-knowledge first appeared in [GMR85] by Goldwasser et
al. Then in [GMW86], it was shown that ZK proofs exist for any NP-language under the
assumption that commitments exist, which in turn is implied in the existence of one-way
functions [Nao91, HILL99].7 Blum et al. showed that the interaction between prover and
verifier in any ZK proof can be replaced by sharing a short common reference string available
to all parties from the start of the protocol [BFM88]. Note that a reference string is a
weaker requirement than interaction. The requirement for non-interactive zero-knowledge
is simpler than for general zero-knowledge, since all information is communicated mono-
directional from prover to verifier. The verifier does not influence the distribution in the
7As in standard literature, NP (non-deterministic polynomial time) refers to the set of all decision prob-
lems, where the ”yes”-instances can be recognized in polynomial time by a non-deterministic Turing machine.
The class P (deterministic polynomial time) contains all decision problems which can be solved by a deter-
ministic Turing machine in polynomial time. Note that every set in P has a trivial zero-knowledge proof in
which the verifier proves membership by himself.
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real world. Thus, in the ideal world, we require a simulator that only produces output that
is indistinguishable from the real distribution of the output. We will use such a generic
construction in Section 10.1, where we show a simple transformation from non-interactive
zero-knowledge to interactive zero-knowledge in the quantum world.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge. Intuitively, a zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge for relation R with common instance x and prover’s private witness w yields no other
knowledge to the verifier than the validity of (x,w) ∈ R. Especially, it holds that witness
w is not leaked. This is formulated by the following three requirements. First, if the prover
follows the protocol and knows w, such that (x,w) ∈ R, he will always convince the verifier.
Note that this holds with probability 1, or in other words, completeness is defined deter-
ministically rather than probabilistically. Second, if the (possibly dishonest) prover can with
whatever strategy convince the verifier to accept, then he knows w. This holds, except with
probability determined by the knowledge error, which again must be negligible in the length
of the challenge (special soundness). Note here that in the context of machines, we interpret
knowledge via behavior. In more detail, to define knowledge, we specify a knowledge extrac-
tor for which it holds that if the extractor can extract w from the prover, for instance, by
simulating two accepting conversations via rewinding, we say that the prover knows w. This
idea prevents the prover to output the knowledge itself, and therewith, the last requirement,
i.e. the property of zero-knowledge, capturing that a dishonest verifier learns (essentially)
nothing, remains unchanged from the description above.
The concept of proofs of knowledge was first introduced also in [GMR85] and formulated
in greater detail in [BG92]. We will propose a quantum-secure zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge based on simulatable witness encoding in Section 10.2.
Σ-protocols. A Σ-protocol is a special case of the above, in that it is an honest-verifier
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. Such a protocol is of three-move-form, starting with the
prover’s message aΣ, followed by the verifier’s challenge cΣ, and concluded with the prover’s
response zΣ. Its name originates from this form, as the “Σ” visualizes first the common
input x, and then the flow of communication (from top to bottom). The flavor of honest-
verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK), although weaker than general zero-knowledge, still allows
for useful building blocks, which would be impossible to implement with a stronger notion in
certain settings. As the name suggests, it captures a scenario in which, instead of covering
any feasible verifier strategy, the verifier behaves honest (or rather honest-but-curious), and
maintains and outputs a transcript of the entire interaction.
By its nature of being a proof of knowledge, special soundness holds for a Σ-protocol,
and therewith, that from two accepting conversations with different challenges a w can be
extracted such that (x,w) ∈ R. We will use an honest-verifier simulator as a black-box in
Sections 4.1.4 and 7.2 to receive, on input x, a valid conversation
(
aΣ, cΣ, zΣ
)
. Intuitively,
the purpose of using Σ-protocols then lies in the fact that only one valid conversation could
have been produced unequivocally without knowing the witness.
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2.4.6 Secure Secret Sharing
Secure secret sharing refers—as the name suggests—to a method for distributing one secret
in several shares amongst the players. The secret can only be reconstructed by combining
a sufficient number of shares (threshold), but any individual share or any number of shares
below the threshold does not contain any useful information on its own.
Classical secret sharing schemes were introduced independently in [Sha79] and [Bla79],
and quantum secret sharing was first proposed in [HBB99,CGL99]. Classical secret sharing
is an extremely powerful primitive and is widely used in multi-party computation. We will
use secret sharing as a building block for equipping our mixed commitments with trapdoor
openings (Section 7.3). This extended construction will then constitute one essential step in
bootstrapping fully simulatable coin-flipping from weak coin-flipping (Chapter 9).
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Quantum Tools
Quantum refers to a discrete unit of a physical quantity at the smallest scale, for which
quantum mechanics constitutes the underlying mathematical framework. For the main part
of this thesis, we will work with abstract mathematical objects, as our focus lies on theory,
as opposed to realizing, for instance, a qubit as an actual physical system such as a “light
quantum”, encoded by polarization of a photon.
In this chapter, we give an overview of the aspects of quantum mechanics, essential for
this work. The connection between the mathematical description and physical reality is best
reflected in the postulates of quantum mechanics, which are covered in Section 3.1. This
section is also intended to fix the terminology we will use later on. Next, we will describe
distance measures (Section 3.2) and uncertainty measures (Section 3.3). Then we will discuss
the concept of information reconciliation and privacy amplification (Section 3.4) as well as the
problems of rewinding in general quantum systems and the technique of quantum rewinding
(Section 3.5). Finally in Section 3.6, we will introduce the definitions of security, which
underlie all our following main results.
3.1 Postulates and Terminology
We now briefly introduce the field of quantum mechanics on the basis of its postulates, cap-
turing quantum-physical events and processes in mathematical formalisms. We will closely
follow the descriptions given in [NC00] and refer thereto for more details.
Description of an isolated system. A general d-dimensional quantum state, where
d ∈ N, is described mathematically by a positive semi-definite density matrix ρ defined in
the complex Hilbert space of dimension d, i.e., a complete inner product space denoted by
Hd. The standard notation to write a pure quantum state is represented in Dirac’s bra-ket
notation by a vector as |Ψ〉 ∈ Hd, and is given, for complex coefficients αi ∈ C, as
|Ψ〉 =
d−1∑
i=0
αi|i〉 . (3.1)
The orthonormal basis is denoted by the set {|0〉, . . . , |d− 1〉}, i.e. the linearly independent
spanning set of mutually orthogonal unit vectors. The form of a pure state as given in
Eq. (3.1) as linear combinations nicely reflects an interference phenomenon unique to the
quantum world, namely the superposition of basis states. Informally speaking, it highlights
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the fact that a quantum particle is in all possible basis states at once. And thus, a complete
description of such a particle must include the description of every possible state as well as
the probability of the particle being in that state, given by |αi|2 for each respective |i〉. By
the normalization condition, the total sum of probabilities, i.e.
∑
i |αi|2, equals 1.
A mixed quantum state is a statistical ensemble of pure states {λi, |i〉}, where again {|i〉}i
forms a basis, and can be represented as density matrix by
ρ =
∑
i
λi|i〉〈i| , (3.2)
with eigenvalues λi and eigenstates |i〉. Again, it holds that the system is in state |i〉 with
probability λi, where λi ≥ 0 and, by the normalization condition, we have
∑
i λi = 1.
More specifically, a qubit is a two-dimensional pure quantum state living in H2. The
computational basis (also called + -basis, standard basis, canonical basis, or rectilinear basis)
is defined by the pair {|0〉, |1〉}, where
|0〉 =
(
1
0
)
and |1〉 =
(
0
1
)
. (3.3)
The pair {|+〉, |−〉} denotes the diagonal basis (also named the ×-basis or Hadamard basis),
where
|+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2 and (3.4)
|−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2 . (3.5)
Another common denotation is {|0〉+, |1〉+} for the computational basis and {|0〉×, |1〉×}
for the diagonal basis. We use {+,×} as shorthand to refer to the set of these two most
commonly used conjugate bases.
Evolution in a closed system. The dynamics that apply in a closed systems as de-
scribed above are captured in the description of a unitary transform U. U is unitary, if it holds
that U†U = I. Unitary operations preserve inner products between vectors, which yields their
more intuitive expression in outer product representation as follows. Define |outi〉 = U|ini〉
to be the transformation from “input” basis {|ini〉}i into “output” basis {|outi〉}i. Then,
U =
∑
i
|outi〉〈ini| . (3.6)
From the requirement of unitarity, it is evident that such a transformation must be reversible.
That means that undoing operation U on |in〉 corresponds to applying its inverse U† on |out〉
and recreates |in〉.
For completeness we note that, although part of this postulate, we will not consider the
refined version of time evolution, defined by the Schro¨dinger equation.
In the more specific case of single qubits, the transformation from the computational
basis to the diagonal basis, and vice versa, is obtained by applying the Hadamard operation
H, where
H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
, (3.7)
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and note that H = H†. The two-dimensional Identity operator I is represented by matrix
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, (3.8)
other important operations are described by the Pauli matrices
σX =
(
0 1
1 0
)
and σZ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (3.9)
Operator σX describes a bit-flip. Matrix σZ defines a phase-flip operation, adding a phase
factor of -1 for non-zero entries, and otherwise leaving the bit invariant. For completeness,
we also explicitly state
σY =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, (3.10)
but note that σY = iσXσZ.
The controlled-NOT operation CNOT is a combination of I and σX and is defined for two
input qubits as
CNOT =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 . (3.11)
Thus, if the control qubit is 1, CNOT flips the target qubit. Otherwise, I is applied to the
target qubit. Or in other words, the value of the second output qubit corresponds to the
classical exclusive disjunction (XOR).
Quantum measurements. To extract information of a quantum system, it must be mea-
sured. The following descriptions of measurements illustrate the irreversible nature of quan-
tum measurements in general, and therewith, the disturbance caused by observation. In
other words, some information about a state before measurement is lost after measurement.
This fact stands in sharp contrast to the reversible transformations within a closed system
as described previously.
Quantum measurements are described by a collection of measurement operators M =
{Mm}m, where m denotes the measurement outcome. The probability Pr [m] to obtain out-
come m when measuring state |ψ〉 with M is given by
Pr [m] = 〈ψ|M†mMm|ψ〉 , (3.12)
with completeness equation
∑
m M
†
mMm = I, or equivalent,
∑
m 〈ψ|M†mMm|ψ〉 = 1. Condi-
tioned on having obtained m, the post-measurement state must be renormalized to
ρm =
Mm|ψ〉√
〈ψ|M†mMm|ψ〉
. (3.13)
We also want to stress that quantum measurements do not necessarily commute, that means
that different measurement orders may yield different measurement outcomes.
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If all operators Mm are orthogonal projectors, denoted by Pm = M
†
mMm, we call the mea-
surement projective and M =
∑
mmPm its observable. The respective probability and post-
measurement state are then given by
Pr [m] = 〈ψ|Pm|ψ〉 (3.14)
and
Pm|ψ〉√
Pr [m]
, (3.15)
Measuring in basis {|m〉}m means to apply a projective measurement defined by projectors
Pm = |m〉〈m|.
When only specifying mappings Em = M
†
mMm, we obtain an expression in the positive
operator-valued measure formalism (POVM), similar to Eq. (3.12), namely,
Pr [m] = tr(Emρ) , (3.16)
where E = {Em}m is the POVM, denoting the set of Hermitian operators such that
∑
m Em =
I and Em ≥ 0. This formalism is simpler than the general expressions in Eqs. (3.12)
and (3.13), but sufficient for many purposes, as it yields simple measurement statistics.
It also becomes evident here that for a complete description of measuring the observable of
a quantum system, the formulation of a quantum system must include uncertainty in that
the probability for all possible outcomes must be encoded in it.
Again more specifically, measuring a single qubit in the computational or diagonal basis
means applying the measurement described by projectors |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1| or projectors |+〉〈+|
and |−〉〈−|, respectively. We want to point out a very important consequence of using such
conjugate bases (also called mutually unbiased bases). Measuring a qubit, prepared in one
of two conjugate bases, is equivalent to distinguishing between two non-orthogonal quantum
states. Non-orthogonal states however cannot be distinguished (with arbitrary precision),
which can be derived from the above formalisms. Thus, any measurement must destroy
information and therewith disturb the system—except, of course, a measurement of a basis
state in its own basis. In other words, a state with fixed measurement outcome in one basis
implies maximal uncertainty about the measurement outcome in the other basis.
Composite systems. The joint state of a multipartite system inH⊗n2n is given by the tensor
product |Ψ〉1⊗· · ·⊗ |Ψ〉n. For simplicity, we consider a bipartite joint state ρAB ∈ HA⊗HB
shared between Alice and Bob, i.e.,
ρAB = |Ψ〉A|Ψ〉B =
∑
i
αi|i〉A
∑
j
βj |j〉B , (3.17)
with orthonormal bases {|i〉A}i forHA and {|j〉B}j forHB. The form of the state in Eq. (3.17)
indicates a product state, which is separable, since it can be decomposed into two definite
pure states.
For string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n, encoded in bases θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ {+,×}n, we
write |x〉θ = |x1〉θ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |xn〉θn . For S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size s, we define x|S ∈ {0, 1}s and
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θ|S ∈ {+,×}s to be the restrictions (xi)i∈S and (θi)i∈S , respectively. If all qubits are encoded
in the same basis θ ∈ [+,×], then |x〉θ = |x1 . . . xn〉θ.
In contrast to the product states of Eq. (3.17), we can also have pure composite systems
in some entangled states of the form
ρAB =
∑
i,j
γij |i〉A|j〉B (3.18)
with γij 6= αiβj . Entangled components mean that they can only be described with reference
to each other. Special cases thereof are the maximally entangled EPR-pairs (or Bell states):
|Φ〉00 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2 ,
|Φ〉11 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2 ,
|Φ〉01 = (|01〉+ |10〉)/
√
2 , and
|Φ〉10 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/
√
2 .
(3.19)
Important for cryptographic purposes are the following observations. First, as Eq. (3.18)
indicates, upon observing one of the two particles, entangled in one single state, the system
will collapse, and thus, the other particle will at least partially be determined—even though
the particles may be spatially separated. On a side note, the outcome of the first measurement
is random, and therewith the state, to which the composite system collapses into, is so as
well. Hence, information (i.e. a non-random message) cannot be transmitted faster than
the speed of light by shared entanglement. Second, entanglement is basis-independent, e.g.
|Φ〉00 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2 = (|++〉+ |−−〉)/√2 . And last, if an entangled state ρAB is pure,
then it cannot be entangled with any other state, for instance, one in Eve’s hands, so it
holds that ρABE = ρAB ⊗ ρE . Thus, under the assumption of it being pure, entanglement is
monogamic.
Subsystems of a composite system can be described by the reduced density operator com-
puted by the partial trace. Let ρAB =
(|a1〉〈a2| ⊗ |b1〉〈b2|) and assume that only subsystem
A is accessible. Then, we have
trB(ρAB) = 〈b2|b1〉 |a1〉〈a2| . (3.20)
Trivially, when tracing system B out of a product state, we have ρAB = trB(ρA⊗ ρB) = ρA.
However, the reduced density operator in an entangled EPR-pair is a complete mixture with
trace distance 1/2 (see next Section 3.2). Thus interestingly, the joint state of two entangled
qubits is pure and can be completely determined, yet its subsystems alone are completely
mixed.
3.2 Distance, Distinguishability, and Dependence
We will need various measures to determine the distance between classical and quantum
states. Distance measures possess an important operational meaning in the context of dis-
tinguishability between two systems.
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Distance. For classical information, the distance between two binary strings of equal
length can be measured by means of the Hamming distance dH , which is the number of
positions at which the strings differ, or more formally, for strings x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
dH(x, y) := |{i : xi 6= yi}| . (3.21)
We will also need the relative Hamming distance
rH(x, y) :=
dH(x, y)
n
. (3.22)
For completeness, we note that the Hamming weight wH is the Hamming distance to x from
the all-zero string (of same length), i.e. wH(x) := |{i : xi = 1}|.
In the classical world, the statistical or variational distance between two classical prob-
ability distributions P and Q over the same finite set X with events E ⊆ X is determined
by
δ
(
P,Q
)
:=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|P (x)−Q(x)| = max
E
|P (E)−Q(E)| . (3.23)
A measure of proximity is given by the fidelity
F
(
P,Q
)
:=
∑
x∈X
√
P (x)Q(x) . (3.24)
The classical notions of distance and fidelity can be generalized to the distance and
proximity of two quantum states ρ and σ. The quantum analogue to the classical distance
in Eq. (3.23) is the trace distance, given as
δ
(
ρ, σ
)
:=
1
2
tr
(|ρ− σ|) , (3.25)
where |A| =
√
A†A is the trace norm of any operator A. The notion of fidelity translates to
quantum fidelity by
F
(
ρ, σ
)
:= tr
√√
ρ σ
√
ρ . (3.26)
The relation between classical variational distance and quantum trace distance can be made
more explicit by
δ
(
ρ, σ
)
= max
E
δ
(E(ρ), E(σ)) , (3.27)
where the maximum is taken over all POVMs E , and ρ, σ indicate the probability distributions
obtained when measuring ρ or σ using E . Moreover, it is worth pinpointing that, for mixtures
of pure quantum states ρ =
∑
i λi|i〉〈i| and σ =
∑
i γi|i〉〈i| with same orthonormal basis {|i〉}i
but potentially different eigenstates λi and γi, the quantum measure naturally reduces to
the classical one between the eigenvalue distributions λ = {λi}i and γ = {γi}i by
δ(ρ, σ) =
1
2
tr |ρ− σ| = 1
2
∣∣∣∑
i
(λi − γi)|i〉〈i|
∣∣∣ = 1
2
∑
i
|λi − γi| = δ(λ, γ) . (3.28)
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A similar reduction can be obtained for the fidelity.
Trace distance and quantum fidelity are, in general, equivalent concepts—but with partly
different characteristics and properties, so we will use one or the other, depending on the
respective context (see [FvdG99] or [NC00] for a more detailed discussion). However, they
are closely related in that we have
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ δ(ρ, σ) ≤√1− F (ρ, σ)2 . (3.29)
For pure states ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and σ = |φ〉〈φ|, expressions (3.25) and (3.26) simplify to
δ
(
ρ, σ
)
=
√
1− |〈ψ|φ〉|2 and F (δ, σ) = |〈ψ|φ〉| , (3.30)
where the latter can be seen as transition probability. Furthermore, the fidelity measure for
a pure state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| and an arbitrary quantum state σ is given by
F
(
ρ, σ
)
=
√
〈ψ|σ|ψ〉 , (3.31)
and shows that the square root of the overlap between the states determines the fidelity.
Distinguishability. The importance of both quantum measures is due to their opera-
tional meaning of distinguishability. The fidelity can be seen as an “upside down” trace
distance in that the limits 0 and 1 in 0 ≤ F (ρ, σ) ≤ 1 meaning perfectly distinguishable
and perfectly indistinguishable, respectively. In contrast, the trace distance 0 ≤ δ(ρ, σ) ≤ 1
increases for decreasing indistinguishability, such that we get δ
(
ρ, σ
)
= 0 for ρ = σ and
δ
(
ρ, σ
)
= 1 for ρ orthogonal to σ.
Coming back to Eq. (3.27) in this context, it is worth noting that the POVM E that
achieves the maximum is the optimal POVM for distinguishing ρ and σ. Furthermore,
we want to single out two important properties by means of the trace distance. First, we
have unitary invariance with δ
(
ρ, σ
)
= δ
(
UρU†, UσU†
)
, meaning that the distance between
the states does not change when a unitary operation U is applied to both of them. And
second, any trace-preserving quantum operation T is contractive (monotonicity under quan-
tum operations) with δ
(
T(ρ), T(σ)
) ≤ δ(ρ, σ). Informally, no physical process can achieve
an increased distance, or in other words, no modification on the states can help to bet-
ter distinguish two states. An important special case relating the partial trace shows that
δ
(
trB(ρAB), trB(σAB)
) ≤ δ(ρAB, σAB), which again informally states that two systems are
at least as hard to distinguish when only a part of them is accessible.
Two families of probability distributions {Pn}n∈N and {Qn}n∈N are called perfectly in-
distinguishable, denoted by P
p≈ Q, if their output distributions on each input are identical,
namely Pn = Qn for all n ∈ N. In other words, an unbounded adversary cannot distinguish
the outcomes, which holds with probability 1. Relaxing this condition defines statistical indis-
tinguishability (P
s≈ Q), which holds if the statistical distance δ(Pn, Qn) is negligible (in the
length of the input). This covers the setting, in which an unbounded adversary cannot dis-
tinguish the outcomes, except with negligible probability. For δ
(
Pn, Qn
) ≤ ε, and therewith,
indistinguishability except with probability ε, we also call the distributions ε-close. Thus,
perfect and statistical indistinguishability are defined in the information-theoretic sense and
we call the resulting security flavor unconditional.
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In the computational setting, we require that the two distributions cannot be distin-
guished by any computationally efficient procedure. More formally, let
Pr [A(P (x)) = 1 |x ← P ] denote the probability that an algorithm A is successful in that
it outputs “P”, if the input x comes from P , and analogue for Q. To claim computational
indistinguishability between P and Q, denoted by P
c≈ Q, for any probabilistic poly-time
algorithm A, it must hold that the (distinguishing) advantage adv, i.e.,
adv(A) = | Pr [A(Pn) = 1]− Pr [A(Qn) = 1] | ,
is negligible in the length of the input. Quantum-computational indistinguishability (P
q≈ Q)
is defined similarly for the case of a quantum algorithm A. In other words, (quantum)
computational security holds with overwhelming probability against a poly-time (quantum)
adversary.
Consider a quantum algorithm consisting of a uniform family {Cn}n∈N of quantum cir-
cuits, which is said to run in polynomial time, if the number of gates of Cn is polynomial
in n. Then, two families of quantum states {ρn}n∈N and {σn}n∈N are called perfectly indis-
tinguishable with ρ
p≈ σ, if δ(ρn, σn) = 0 in the case of unrestricted running time. We have
statistical indistinguishability with ρ
s≈ σ, if δ(ρn, σn) ≤ ε, for ε negligible in n, and without
any restriction on the running time. Again, for δ(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, we call the quantum states
ε-close—or indistinguishable, except with probability ε. Then, to prove sufficient closeness
between an ideal system and the real state, we require ε to be negligible (in the security
parameter). Last, we have quantum-computationally indistinguishable, denoted by ρ
q≈ σ,
if any polynomial-time quantum algorithm has negligible advantage ε of distinguishing ρn
from σn.
Dependence. We will often use upper case letters for random variables (for proofs) that
describe respective values (in the actual protocol). Let PX denote the probability distribution
of a classical random variable X ∈ X over finite set X .
Let
ρX =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| (3.32)
denote the quantum representation of the classical random variable X. Let ρxE denote a state
in register E, depending on value x ∈ X of random variable X over X with distribution PX .
Then, from the view of an observer, who holds register E but does not know X, the system
is in state
ρE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)ρ
x
E , (3.33)
where ρE depends on X in the sense that E is in state ρ
x
E exactly iff X = x.
Independence in a bipartite joint state with classical and quantum parts can be expressed
as
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE . (3.34)
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Such a state is formally called a cq-state. Note that naturally, ρE = trX(ρXE) =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E ,
and that the notation can be extended to states depending on more classical variables, i.e.
ccq-states, cccq-states etc. Full independence of classical and quantum parts within one state
is given iff ρxE = ρE for any x and therewith ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE . This means in particular that
no information on X is gained by observing only ρE . However, full independence is often
too strong a requirement. For our purposes, it suffices that the real state is close to the ideal
situation.
Last in this context, we want to express that a random variable X is independent of
a quantum state ρE when given a random variable Y . Independence in this case means
that, when given Y , the state E gives no additional information on X. Yet another way to
understand conditional independence is that E is obtained from X and Y by solely processing
Y . Formally, adopting the notion introduced in [DFSS07], we require that ρXY E equals
ρX↔Y↔E , where the latter is defined as
ρX↔Y↔E :=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)|x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉〈y| ⊗ ρyE , (3.35)
where ρyE =
∑
x PX|Y (x|y)ρx,yE . In other words, ρXY E = ρX↔Y↔E precisely if ρx,yE = ρyE for
all x and y.
3.3 Entropies
Entropies are useful measures of “information, choice and uncertainty”. We will give a brief
recap here, only covering the concepts most important in the context of this work. For a
general introduction we refer to e.g. [NC00,Ren05,Sch07] for more details and proofs.
The Shannon entropy [Sha48]
H(X) := − log
(∑
x
PX(x)
)
= −
∑
x
px log px (3.36)
applies to a classical probability distribution PX over X with probabilities px, and as such
quantifies the information gain on average after learning X, or complementary, the average
uncertainty before learning X.1 The binary version thereof, namely the binary entropy
function, is defined for the case of two possibilities as
h(µ) := −(µ log(µ) + (1− µ) log (1− µ)) (3.37)
with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 12 . We will use that, given the ball of all n-bit strings at Hamming distance at
most µn from x, denoted as Bµn(x), we have that |Bµn(x)| ≤ 2h(µ)n.
For a cryptographic scenario with not necessarily independent repetitions, its generaliza-
tion is given by the Re´nyi entropy [Re´n61] of order α as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log
(∑
x∈X
PX(x)
α
)
(3.38)
1Note that the logarithmic base is 2 for a result in bits.
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for α ≥ 0. Note that the Shannon entropy is the special case for limit α→ 1.
The joint entropy of a pair of random variables (X0, X1) measures the total uncertainty
about the pair and is naturally defined as
H(X0X1) = − log
(∑
x0,x1
PX0X1(x0, x1)
)
. (3.39)
Assume now that X1 is learned, and therewith, H(X1) bits of information about (X0, X1).
Then, the remaining uncertainty of X0, conditioned on knowing X1, is given by the condi-
tional entropy
H(X0|X1) := H(X0X1)−H(X1) . (3.40)
Re´nyi entropies can also be defined for the quantum world, i.e., where a density matrix
ρ replaces the probability distribution, and we have
Hα(ρ) :=
1
1− α log
(
tr(ρα)
)
, (3.41)
for α ∈ [0,∞]. The von Neumann entropy is then given by
H(ρ) := − tr(ρ log ρ) , (3.42)
which corresponds to the Shannon entropy when measuring quantum state ρX in basis
{|x〉〈x|}, or in other words H(ρ) = −∑x λx log λx, where λx are the eigenvalues of ρX .
Thus, it naturally holds that Hα(ρX) = Hα(X), whenever classical variable X is encoded in
quantum state ρX .
A special entropy measure is obtained when taking the limit α → ∞, namely the min-
entropy . The notion of min-entropy is used in the context of randomness extraction and
privacy amplification in the presence of a dishonest receiver or an eavesdropper on the trans-
mission (see Section 3.4). Intuitively, the (classical) min-entropy is determined by the highest
peak in a distribution, and therewith, describes the maximum amount of potentially leaked
information, which in turn formalizes security for cryptographic applications in the worst
case. In other words, the min-entropy measures the probability of an adversary’s best guess
about an unknown value.
Definition 3.1 (Min-Entropy) Let X be a random variable over alphabet X with proba-
bility distribution PX . The min-entropy of X is defined as
H∞(X) = − log
(
max
x
PX(x)
)
.
Another important special case is the max-entropy with values for α approaching zero.
Its definition captures a Re´nyi entropy, in which all possible events are considered equally,
regardless of their probabilities. Its operational meaning lies in information reconciliation
(see also Section 3.4).
Definition 3.2 (Max-Entropy) The max-entropy of a density matrix ρ is defined as
H0(ρ) = log
(
rank(ρ)
)
.
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For completeness, we note that another notion of Re´nyi entropies with a (non-negative)
smoothing parameter  was introduced in [Ren05, RW05]. Intuitively, it holds that for two
random variables X0 and X1 with almost the same probability distribution (e.g. X0 = X1
with high probability), the difference between Hα(X0) and H

α(X1) is small. However, in
this work we will only use the “un-smoothed” Re´nyi entropies as discussed above.
Last, we conclude with the following lemma, which we will need in the context of oblivious
transfer. Informally, it states that if the joint entropy of two random variables X0 and X1 is
large, then at least one of them has half of the original entropy—in a randomized sense.
Lemma 3.1 (Min-Entropy-Splitting Lemma [Wul07,DFR+07]) Let X0, X1 be ran-
dom variables with H∞(X0X1) ≥ α. Then, there exists a binary random variable K ∈ {0, 1}
such that H∞(X1−KK) ≥ α/2.
3.4 Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification
Errors and eavesdropping affect the communication in our quantum protocols such that
the honest parties might end up with bit-strings of measurement outcomes that differ or
have leaked in some positions. Countermeasures were proposed already in the first practical
implementation of QKD [BBB+92]. The honest parties first reconcile their shared data by
public discussion to obtain consistent strings. Note that this process has to be accomplished
without revealing more information than absolutely necessary to an adversary eavesdropping
on the public (classical) channel. The simplest procedure involves a test on a subset of all
shared (qu)bits to compute the error rate, i.e., the relative number of all positions with
different outcomes. In that case, these publicly announced bits must later be discarded,
which in turn means that more qubits have to be sent at the beginning of the protocol.
According to the error rate in the testset, error correction must be applied to the untested
remaining set. Since the transmission of qubits is very efficient in practice and good error
correction techniques are known, we will use this simple technique in our quantum protocols.
After successful reconciliation, the honest parties are in possession of identical bit-strings.
To turn these strings into completely secure ones, privacy amplification [BBR88] can be
applied, which intuitively distills a shorter but (essentially) private shared string. More
concretely, privacy amplification employs two-universal hashing (see Definition 3.3) to trans-
form a partially secret string into a highly secure “hashed down” string, about which any
adversary only has negligible information and which looks essentially random to him. Note
that two-universal hashing also works against quantum adversaries, i.e., in the case when
the attacker holds quantum information about the initial string [KMR05, RK05, Ren05]. In
fact, it is essentially the only efficient way to perform privacy amplification against quantum
adversaries.
Definition 3.3 (Two-Universal Hashing) A class F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` of hashing func-
tions is called two-universal, if for any pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with x 6= y, and F uniformly
chosen from F , it holds that
Pr [F (x) = F (y)] ≤ 1
2`
.
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In the slightly stronger notion of strongly two-universal hash-functions, we require the random
variables F (x) and F (y) to be independent and uniformly distributed over {0, 1}`.
Let classical X be correlated with classical part U and quantum part E, i.e., ρXUE =∑
x∈{0,1}n PX(x)ρ
x
UE . Let F be a hash-function chosen uniformly from F . After applying F
to X, we obtain the cccq-state ρF (X)FUE of form
ρF (X)FUE =
∑
f∈F
∑
z∈{0,1}`
|z〉〈z| ⊗ |f〉〈f | ⊗
∑
x∈f−1(z)
PX(x)ρ
x
UE . (3.43)
The basic theorem for privacy amplification in the quantum world was introduced in [RK05]
and [Ren05], and confined in [Sch07]. Here, we give the version from [Sch07, Corollary 2.25]
but in its un-smoothed form and tailored to our context.
Theorem 3.1 (Privacy Amplification) Let ρXUE be a ccq-state with classical X dis-
tributed over {0, 1}n, classical U in the finite domain U , and quantum state ρE. U and ρE
may depend on X. Let F be the random and independent choice of a member of a universal-2
class of hash-functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`. Then,
δ
(
ρF (X)FUE ,
1
2`
1⊗ ρFUE
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(
H∞(X|U)−H0(ρE)−`
)
.
Note that if the rightmost term of the theorem is negligible, then we are in a situation where
F (X) is essentially uniform and independent of F and E.
3.5 Rewinding
We require for classical schemes in the quantum world that quantum computation does not
jeopardize the underlying mathematical assumption that guarantees the security. But we
encounter even more setbacks in the context of actually proving a cryptographic protocol
secure in a quantum environment, which in the realm of this work are mostly due to the
strong restrictions on general rewinding—a common proof technique for showing the security
of different protocols in the computational setting.
3.5.1 Problems with General Rewinding
Recall that in the context of simulation-based security, we prove security against a cheating
player by showing that a run of a protocol between him and the honest player can be efficiently
simulated without interacting with the honest player but with a simulator instead. Basically,
such a simulator prepares a valid conversation and tries it on the dishonest party. In case this
party does not send the expected replies, a classical simulator rewinds the machine of the
corrupted player to an earlier status and repeats the simulation. Note that if the dishonest
party sends an invalid reply, the simulation is aborted. To conclude the proof, we then show
that the running time of the simulation as well as the distribution of the conversation are
according to expectations.
Such a technique, however, is impossible to justify in the quantum world. Generally
speaking, the simulator had to partially measure the quantum system without copying it
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beforehand to obtain the protocol transcript. But then it would become impossible to recon-
struct all information necessary for correct rewinding. The problem of rewinding in general
quantum systems was originally observed in [Gra97], detailed discussions can also be found
e.g. in [DFS04,Wat09]. In the context of this work, there are two relevant rewinding settings.
The first setting applies to simulations intended to collect several transcripts of conversa-
tions. An example thereof is the classical simulation for protocols with embedded computa-
tionally binding commitments. Recall that computational binding means that if a dishonest
party can open a commitment to two different values, then the computational assumption
does not hold. In a classical simulation, the simulator simulates a run of the outer protocol
with the committer, such that the latter outputs a valid commitment and later provides a
correct opening. Now, the simulator has the possibility to rewind the player to a point after
the commitment was sent and repeat the simulation, which can be adapted to the simulator’s
knowledge of the committed value. The event of obtaining a different opening for the same
commitment in this second run implies the inversion of the underlying one-way function,
which is assumed to be infeasible. In such a simulation, the simulator must store the previ-
ous transcript before rewinding. Another example of this setting occurs when proving special
soundness in a proof of knowledge. There, a classical simulator simulates a run of a protocol
against a dishonest prover. It then keeps a transcript of the simulation and rewinds him.
From two accepting conversations, the simulator can extract the prover’s witness. Again,
the simulator must store transcripts of the communication before rewinding.
The second setting requires the simulator to rewind the dishonest player to the beginning
of a protocol, if the reply from the dishonest party does not match the prepared outcome of
the protocol such that both sides conclude on the ideal values as their result. This setting
applies, for instance, when proving an outer protocol with an embedded computationally hid-
ing commitment secure. Fortunately, if such a simulation complies with a restricted setting,
the newly introduced quantum rewinding lemmas of [Wat09] can be applied. Therewith,
rewinding is possible in a restricted quantum setting. We will discuss this technique in more
detail in the following section, but in short, it requires a one bit reply from the dishonest
party (e.g. a bit reply to a previous bit commitment), the simulation circuit must be unitary,
and in case of rewinding, we do not intend to keep intermediate transcripts nor collect all
possible results (see Section 3.5.2). Unfortunately, we do not know how to translate this
technique to a multi-bit reply, while keeping the running time of the simulator polynomially
bounded. In that case, the classical simulation would again reduce to the first setting above,
in which the simulator must store previous transcripts, namely a previous message from the
dishonest party that commits him to his multi-bit reply beforehand.
3.5.2 Quantum Rewinding
Recall that we consider the second setting of the previous section. In a classical simulation
against dishonest Bob, a poly-time simulator guesses, for instance, a valid reply b′ of dishonest
Bob and prepares the protocol transcript according to it. When the simulator finally receives
Bob’s actual reply b, it checks if the values coincide (b = b′), i.e., if its guess was correct and
therewith, if the simulation was successful. If that is not the case, the simulator rewinds
Bob and repeats the simulation until b = b′. No previous information has to be stored nor
collected.
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Recently, Watrous proposed a quantum analogue of such a simulator with the potential
of rewinding, and proved therefore, that quantum zero-knowledge is possible in an unre-
stricted model. We will sketch the most important aspects of his construction here but refer
to [Wat09] for further details and proofs. More specifically, Watrous proved how to con-
struct a quantum zero-knowledge proof system for Graph Isomorphism and introduced two
so-called quantum rewinding lemmas; one for an exact setting and one that holds for slightly
weaker assumptions and therewith covers a scenario with perturbations. The investigated
protocol proceeds as a Σ-protocol, i.e., a protocol in three-move form, where the verifier flips
a single coin in the second step and sends this challenge to the prover. Thus, the setting
applies to the case where the reply b from above is a single bit. This will also be the case
for our simulation in Chapter 8, and therefore, we can use Watrous’ result in a black-box
manner. Unfortunately, we do not know how to translate his technique to a multi-bit reply,
while keeping the running time of the simulator polynomially bounded.
The quantum rewinding procedure is implemented by a general quantum circuit R, which
receives Bob’s input registers
(
W,X
)
, where W contains any n-qubit auxiliary input |ψ〉 and
X is a working register, initialized to the all-zero state of size k. As a first step, R applies a
unitary quantum circuit Q to all registers to simulate the conversations, obtaining as output
a multi-qubit register Y and a single-qubit register G. Register G contains the outcome of
the CNOT-operation on the dishonest party’s bit b (as control) and the simulator’s guess b′.
Thus, by measuring this register in the computational basis, the simulator can determine
whether the simulation was successful.
In more detail, the transformation from
(
W,X
)
to
(
G, Y
)
by applying Q can be written
as
Q|ψ〉W
∣∣∣0k〉
X
=
√
p|0〉G|φgood(ψ)〉Y +
√
1− p|1〉G|φbad(ψ)〉Y ,
where 0 < p < 1 and |φgood(ψ)〉 denotes the state, we want the system to be in for a successful
simulation. The qubit in register G is then measured with respect to the standard basis,
which indicates success or failure of the simulation. A successful execution (where b = b′)
results in outcome 0 with probability p. In that case, R outputs Y . A measurement outcome
1 indicates b 6= b′, and hence, implies an unsuccessful simulation. In that case, R quantumly
rewinds the system by applying the reverse circuit Q†, and then a phase-flip transformation
(on register X) before another iteration of Q is applied, i.e.,
Q
(
2
(
I⊗
∣∣∣0k〉〈0k∣∣∣)− I)Q†|1〉G|φbad(ψ)〉Y
= 2
√
p(1− p)|0〉G|φgood(ψ)〉Y + (1− 2p)|1〉G|φbad(ψ)〉Y .
Thus, after this rewinding, the amplitudes of the “good” and the “bad” states are increased
and decreased, respectively. Thus, a measurement of register G in the computational basis
will result in outcome 0 with higher probability 4p(1 − p). Note that for the special case
where p equals 1/2 and is independent of |ψ〉, the simulation terminates after at most one
rewinding.
Watrous’ ideal quantum rewinding lemma (without perturbations) then states the follow-
ing: Under the condition that the probability p of a successful simulation is non-negligible
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and independent of any auxiliary input, R is poly-time and its output ρ(ψ) has square-fidelity
close to 1 with state |φgood(ψ)〉 of a successful simulation, i.e.,
〈φgood(ψ)|ρ(ψ)|φgood(ψ)〉 ≥ 1− ε ,
with error bound ε > 0.
However, we cannot apply the exact version of Watrous’ rewinding lemma in our simula-
tion in Chapter 8, since we simulate against a dishonest party with an underlying commitment
that only provides quantum-computational hiding against this party. Therefore, we can only
claim that the party’s input is close to independent from the probability p. In other words,
we must allow for small perturbations in the quantum rewinding procedure and the slightly
weaker notion of Watrous’ quantum rewinding lemma, as stated below, applies.
Lemma 3.2 (Quantum Rewinding Lemma with small perturbations [Wat09]) Let
Q be the unitary (n, k)-quantum circuit and let R be the general quantum circuit describing
the quantum rewinding procedure. Let p0, q ∈ (0, 1) and ε ∈ (0, 12) be real numbers such that
1. |p− q| < ε
2. p0(1− p0) ≤ q(1− q), and
3. p0 ≤ p
for all n-qubit states |ψ〉. Then there exists R of size
O
(
log(1/ε)size(Q)
p0(1− p0)
)
such that, for every n-qubit state |ψ〉, the output ρ(ψ) of R satisfies
〈φgood(ψ)|ρ(ψ)|φgood(ψ)〉 ≥ 1− ε′
where ε′ = 16ε log
2(1/ε)
p20(1−p0)2
.
Intuitively, Requirement (1.) allows for small perturbation between the actual probability
p and the ideal probability q. Thus, ε can be understood as the advantage of the dishonest
party. It follows that if ε is negligible, we can argue that p is close to q and therefore,
close to independent of the auxiliary input. Probability p0 in Requirement (3.) denotes the
lower bound on the actual probability, for which the procedure guarantees correctness and
terminates in poly-time. Instead of using p in circuit R, we use p0. Furthermore, Q is
replaced by U with U = V Q. Lemma 3.2 reflects these replacements. On a very intuitive
level, the general input state |ψ〉 is analyzed in more detail, i.e. |ψ〉 = ∑2ni=1 αi|ψi〉 leading to
|φgood(ψ)〉 =
2n∑
i=1
αi
√
p(ψi)
p(ψ)
|φgood(ψi)〉 ,
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and similar for |φbad(ψ)〉. This more detailed description allows that in any position, the
probability is only near-independent of the input. The slight variations must then be ad-
dressed by an operator V , such that U = V Q is close to Q but satisfies the exact case of
rewinding. In other words, applying U on the perturbed input state gives the ideal outcome
U |ψ〉W
∣∣∣0k〉
X
=
√
q|0〉G|δgood(ψ)〉Y +
√
1− q|1〉G|δbad(ψ)〉Y .
Transformation V can therewith be understood as a correction. The bound in Require-
ment (2.) follows from proof details which will not be addressed here. Finally, note that the
bounds are not necessarily tight. Important for our proof is, however, that all operations can
be performed by polynomial-size circuits, and thus, the simulator has polynomial size (in
the worst case). Furthermore, for negligible ε, it follows that the “closeness” of output ρ(ψ)
with good state |φgood(ψ)〉 is slightly reduced, but quantum rewinding remains possible and
the output ρ(ψ) of R has still square-fidelity close to 1 with state |φgood(ψ)〉 of a successful
simulation.
3.6 Definition of Security
We will now define security for our two-party protocols, along the lines informally described
in Section 2.2. To this end, we will work in the framework put forward by Fehr and Schaffner
in [FS09]. There, they propose general definitions for correctness and security for any quan-
tum protocol that implements a classical non-reactive two-party functionality, meaning that
in- and output must be classical. We stress that the framework also allows functionalities
which behave differently in case of a dishonest player. They then show that such a quantum
protocol, complying with the framework, composes sequentially in a classical environment,
or in other words, within an outer classical protocol. Their security definitions are phrased
in simple information-theoretic conditions, depending on the functionality, which implies
strong simulation-based security. For the sake of simplicity, the framework does not assume
additional entities such as e.g. an environment, without of course compromising correctness
in the given setting.
Throughout this work, we are interested in quantum and classical protocols that im-
plement classical functionalities. As already mentioned, such primitives are often used as
building blocks in more complicated classical (multi-party) protocols which implement more
advanced tasks. Therefore, it can be justified in Part II to restrict the focus to such quantum
protocols that run in a classical environment and have classical in- and outputs. Furthermore,
although the framework was originally proposed for quantum protocols that compose in a
classical environment, we adapt it here for classical protocols against quantum attacks, com-
posing equally well when imposing the suggesting restriction regarding the in- and outputs.
Thus, we will use it also in Part III for defining security of our classical protocols.
Although various other security and composition frameworks have been proposed (such
as [BM04,Unr04,Unr10,WW08]), we consider the security level achieved in this framework
as a reasonable balance between weak demands and yet meaningful security. Furthermore,
its structure is as simple and clear as possible and compliance with the definitions gives us
sequential composition. Towards a general composition, we must, of course, extend the basic
protocols as shown in Sections 5.5 and 8.3.
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We will now introduce the framework more formally for a general functionality. We will
use information-theoretic definitions in our notions of unconditional security as investigated
in [FS09]. In addition, we will also show that computational security can be defined similarly,
although with some modifications.
3.6.1 Correctness
A protocol Π consists of an infinite family of interactive quantum circuits for players Alice
and Bob, indexed by the security parameter. For instance, in our quantum protocols this
security parameter m corresponds to the number of qubits transmitted in the first phase.
However, to ease notation, we often leave the dependence on the security parameter implicit.
Since we assume the common input state ρUV to be classical, i.e.,
ρUV =
∑
u,v
PUV (u, v)|u〉〈u| ⊗ |v〉〈v| ,
for some probability distribution PUV , we understand U, V as random input variables. The
same holds for the classical output state ρXY with output X,Y . The input-output behavior
of the protocol is uniquely determined by PXY |UV , and we write Π(U, V ) = (X,Y ). Then,
a classical non-reactive two-party ideal functionality F is given by a conditional probability
distribution PF(U,V )|UV with F(U, V ) denoting the ideal-world execution, where the players
forward their inputs U, V to F and output whatever they obtain from F . The definition of
correctness of a protocol is now straightforward.
Definition 3.4 (Correctness) A protocol Π(U, V ) = (X,Y ) correctly implements an ideal
classical functionality F , if for every distribution of the input values U and V , the resulting
common output satisfies
(U, V,X, Y )
s≈ (U, V,F(U, V )) .
3.6.2 Information-Theoretic Security
We define information-theoretic security based on [FS09, Proposition 4.3]. Note that in the
following, we simplify the joint output representation (compared to [FS09]) in that we denote
the output in the real world by outΠA,B (which is equivalent to ΠA,BρUV ), and the output in
the ideal world by outF
Aˆ,Bˆ
(equivalent to (FAˆ,Bˆ)ρUV ).
Recall that U denotes honest Alice’s classical input, and let Z and V ′ denote dishonest
Bob’s classical and quantum information. Then, any input state ρUZV ′ is restricted to be of
form
ρU↔Z↔V ′ =
∑
u,z
PUZ(u, z)|u〉〈u| ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzV ′ ,
where it holds here that ρzV ′ = ρ
u,z
V ′ . This implies that Bob’s quantum part V
′ is correlated
with Alice’s part only via his classical Z.
Definition 3.5 (Unconditional security against dishonest Bob) A protocol Π imple-
ments an ideal classical functionality F unconditionally securely against dishonest Bob, if for
any real-world adversary B′, there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ such that, for any input
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Figure 3.1: Real World vs. Ideal World [Sch10].
state with ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′, it holds that the outputs in the real and the ideal world are
statistically indistinguishable, i.e.,
outΠA,B′
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′ .
For completeness, we state these output states explicitly, i.e.,
outΠA,B′ = ρUXZY ′ and out
F
Aˆ,Bˆ′ = ρUX↔Z↔Y ′ ,
which shows that Bob’s possibilities in the ideal world are limited. He can produce some
classical input V for F from his quantum input state V ′, and then he can obtain a quantum
state Y ′ by locally processing V and possibly F ’s classical reply Y . This description is also
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Analogously, we can define unconditional security for honest Bob against dishonest Alice.
In this case, we assume a classical Z and a quantum state U ′ as dishonest Alice’s input and
a classical input V of honest Bob.
Definition 3.6 (Unconditional security against dishonest Alice) A protocol Π im-
plements an ideal classical functionality F unconditionally securely against dishonest Alice,
if for any real-world adversary A′, there exists an ideal-world adversary Aˆ′ such that, for any
input state with ρU ′ZV = ρU ′↔Z↔V , it holds that the outputs in the real and the ideal world
are statistically indistinguishable, i.e.,
outΠA′,B
s≈ outF
Aˆ′,Bˆ .
Note that in the definitions above, we do not require the running time of ideal-world
adversaries to be polynomial whenever the real-life adversaries run in polynomial time. This
way of defining unconditional security can lead to the (unwanted) effect that unconditional
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security does not necessarily imply computational security. However, as mentioned before,
by extending our basic constructions we can achieve efficient ideal-life adversaries.
Intuitively, the composition theorem below states that if quantum protocols pi1 · · ·pi`
securely implement ideal functionalities F1 · · · F`, then a protocol Σpi1···pi` is essentially as
secure as a classical hybrid protocol ΣF1···F` with sequential calls to F1 · · · F`. Note that
for the hybrid protocol to be classical, we mean that it has classical in- and output (for
the honest players), but also that all communication between the parties is classical.2 The
above facts imply that such protocols compose sequentially. Below, we state (a simplified
variant of) the theorem in [FS09]. We omit its proof here but note that it proceeds along
similar lines as the proof of Theorem 3.3, translating sequential composition to the case of
computational security.
Theorem 3.2 (Composition Theorem I [FS09]) Let ΣF1···F` be a classical hybrid pro-
tocol which makes at most k calls to F1 · · · F`, and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, let protocol pii be
an ε-secure implementation of Fi against A and B. Then the output of Σpi1···pi` is at distance
at most O(kε) to the output produced by ΣF1···F`.
We want to explicitly state here that if the hybrid protocol is secure, then so is the real-
life protocol, and as such it could itself be use as a sub-protocol in yet another classical outer
protocol.
Corollary 3.1 If ΣF1···F` is a δ-secure implementation of G against A and B, and if pii is
an ε-secure implementation of Fi against A and B for every i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, then Σpi1···pi` is a
O(δ + ε)-secure implementation of G.
3.6.3 Computational Security
One can define security against a computationally bounded dishonest Bob in the CRS-model
analogously to information-theoretic security, with the two differences that the input given to
the parties has to be sampled by an efficient quantum algorithm and that the output states
of Definition 3.5 should be computationally indistinguishable. Recall that in the CRS-model,
all participants in the real world have access to a classical public common reference string ω,
which is chosen before any interaction starts, according to a distribution only depending on
the security parameter. On the other hand, the participants in the ideal-world execution
FAˆ,Bˆ, interacting only with the ideal functionality, do not make use of string ω. Hence,
an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ that operates by simulating a real-world adversary B′ is free to
choose ω in any way he wishes.
In order to define computational security against a dishonest Bob in the CRS-model, we
consider a polynomial-size quantum circuit, called input sampler, which takes as input the
security parameter and the common reference string ω (chosen according to its distribution)
and which produces the input state ρUZV ′ . Again, U , Z, and V
′ denote Alice’s classical, Bob’s
2We want to stress that a hybrid protocol is a protocol that makes sequential calls to ideal functionalities.
This term should not be confused with the notion of hybrid security in Chapter 5, which refers to quantum
protocols providing twofold security in case of an adversary who is either bounded in quantum storage or
bounded in quantum-computational power.
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classical, and Bob’s quantum information, respectively, and we require from the input sampler
that ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′ . In the following, we let Bpoly be the family of all polynomial-time
strategies for dishonest Bob.
Definition 3.7 (Computational security against dishonest Bob) A protocol Π im-
plements an ideal classical functionality F computationally securely against dishonest Bob,
if for any real-world adversary B′ ∈ Bpoly, who has access to the common reference string
ω, there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly, not using ω, such that, for any efficient
input sampler as described above, it holds that the outputs in the real and the ideal world are
quantum-computationally indistinguishable, i.e.,
outΠA,B′
q≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′ .
Protocols fulfilling the definition above provide sequential composition in a naturally
weaker but otherwise similar notion as unconditionally secure protocols. We can therefore
adapt the original composition theorem to the case of computational security. For complete-
ness, we will include its proof as given in [DFL+09].
Consider a dishonest B′ and the common state ρUjV ′j at any point during the execution of
the hybrid protocol when a call to functionality Fi is made. The requirement for the oracle
protocol to be classical is now expressed in that there exists a classical Zj—to be understood
as consisting of Bˆ′’s classical communication with Aˆ and with the Fi′ ’s up to this point—
such that given Zj , Bob’s quantum state V
′
j is not entangled with Alice’ classical input and
auxiliary information: ρUjZjV ′j = ρUj↔Zj↔V ′j . Furthermore, we require that we may assume
Zj to be part of V
′
j in the sense that for any Bˆ
′ there exists Bˆ′′ such that Zj is part of V ′j .
This definition is motivated by the observation that if Bob can communicate only classically
with Alice, then he can entangle his quantum state with information on Alice’s side only by
means of the classical communication.
We also consider the protocol we obtain by replacing the ideal functionalities by quantum
two-party sub-protocols pi1 · · ·pi` with classical in- and outputs for the honest parties, i.e.,
whenever ΣF1···F` instructs Aˆ and Bˆ to execute Fi, they instead execute pii and take the
resulting outputs. We then write Σpi1···pi` for the real quantum protocol we obtain this way.
Recall that we require from the input sampler that ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′ , i.e., that V ′
is correlated with Alice’s part only via the classical Z. When considering classical hybrid
protocols Σpi1···pi` in the real world, where the calls are replaced with quantum protocols
using a common reference string, it is important that every real protocol pii uses a separate
instance (or part) of the common reference string which we denote by ωi.
Theorem 3.3 (Composition Theorem II) Let ΣF1···F` be a classical two-party hybrid
protocol which makes at most k = poly(n) calls to the functionalities, and for every i ∈
{1, . . . , `}, let protocol pii be a computationally secure implementation of Fi against Bpoly.
Then, for every real-world adversary B′ ∈ Bpoly who accesses the common reference string
ω = ω1, . . . , ωk there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ
′ ∈ Bpoly who does not use ω such that
for every efficient input sampler, it holds that the outputs in the real and the ideal world are
quantum-computationally indistinguishable, i.e.,
outΣ
pi1···pi`
A,B′
q≈ outΣF1···F`
Aˆ,Bˆ′ .
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Note that we do not specify what it means for the hybrid protocol to be secure. In fact,
Theorem 3.3 guarantees that whatever the hybrid protocol achieves, an indistinguishable
output is produced by the real-life protocol with the functionality calls replaced by protocols.
Of course, if the hybrid protocol is secure in the sense of Definition 3.7, then so is the real-life
protocol.
Corollary 3.2 If ΣF1···F` is a computationally secure implementation of G against Bpoly,
and if pii is a computationally secure implementation of Fi against Bpoly for every i ∈
{1, . . . , `}, then Σpi1···pi` with at most k = poly(n) oracle calls is a computationally secure
implementation of G against Bpoly.
Proof.
We prove the claim in Theorem 3.3 by induction on k. If no calls are made, we can set
Bˆ′ := B′ and the claim holds trivially. Consider now a protocol ΣF1···F` with at most k > 0
oracle calls. For simplicity, we assume that the number of oracle calls equals k, otherwise we
instruct the players to make some “dummy calls”. Let ρUkZkV ′k be the common state right
before the k-th, and thus, last call to one of the sub-protocols pi1, . . . , pi` in the execution of
the real protocol Σpi1,...,pi` . To simplify notation in the rest of the proof, we omit the index
k and write ρU¯Z¯V¯ ′ instead (see Figure 3.2). We know from the induction hypothesis for
k − 1 that there exists an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly not using the common reference
string such that ρU¯Z¯V¯ ′
q≈ σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ where σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ is the common state right before the k-th
call to a functionality in the execution of the hybrid protocol ΣF1···F` with input ρUZV ′ . As
described, U¯ and Z¯, V¯ ′ are to be understood as follows. U¯ denotes A’s (respectively Aˆ’s)
input to the sub-protocol (respectively functionality) that is to be called next. Z¯ collects the
classical communication dictated by ΣF1...,F` as well as Bˆ′’s classical inputs to and outputs
from the previous calls and V¯ ′ denotes the dishonest player’s current quantum state. Note
that the existence of Z¯ is guaranteed by our formalization of classical hybrid protocols and
σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ = σU¯↔Z¯↔V¯ ′ .
Let ωi be the common reference string used in protocol pii. For simplicity, we assume
that the index i, which determines the sub-protocol pii (or functionality Fi) to be called next,
is fixed and we just write pi and F for pii and Fi, respectively.
It follows from Definition 3.7 of computational security that there exists Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly
(independent of the input state) not using ωi such that the corresponding output states
σX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ and τX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ produced by FAˆ,Bˆ′ (as prescribed by the oracle protocol) and piA,B′ run on
the state σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ = σU¯↔Z¯↔V¯ ′ are quantum-computationally indistinguishable.
The induction step is then completed with
outΣ
pi
A,B′ = ρX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ = (piA,B′) ρU¯Z¯V¯ ′
q≈ (piA,B′)σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ = σX¯Z¯Y¯ ′
q≈ τX¯Z¯Y¯ ′ = outΣ
F
Aˆ,Bˆ′ ,
where (piA,B′) ρX should be understood as running protocol piA,B′ with input ρX .
Note that the strategy of Bˆ′ does not depend on the state σU¯Z¯V¯ ′ , and hence, the overall
ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ does not depend on the input state either. Furthermore, the con-
catenation of two polynomially bounded players is polynomially bounded, i.e. Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly.
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Part II
Quantum Cryptography
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Introduction
In this part of the thesis, we present our research in quantum cryptography, which offers
a secure alternative to some conventional cryptographic schemes that are rendered insecure
by the potential emerge of large-scale quantum-computing. We also want to mention an ac-
tual implementation of quantum protocols within the research project MOBISEQ (“Mobile
Quantum Security”), which is a joint project of the cryptology group from the computer
science department and the iNano center at the physics department, both at Aarhus Uni-
versity. The main goal of MOBISEQ is the development of technology for secure quantum
communication that can compete with conventional methods on practicality, velocity and
security and that can be integrated into existing infrastructures. However, at the time of
writing, the implementation is still “under construction”.
In the next sections, we will introduce the concept of mixed (classical) commitment
schemes, since they are an important underlying construction in our quantum protocols.
In Chapter 5, we discuss our main result on improving the security of quantum protocols
via a commit&open step, based on these mixed commitments. We first introduce the setting
and then propose a general compiler therein. We further show that the construction remains
secure in the case of noisy communication. We then proceed with combining the compilation
technique with the bounded-quantum-storage model. Last, we show sequential composability
and further use the extended commitment construction, discussed in Section 4.1.4, towards
a more general composition.
In Chapter 6, we discuss that the compiler can be applied to known protocols and show
two example applications, with the result of achieving hybrid-secure protocols.
4.1 Mixed Commitments
Commitments were introduced on an intuitive level in Section 2.4.1 and capture the process
of a party being committed to his message by the binding characteristic without immediately
revealing it to the other party due to the hiding aspect.
4.1.1 Motivation
Our compiler construction in the following chapters requires a classical yet quantum-secure
commitment from B to A. Since we aim at preserving the unconditional security against
A in the outer quantum protocols, the commitment can only be quantum-computationally
binding. As described in Section 3.5, the standard reduction from the computational security
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of the protocol to the computational binding property of the commitment would require
rewinding B′, which is not possible in the assumed protocol scenario.
Therefore, we construct keyed commitment schemes, which are special in that they are
mixed commitments or dual-mode commitments.1 Generally speaking, the notion of mixed
commitments requires some trapdoor information, related to the common reference string
and given to the simulator in the ideal world. This trapdoor provides the possibility for
extracting information out of the commitments, which finally allows us to circumvent the
necessity of rewinding B′. We will discuss this in detail in Section 4.1.2. Additionally, we
require that the basic mathematical assumption, which guarantees the hiding and binding
properties of the commitments, withstands quantum attacks. We will propose an actual
instantiation in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Idea
Recall that a keyed bit or string commitment C = commit pk (m, r) takes as input a mes-
sage m and some randomness r of size polynomial in the security parameter, as well as a
public key pk. The message m can be a single bit b for the implementation of bit commit-
ments or, in order to achieve string commitments, a bit-string m = b0, . . . , bs. In order to
open the commitment, message m and random variable r are sent in plain and the receiver
therewith checks the correctness of C. Hiding is typically formalized by the requirement(
pk, commit pk (m1, r1)
) ≈ (pk, commit pk (m2, r2) ) with different flavors of indistinguisha-
bility, while binding prohibits that there exist C,m1, r1,m2, r2, such that m1 6= m2, but
commit pk (m1, r1) = C = commit pk (m2, r2) .
We construct our commitments in the CRS-model such that they provide dual modes
depending on the public key. In more detail, let commitK = (commit,GH,GB, xtr) denote a
(keyed) mixed commitment scheme. The commitment key pk is generated by one of the
two possible key-generation algorithms, GH or GB. Generator GB takes as input the security
parameter κ and generates a key pair (pk, sk)← GB, where pk ∈ {0, 1}κ is a public key and
sk is the corresponding secret key. xtr is a poly-time extraction algorithm that takes sk
and C as input and produces m as output, i.e., xtrsk(C) = xtrsk(commit pk (m, r) ) = m,
which must hold for all pairs (pk, sk) generated by GB and for all values m, r. In other
words, the secret key sk allows to efficiently extract m from C, and as such the commitment
is unconditionally binding. We often denote this type of key therefore by pkB. For a key
pk ← GH, the commitment scheme is unconditionally hiding (and we often refer to this type
as pkH). Furthermore, we need the unconditionally binding key pkB and the unconditionally
hiding key pkH to be computationally indistinguishable even against quantum attacks, i.e.,
pkB
q≈ pkH.
We want to stress that we can even weaken the assumption on the hiding key in that we
merely require that there exists a public-key encryption scheme where a random public key
looks pseudo-random to poly-time quantum circuits. Thus, commit does not require actual
unconditionally hiding keys, but we can use uniformly random strings from {0, 1}κ as such.
1The notions are interchangeable. The term of mixed commitments was introduced in [DN02].
In [DFL+09], the name dual-mode commitments was used to relate to the notion of a dual-mode crypto-
system [PVW08], which is similar in spirit, but slightly more involved. Last we want to mention that our
schemes are similar to the commitment schemes used in [DFS04] but with extensions.
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This is feasible in our proposed construction, sketched below, and still provides unconditional
hiding, except with negligible probability. This fact also ensures that most keys of a specific
domain are in that sense unconditionally hiding keys.
Finally, to avoid rewinding we use the following proof method: In the real-world protocol,
B uses the unconditionally hiding key pkH to maintain unconditional security against any
unbounded A. To argue security against a computationally bounded B′, an information-
theoretic argument involving the simulator Bˆ′ is given to prove that B′ cannot cheat with
the unconditionally binding key pkB. Security in real life then follows from the quantum-
computational indistinguishability of pkH and pkB.
4.1.3 Instantiations
As a candidate for instantiating our commitment construction, we propose the lattice-based
public-key encryption scheme of Regev [Reg05]. The crypto-system is based on the (con-
jectured) hardness of the learning with error (LWE) problem, which can be reduced from
worst-case hardness of the approximation of the shortest vector problem (in its decision
version). Thus, breaking Regev’s crypto-system implies an efficient algorithm for approxi-
mating the lattice problem in the worst-case, which is assumed to be hard even with quantum
computing power.
In more detail, the crypto-system uses dimension n as security parameter and is para-
metrized by two integers m and p, where p is a prime bounded by n2 ≤ p ≤ 2n2, and a
probability distribution on Zp. A regular public key (in Zm×np ) for Regev’s scheme is proven
to be quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the case where a public key is chosen
from the uniform distribution, and therewith, independently from a secret key. In this case,
the ciphertext carries essentially no information about the message [Reg05, Lemma 5.4]. This
proof of semantic security for Regev’s crypto-system is in fact the property we require for
our commitment, as the public key of a regular key pair can be used as the unconditionally
binding commitment key pkB in the ideal-world simulation. Then, for the real protocol, an
unconditionally hiding commitment key pkH can simply be constructed by uniformly choosing
numbers in Zn×mp . Both public keys will be of size O˜(n2), and the encryption process involves
only modular additions, which makes its use simple and efficient.2
For simplicity and efficiency, we use a common reference string, which allows us to use
Regev’s scheme in a simple way and, since it is relatively efficient, we get a protocol that
is potentially practical. More specifically, in the CRS-model we assume the key pkB for the
commitment scheme, generated by GB, to be contained in the common reference string. We
want to stress however that we show in Part III, Section 10.3, how to avoid the CRS-model at
the cost of a non-constant round construction, where we let the parties generate a common
reference string jointly by coin-flipping.
For the compiler construction here, we will use Regev’s original version, as we require
bit commitments. However, a multi-bit variant of Regev’s scheme is given in the full version
of [PVW08]. All requirements as described above are maintained in this more efficient
variant, which improves the performance of Regev’s scheme by essentially a factor of n, e.g.,
the scheme can encrypt n bits using O˜(n) bits. We use later in Part III, Chapter 9, that
2The notation O˜(·) is similar to the asymptotic Landau notation O(·) but ignores logarithmic factors.
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this implies that we can flip a λ-bit string using O(λ) bits of communication when λ is large
enough. We also rely on this multi-bit version for our extended commitment construction,
which we will describe in the next Section 4.1.4 and then use in Section 5.5.2, where we show
how to achieve efficient simulation also against a dishonest A′.
4.1.4 Extended Construction
To achieve efficient simulation against both players, i.e. additional efficient simulation also
against A′ (in Section 5.5.2), we need to extend our commitments by yet another trapdoor,
which provides the commitment with equivocability . Intuitively, this means that we now
enable the simulator in the ideal world that it can construct commitments equivocally such
that it can open them later to different bits. As we still need in addition the properties of
the mixed commitment scheme of Section 4.1.2 in its multi-bit variant, we will build the new
scheme around it, such that its trapdoor can still be used for extraction.
The new extension is based on the idea of UC-commitments [CF01] and requires a Σ-
protocol for a (quantumly) hard relation R = {(x,w)}, i.e. an honest-verifier perfect zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge with instance x and witness w (see also Section 2.4.5). Con-
versations are of form
(
aΣ, cΣ, zΣ
)
, where the prover sends aΣ, the verifier challenges him with
bit cΣ, and the prover replies with zΣ. For practical candidates of R, see e.g. [DFS04]. By
special soundness, it holds that from two accepting conversations with different challenges,
i.e.
(
aΣ, 0, zΣ0
)
and
(
aΣ, 1, zΣ1
)
, the simulator can extract w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
In real life, the common reference string consists of commitment key pkH and instance
x. To commit to a bit b, the committer B first runs the honest-verifier simulator to get,
on input x, a conversation
(
aΣ, b, zΣ
)
. Then, he commits by sending
(
aΣ, C0, C1
)
, where
Cb = commit pkH (z
Σ
b, rb) and C1−b = commit pkH (0z
′
, r1−b) with randomness rb, r1−b and
z′ = |zΣ|. To open a commitment, B reveals b and opens Cb by sending zΣb, r. The receiver
checks that
(
aΣ, b, zΣ
)
is a valid conversation and that Cb was correctly opened. Assuming
that the Σ-protocol is honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge and pkH provides unconditional
hiding, the new commitment construction is again unconditionally hiding.
In the ideal world, we assume that the simulator (simulating against A′) knows w such
that (x,w) ∈ R (and public key pkH). Therewith, it can compute two valid conversations(
aΣ, 0, zΣ0
)
and
(
aΣ, 1, zΣ1
)
and set C0 = commit pkH (z
Σ
0, r0) and C1 = commit pkH (z
Σ
1, r1) .
This enables to open both ways, assuming the knowledge of the trapdoor w.
We maintain extraction, since in the respective simulation against B′, the public key is
chosen in a different but indistinguishable way, namely as (x, pkB), where pkB is the binding
commitment key, generated together with sk. Now, given a commitment (a,C0, C1), the
simulator can decrypt C0, C1 to determine which of them contains a valid reply z
Σ
b of the
Σ-protocol. The only way this could fail is in the case where both C0 and C1 contain valid
replies, which would imply that the committer B′ could compute a valid w. For a polynomial-
time bounded committer and a (quantumly) hard relation R, however, this can occur only
with negligible probability.
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Improved Security for
Quantum Protocols
Here, we propose a general compiler for improving the security of two-party quantum proto-
cols, implementing different cryptographic tasks and running between mutually distrusting
players Alice and Bob. The compiler extends security against an “almost honest” adversary
by security against an arbitrary computationally bounded (quantum) adversary. Further-
more, we can achieve hybrid security such that certain protocols can only be broken by an
adversary who has large quantum memory and large computing power. The results in this
chapter are joint work with Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail and Schaffner, and appeared in [DFL+09].
5.1 Motivation
Our proposed compiler applies to a large class of quantum protocols, namely to so-called
BB84-type protocols that follow a particular but very typical construction design for quantum
communication. Our main result states that if the original protocol is secure against a so-
called benign Bob who is only required to treat the qubits “almost honestly” but can deviate
arbitrarily afterwards, then the compiled protocol is secure against a computationally bounded
quantum Bob. The unconditional security against Alice that BB84-type protocols usually
achieve is preserved during compilation and it requires only a constant increase of transmitted
qubits and classical messages.
In other words, with our compiler, one can build a protocol for any two-party functionality
by designing a protocol that only has to be secure if Bob is benign, which is a relatively weak
assumption. On the other hand, many protocols following the BB84-type pattern (at least
after some minor changes) have been proposed, e.g. for Oblivious Transfer, Commitment, and
Password-Based Identification [CK88,DFSS08,DFR+07,DFSS07]. Typically, their proofs go
through under our assumption. For instance, our compiler can easily be applied to existing
quantum protocols implementing ID and OT, which we will show as example applications in
Chapter 6.
In more detail, the compiler incorporates the mixed commitment scheme, discussed in
Section 4.1, into the basic protocols with Bob as committer. Recall that we need such
a mixed commitment to preserve the unconditional security against Alice that BB84-type
protocols typically achieve but cannot apply the typical reduction from the computational
security of the protocol to the computational binding property of the commitment, due to
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the restrictions on rewinding in the quantum world (see Section 3.5). The idea of introduc-
ing a (plain) commitment in quantum protocols has already been sketched in other works,
for instance, in [CK88, BBCS91]. Furthermore, there are partial results, investigating this
scenario, e.g. [Yao95, CDMS04, May96]. We will go into more details of preceding work in
Section 6.1.
Previously, it was very unclear what exactly such a Commit&Open-step would achieve in
the quantum world. The intuition is clearly that if Bob passes the test, he must have mea-
sured most of his qubits, also in the remaining untested subset. But—to our best knowledge—
it was never formally proven that the classical intuition also holds for a quantum Bob. We
now give a full characterization of Commit&Open in our quantum setting, namely that it
forces Bob to be benign, for which we propose a formal definition and which might be of
independent interest. These aspects are covered in Section 5.2. In this context, we want
to mention the follow-up work in [BF10]. They phrase the Commit&Open-approach more
clearly as the quantum version of classical sampling, and additionally, investigate sampling
in quantum settings more generally.
In Section 5.3, we generalize our result to noisy quantum communication. Furthermore,
security in the bounded-quantum-storage model that assumes the adversary’s quantum stor-
age to be of limited size, implies benign security. Therefore by compilation of such proto-
cols, we can achieve hybrid security, which means that the adversary now needs both large
quantum memory and large quantum computing power to break these new protocols. The
preservation of BQSM-security allows us to get security properties that classical protocols
cannot achieve, if the assumption on the limited quantum memory holds—which definitely
is the case with current state-of-the-art (Section 5.4). However, if the assumption should fail
and the adversary could perfectly store all qubits sent, the known protocols can be easily
broken. Thus, by applying our compiler, we obtain another security layer that equips such
protocols with additional quantum-computational security. Last, we sketch that the com-
piled protocols in their basic form remain sequentially composable. Moreover, by using the
extended commitment construction of Section 4.1.4, we achieve efficient simulations on both
sides, and therewith, a more general composition. This result is discussed in Section 5.5.
5.2 Introducing Commit&Open
We now discuss our compiler construction in detail, starting from describing the form of
BB84-type protocols and formalizing our notion of benignity. Then, we show the transfor-
mation from benign security towards computational security and conclude with its proof.
5.2.1 Initial situation
We consider quantum two-party protocols that follow a particular but very typical construc-
tion design. These protocols consist of two phases, called preparation and post-processing
phase. We call such a protocol a BB84-type protocol, as they have the same structure and
the same encoding scheme as the first (complete) quantum protocol by Bennett and Brassard
in 1984 for quantum key distribution [BB84]. However, we want to stress again that we are
interested in protocols for cryptographic tasks other than key distribution, and therewith,
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Protocol Π
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends |x〉θ to B, and B chooses
θˆ ∈R {0, 1}n and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Post-processing:
Arbitrary classical communication and classical local computations.
Figure 5.1: The Generic BB84-type Quantum Protocol Π.
we also consider the case of dishonest players. A generic BB84-type protocol Π is specified
in Figure 5.1.
In the preparation phase, Alice transmits n random BB84-qubits to Bob. More specifi-
cally, Alice chooses a random bit string x = x1, ..., xn and a random basis-string θ = θ1, ..., θn
from a set of two conjugate bases, encodes her qubits accordingly, i.e., xi is encoded in the
state of the ith particle using basis θi, and sends them to Bob. Bob chooses a basis-string
θˆ = θˆ1, .., θˆn and measures the ith particle in basis θˆi. If Bob plays honestly, he learns xi
whenever the bases match, i.e. θˆi = θi. Otherwise, he gets a random independent result.
The second phase of the protocol, the post-processing, consist of arbitrary classical messages
and local computations, depending on the task at hand.
However, the fact that all BB84-type protocols have in common is that the classical
post-processing typically relies on Bob’s subsets of correct and random outcomes, or in
other words, on the fact that a dishonest Bob has high uncertainty about a crucial piece of
information. Thus, BB84-type protocols—in their basic form—may be broken by a dishonest
Bob, who does not measure the qubits immediately. This is due to the fact that Alice typically
reveals θ at a later stage so that Bob knows the correct subset. However, a dishonest Bob
could measure all stored qubits in matching bases θˆ = θ, and thus, learn more information
than he was supposed to.
This aspect is captured in our definition of security against a benign Bob, or more precisely
a “benignly dishonest” Bob, who treats the qubits “almost honestly” in the preparation phase
but can deviate arbitrarily otherwise. Note that, in contrast to Bob’s situation, BB84-type
protocols typically achieve unconditional security against cheating by Alice in their default
form. On a very intuitive level, it should now be evident that we want to enforce Bob’s
measurement upon qubit reception before any further announcement by Alice. In the next
section, we will make this definition more formal.
5.2.2 Security against Benign Bob
The following security definition captures information-theoretic security against a benign
Bob. Recall that such a dishonest Bob is benign in that, in the preparation phase, he does
not deviate (too much) from what he is supposed to do. In the post-processing phase, though,
he may be arbitrarily dishonest.
To make this description formal, we fix an arbitrary choice of θ and an arbitrary value
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for the classical information, z, which Bob may obtain as a result of the preparation phase
(i.e. z = (θˆ, xˆ) in case Bob is actually honest). Let X denote the random variable describing
the bit-string x, where we understand the distribution PX of X to be conditioned on the
fixed choices for θ and z. Furthermore, let ρE be the state of Bob’s quantum register E
after the preparation phase. Note that, still with fixed θ and z, ρE is of the form ρE =∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E , where ρ
x
E is the state of Bob’s quantum register in case X takes on the value
x. In general, the ρxE may be mixed, but we can think of them as being reduced pure states
with ρxE = trR
(|ψxER〉〈ψxER|) for a suitable register R and pure states |ψxER〉. We then call
the state ρER =
∑
x PX(x)|ψxER〉〈ψxER| a point-wise purification (with respect to X) of ρE .
Obviously, in case Bob is honest, Xi is fully random whenever θi 6= θˆi, and we have
H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) = dH(θ|I , θˆ|I) ,
for every I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and every x|I , where I¯ denotes the complementary set. In that case,
Bob does not store any non-trivial quantum state so that R is “empty” and
H0(ρER) = H0(ρE) = 0 .
A benign Bob B′ is now specified to behave close-to-honestly in the preparation phase
in that, after the preparation, he produces an auxiliary output θˆ. Given this output, we are
in a certain sense close to the ideal situation where Bob really measured in basis θˆ as far
as the values of H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) and H0(ρER) are concerned.1 Informally speaking,
the following definition states (under Point (1.)) that there exists a string θˆ of B′’s mea-
surement bases, such that the uncertainty about A’s bit xi is essentially 1 whenever θi 6= θˆi.
Furthermore, B′’s quantum storage is small.
Definition 5.1 (Unconditional security for Alice against benign Bob) A BB84-type
quantum protocol Π securely implements F against a β-benign B′ for some parameter β ≥ 0,
if it securely implements F according to Definition 3.5, with the following two modifications:
1. The quantification is over all B′ with the following property: After the preparation phase
B′ either aborts, or else produces an auxiliary output θˆ ∈ {+,×}n. Moreover, the joint
state of A and B′ after θˆ has been output is statistically indistinguishable from a state
for which it holds that, for any fixed values for θ, θˆ and z, for any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
and for any x|I¯ ,
H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) ≥ dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)− βn and H0(ρER) ≤ βn , (5.1)
where ρER is a point-wise purification of ρE with respect to X.
2. Bˆ′’s running time is polynomial in the running time of B′.
1The reason why we consider the point-wise purification of ρE is to prevent Bob from artificially blowing
up H0(ρER) by locally generating a large mixture or storing an unrelated mixed input state.
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Protocol Cα(Π) :
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}m and θ ∈R {+,×}m and sends |x〉θ to B. Then, B chooses
θˆ ∈R {0, 1}m and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Verification:
1. B commits to θˆ and xˆ position-wise by ci := commit ((θˆi, xˆi), ri) with random-
ness ri for i = 1, . . . ,m. He sends the commitments to A.
2. A sends a random test subset T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} of size αm. B opens ci for all
i ∈ T . A checks that the openings are correct and that xi = xˆi whenever
θi = θˆi. If all tests are passed, A accepts. Otherwise, she rejects and aborts.
3. The tested positions are discarded by both parties: A and B restrict x and θ,
respectively θˆ and xˆ, to i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing:
As in Π (with x, θ, xˆ and θˆ restricted to positions i ∈ T¯ ).
Figure 5.2: The Compiled Protocol Cα(Π).
5.2.3 From Benign to Computational Security
We now show a generic compiler which transforms any BB84-type protocol into a new quan-
tum protocol for the same task. The compiler achieves that, if the original protocol is un-
conditionally secure against dishonest Alice and unconditionally secure against benign Bob,
then the compiled protocol remains to be unconditionally secure against dishonest Alice but
is now computationally secure against an arbitrary dishonest Bob.
The idea behind the construction of the compiler is to incorporate a commitment scheme
and force Bob to behave benignly by means of the Commit&Open-procedure. More precisely,
we let Bob classically and position-wise commit to all his measurement bases and outcomes.
Then Alice chooses a random test-subset of size αm and checks by Bob’s openings that
the bits coincide whenever the bases match. If the test is passed, the post-processing is
conducted on the remaining unopened positions. Otherwise, Alice aborts. Figure 5.2 shows
the compilation of an arbitrary BB84-type protocol Π. The quantum communication is
increased from n to m = n/(1 − α) qubits, where 0 < α < 1 is an additional parameter
that can be arbitrarily chosen, and the compiled protocol requires three more rounds of
interaction.
Although apparently simple—intuition clearly suggests that if Bob passes the measure-
ment test, he must have measured most of his qubits, also in the remaining untested subset—
this Commit&Open approach is not trivial to rigorously prove for a quantum Bob. Moreover,
in order to preserve unconditional security against dishonest Alice, the commitment scheme
needs to be unconditionally hiding, and so can be at best quantum-computationally binding.
For a plain commitment scheme however, the common reduction from computational secu-
rity of the protocol Cα(Π) to the computational binding property of a commitment scheme
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would require rewinding, but we do not know of any technique for our protocol structure
(see also Section 3.5 for an elaborated discussion).
Therefore, we use our mixed dual-mode commitment construction commit from Sec-
tion 4.1 that allows use to circumvent the necessity of rewinding. Recall that commit is a
keyed dual-mode commitment scheme with unconditionally hiding key pkH, generated by
GH, and unconditionally binding key pkB, generated by GB along with a secret key sk that
allows to efficiently extract m from commit pkB (m, r) . Furthermore, we have that pkH
q≈ pkB.
For simplicity and efficiency, we consider the CRS-model, and we assume the key pkB for
the commitment scheme, generated according to GB, to be contained in the common ref-
erence string. We discuss in Section 10.3.2 how to avoid the CRS-model, at the cost of
a non-constant round construction where the parties generate a common reference string
jointly by coin-flipping. Such an approach allows us to implement the entire application
without any set-up assumptions. With our dual-mode commitment scheme, we arrive at the
following theorem, capturing the compilation of any protocol from benign security towards
computational security.
Theorem 5.1 (Compiler) Let Π be a BB84-type protocol, unconditionally secure against
dishonest Alice and against β-benign Bob for some constant β ≥ 0. Consider the compiled
protocol Cα(Π) for arbitrary α > 0, where the commitment scheme is instantiated by a dual-
mode commitment scheme. Then, Cα(Π) is unconditionally secure against dishonest Alice
and quantum-computationally secure against dishonest Bob in the CRS-model.
Proof. We sometimes write CαpkH(Π) for the compiled protocol Cα(Π) to stress that key
pkH, produced by GH, is used for the dual-mode commitment scheme. Analogously, we write
CαpkB(Π) when key pkB, produced by GB, is used instead.
Correctness is trivially checked. In order to show unconditional security against A′, first
note that the unconditionally hiding property of the commitment ensures that A′ does not
learn any additional information. Furthermore, as the ideal-world adversary Aˆ′ is not required
to be poly-time bounded, according to Definition 3.6, Aˆ′ can break the binding property of
the commitment scheme, and thereby, perfectly simulate the behavior of honest B towards
A′ attacking Cα(Π). The issue of efficiency of the ideal-life adversaries will be addressed in
Section 5.5.
As for computational security against dishonest Bob, according to Definition 3.7, we
need to prove that for every real-world adversary B′ ∈ Bpoly attacking Cα(Π), there exists a
suitable ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly attacking F such that
out
Cα(Π)
A,B′
q≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′ . (5.2)
First, note that by the computational indistinguishability of pkH and pkB,
out
Cα(Π)
A,B′ = out
CαpkH(Π)
A,B′
q≈ outC
α
pkB(Π)
A,B′ . (5.3)
Then, we construct an adversary B′◦ ∈ Bpoly who attacks the unconditional security against
benign Bob of protocol Π, and which satisfies
out
CαpkB(Π)
A,B′ = out
Π
A◦,B′◦ , (5.4)
5.2. INTRODUCING COMMIT&OPEN 59
A◦ A˜ B′
Π
Cα(Π)
A
B′◦
Figure 5.3: Constructing an attacker B′◦ against Π from an attacker B′ against Cα(Π).
where A◦ honestly executes Π. We define B′◦ in the following way. Consider the execution of
Cα(Π) between A and B′. We split entity A into two players A◦ and A˜, where we think of A˜
as being placed in between A◦ and B′. The splitted entities of this proof are also depicted in
Figure 5.3. A◦ plays honest A’s part of Π. A˜ can be understood as completing Commit&Open.
More specifically, A˜ acts as follows. It receives n qubits from A◦ and produces αn/(1 − α)
random BB84-qubits of its own. Then, it interleaves the produced qubits randomly with
the received qubits and sends the resulting m = n/(1 − α) qubits to B′. A˜ then completes
the verification step of Cα(Π) with B′, asking him to have the commitments opened which
correspond to A˜’s produced qubits. If this results in accept, A˜ lets A◦ finish the protocol
with B′. Note that pair (A◦, A˜) does exactly the same as A.
However, we can also move the actions of A˜ to B′’s side, and define B′◦ as follows. B′◦
samples (pkB, sk) according to GB and executes Π with A by locally running A˜ and B′, us-
ing pkB as commitment key. If A˜ accepts the verification, then B′◦ outputs θˆ ∈ {0, 1}n (as
required from a benign Bob), obtained by decrypting the unopened commitments with the
help of sk. Otherwise, B′◦ aborts at this point. It is now clear that Eq. (5.4) holds. Exactly
the same computation takes place in both “experiments”, the only difference being that they
are executed partly by different entities.
The last step is to show that, for some Bˆ′,
outΠA◦,B′◦
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′ . (5.5)
Eq. (5.5) actually claims that Aˆ′ and Bˆ′ successfully simulate A◦ and B′◦ executing Π. This
follows by assumption of benign security of Π, if we can show that B′◦ is β-benign, according to
Definition 5.1, for any β ≥ 0. We show this in the following subsection, or more precisely, we
prove that the joint state of A◦,B′◦ after the preparation phase is statistically indistinguishable
from a state ρIdeal which satisfies the bounds in Eq. (5.1) of Definition 5.1. We conclude the
current proof by claiming that Theorem 5.1 follows from Eqs. (5.3) – (5.5) together. 
5.2.4 Proof of Bounds on Entropy and Memory Size
Recall that A◦ executing Π with B′◦ can equivalently be thought of as A executing CαpkB(Π)
with B′ (Figure 5.3). Furthermore, a joint state of A,B′ is clearly also a joint state of A◦,B′◦.
To show the existence of ρIdeal for A◦,B′◦ as promised above, it therefore suffices to show such
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Protocol EPR-CαpkB(Π) :
Preparation:
A prepares m EPR-pairs 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) and sends the second qubit in each pair to
B, while keeping the other qubits in register A = A1 · · ·Am. B chooses θˆ ∈R {0, 1}m
and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m by measuring the received qubits in bases θˆ.
Verification:
1. B commits to θˆ and xˆ position-wise by ci := commit ((θˆi, xˆi), ri) with random-
ness ri for i = 1, . . . ,m. He sends the commitments to A.
2. A sends a random test subset T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} of size αm. B opens ci for all
i ∈ T . A chooses θ ∈R {+,×}m, measures registers Ai with i ∈ T in basis
θˆi to obtain xi, and checks that the openings are correct and that xi = xˆi
whenever θi = θˆi for i ∈ T . If all tests are passed, A accepts. Otherwise,, she
rejects and aborts.
3. A measures the remaining registers in basis θ|T¯ to obtain x|T¯ . The tested
positions are discarded by both parties: A and B restrict x and θ, respectively
θˆ and xˆ, to i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing:
As in Π (with x, θ, xˆ and θˆ restricted to positions i ∈ T¯ ).
Figure 5.4: The EPR-version of CαpkB(Π).
a state for A,B′. In other words, we need to show that the execution of CαpkB(Π) with honest
A and arbitrarily dishonest B′—after verification—will be close to a state where Eq. (5.1)
holds.
To show this closeness, we consider an equivalent EPR-version, where Alice creates m
EPR-pairs (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, sends one qubit in each pair to Bob, and keeps the others in
register A. Then, Alice can measures her qubits only when needed, namely, she measures
the qubits within T in Step (2.) of the verification phase, and the remaining qubits at the
end of the verification phase. With respect to the information Alice and Bob obtain, this
EPR-version is identical to the original protocol CαpkB(Π) based on single qubits, since the
only difference is the point in time when Alice obtains certain information.
We can further modify the procedure without affecting Eq. (5.1) as follows. Instead of
measuring her qubits in T in her basis θ|T , Alice measures them in Bob’s basis θˆ|T . However,
she still verifies only whether xi = xˆi for those i ∈ T with θi = θˆi. Because the positions i ∈ T
with θi 6= θˆi are not used in the protocol at all, this change has no effect. As the commitment
scheme is unconditionally binding, if key pkB is used, Bob’s basis θˆ is well defined by his
commitments (although hard to compute), even if Bob is dishonest. The resulting scheme is
given in Figure 5.4.
We consider an execution of EPR-CαpkB(Π) in Figure 5.4 with an honest A and a dishonest
B′, and we fix θˆ and xˆ, determined by B′’s commitments. Let |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA⊗HE be the state
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of the joint system right before Step (2.) of the verification phase. Since we are anyways
interested in the point-wise purification of B′’s state, we may indeed assume this state to be
pure. If it is not pure, we purify it and carry the purifying register R along with E.
Clearly, if B′ had honestly done his measurements then, for some |ϕE〉 ∈ HE ,
|ϕAE〉 = |xˆ〉θˆ ⊗ |ϕE〉 .
In this case, the quantum memory E would be empty, i.e.,
H0(|ϕE〉〈ϕE |) = 0 ,
and the uncertainty about X, obtained when measuring A|T¯ in basis θ|T¯ would be maximal
in the sense that it would be exactly one bit in each position with non-matching bases, i.e.,
H∞(X) = dH(θ|T¯ , θˆ|T¯ ) .
We now show that the verification phase enforces these properties for an arbitrary dis-
honest B′, at least approximately in the sense of Eq. (5.1). Recall that T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} is
random subject to |T | = αm. Furthermore, for fixed θˆ but randomly chosen θ, the subset
T ′ = {i ∈ T : θi = θˆi} is a random subset (of arbitrary size) of T . Let the random variable
Test describe the choice of test = (T, T ′) as specified above, and consider the state ρTestAE ,
consisting of the classical Test and the quantum state |ϕAE〉 with
ρTestAE = ρTest ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE | =
∑
test
PTest(test)|test〉〈test| ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE | .
Recall that rH(·, ·) denotes the relative Hamming distance between two strings (see
Eq. (3.22)). The following lemma shows that, we are in state ρTestAE close to an “ideal
state” ρ˜TestAE , capturing a situation , where for any choice of T and T
′ and for any outcome
x|T when measuring A|T in basis θˆ|T , the relative error rH(x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) (the test estimate)
gives an upper bound (which holds with probability 1) on the relative error rH(x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) one
would obtain by measuring the remaining subsystems Ai with i ∈ T¯ in basis θˆi.
Lemma 5.1 For any ε > 0, xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m and θˆ ∈ {+,×}m, the state ρTestAE is negligibly
close (in m) to a state
ρ˜TestAE =
∑
test
PTest(test)|test〉〈test| ⊗
∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣ ,
where for any test = (T, T ′), we have∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉 = ∑
x∈Btest
αtestx |x〉θˆ|ψxE〉 ,
for Btest = {x ∈ {0, 1}m | rH(x|T¯ , xˆ|T¯ ) ≤ rH(x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) + ε} and arbitrary coefficients αxtest ∈
C.
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We want to point out that the “ideal state” |ϕ˜testAE〉 in the remaining subsystem after the
test is a superposition of states with relative Hamming distance upper bounded by the test
estimate (plus a small error ε). This is the case, since we sum over all x restricted to the set
specifying exactly that, and also note that B′’s subsystem |ψxE〉 depends on x, which means,
informally speaking, only such states survive. Yet in other words, we are indeed left with a
superposition over all strings that have relative Hamming distance ε-close to the estimate of
the test.
Proof. For any test, we let |ϕ˜testAE〉 be the renormalized projection of |ϕAE〉 into the subspace
span{|x〉θˆ |x ∈ Btest}⊗HE and we let |ϕ˜test⊥AE 〉 be the renormalized projection of |ϕAE〉 into the
orthogonal complement, such that |ϕAE〉 = εtest|ϕ˜testAE〉+ ε⊥test|ϕ˜test⊥AE 〉 with εtest = 〈ϕ˜testAE |ϕAE〉
and ε⊥test = 〈ϕ˜test⊥AE |ϕAE〉. By construction, |ϕ˜testAE〉 is of the form as required in the statement
of the lemma. A basic property of the trace norm of pure states leads to
δ
(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |, ∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣) = √1− |〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣ϕAE〉|2 = √1− |εtest|2 = |ε⊥test| .
This last term corresponds to the square root of the probability, when given test, to observe
a string x 6∈ Btest when measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉 in basis θˆ. Furthermore, using
elementary properties of the trace norm with Jensen’s inequality2 gives
δ
(
ρTestAE , ρ˜TestAE
)2
=
(∑
test
PTest(test) δ
(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |, ∣∣ϕ˜testAE〉〈ϕ˜testAE∣∣))2
=
(∑
test
PTest(test) |ε⊥test|
)2
≤
∑
test
PTest(test) |ε⊥test|2 ,
where the last term is the probability to observe a string x 6∈ Btest when choosing test
according to PTest and measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉 in basis θˆ. This situation, though, is
a classical sampling problem, for which it is well known that for any measurement outcome
x, the probability (over the choice of test) that x 6∈ Btest is negligible in m (see e.g. [Hoe63]).
Thus, it follows that state ρTestAE is negligibly close (in m) to state ρ˜TestAE . 
Next, we need a preliminary lemma, stating that a pure state can be written as a “small
superposition” of basis vectors.
Lemma 5.2 Let |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HE be a state of the form |ϕAE〉 =
∑
i∈J αi|i〉|ϕiE〉, where
{|i〉}i∈I is a basis of HA and J ⊆ I. Then, the following holds.
1. Let ρ˜AE =
∑
i∈J |αi|2|i〉〈i|⊗ |ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |, and let W , and W˜ , be the outcome of measuring
A of |ϕAE〉, respectively of ρ˜AE, in some basis {|w〉}w∈W . Then,
H∞(W ) ≥ H∞(W˜ )− log |J | .
2. The reduced density matrix ρE = trA(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |) has max-entropy
H0(ρE) ≤ log |J | .
2In this context, we use Jensen’s inequality with f
(∑
i pixi
) ≤∑i pif(xi), for positive pi and real convex
function f .
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Note that when using Renner’s definition for conditional min-entropy of [Ren05] under
Point (1.), one can actually show that H∞(W |E) ≥ H∞(W˜ |E)− log |J |.
Proof. For Point (1.), we may understand ρ˜AE as being in state |i〉|ϕiE〉 with probability
|αi|2, so that we easily see that
PW˜ (w) =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2|〈w|i〉|2 =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2|〈w|i〉|2 ·
∑
i∈J
12 · 1|J |
≥
∣∣∣∣∑
i∈J
αi〈w|i〉
∣∣∣∣2 · 1|J | =
∣∣∣∣〈w|∑
i∈J
αi|i〉
∣∣∣∣2 · 1|J | = PW (w) · 1|J | ,
where the inequality is Cauchy-Schwartz3. The claim follows (with Definition 3.1).
For Point (2.), note that ρE = trA(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |) =
∑
i∈J |αi|2|ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |. The claim follows
immediately from the sub-additivity of the rank, i.e.,
rank(ρE) ≤
∑
i∈J
rank(|αi|2
∣∣ϕiE〉〈ϕiE∣∣) ≤∑
i∈J
1 = |J | ,
where we use that all |ϕiE〉〈ϕiE | have rank (at most) 1. 
Now, combining the fact that it holds for the binary entropy h that
∣∣{y ∈ {0, 1}n | dH(y, yˆ) ≤
µn}∣∣ ≤ 2h(µ)n for any yˆ ∈ {0, 1}n and 0 ≤ µ ≤ 12 with Lemma 5.2 on “small superpositions
of product states”, we can conclude the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1 Let ρ˜TestAE be of the form as in Lemma 5.1 (for given ε, xˆ and θˆ). For any
fixed test = (T, T ′) and for any fixed x|T ∈ {0, 1}αm with err := rH(x|T ′ , xˆ|T ′) ≤ 12 , let |ψAE〉
be the state to which |ϕ˜testAE〉 collapses when, for every i ∈ T , subsystem Ai is measured in
basis θˆi and xi is observed, where we understand A in |ψAE〉 to be restricted to the registers
Ai with i ∈ T¯ . Finally, let σE = trA(|ψAE〉〈ψAE |) and let the random variable X describe the
outcome when measuring the remaining n = (1−α)m subsystems of A in basis θ|T¯ ∈ {+,×}n.
Then, for any subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and any x|I ,4
H∞
(
X|I
∣∣X|I¯ = x|I¯) ≥ dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)− h(err + ε)n
and
H0
(
σE
) ≤ h(err + ε)n .
Thus, the number of errors between the measured x|T ′ and the given xˆ|T ′ gives us a bound
on the min-entropy of the outcome, when measuring the remaining subsystems of A, and on
the max-entropy of the state of subsystem E.
Proof. To simplify notation, we write ϑ = θ|T¯ and ϑˆ = θˆ|T¯ . By definition of ρ˜TestAE , for any
fixed values of ε, xˆ and θˆ, the state |ψAE〉 is of the form |ψAE〉 =
∑
y∈Y αy|y〉ϑˆ⊗ |ψyE〉, where
3In this context, we use the inequality phrased as
∑
i |xi|2|yi|2 ≥ |
∑
i xiyi|2
4Below, θ|I (and similarly θˆ|I) should be understood as first restricting the m-bit vector θ to T¯ , and then
restricting the resulting n-bit vector θ|T¯ to I: θ|I := (θ|T¯ )|I .
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Y = {y ∈ {0, 1}n : dH(y, xˆ|T¯ ) ≤ (err + ε)n}. Recall here that rH(y, xˆ|T¯ ) = dH(y, xˆ|T¯ )/n.
Consider the corresponding mixture σ˜AE =
∑
y∈Y |αy|2|y〉ϑˆ〈y|ϑˆ ⊗ |ψyE〉〈ψyE | and define X˜ as
the random variable for the outcome when measuring register A of σ˜AE in basis ϑ. Note that
H∞(X˜) ≥ dH(ϑ, ϑˆ), since any state |y〉ϑˆ, when measured in basis ϑ, produces a random bit
for every position i with ϑ 6= ϑˆ (see also the definition of the min-entropy (Definition 3.1)
and note that there exist 2dH(ϑ,ϑˆ) possible outcomes). Lemma 5.2 allows us to conclude that
H0(σE) ≤ log |Y| ≤ log 2h(err+ε)n = h(err + ε)n ,
and similarly,
H∞(X) ≥ H∞(X˜)− log |Y| ≥ dH(ϑ, ϑˆ)− h(err + ε)n .
This proves the claim for I = {1, . . . , n}. For arbitrary I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and x|I , we can
consider the pure state, obtained by measuring the registers Ai with i 6∈ I in basis ϑi, when
x|I¯ is observed. This state is still a superposition of at most |Y| vectors and thus we can
apply the exact same reasoning to obtain Eq. (5.1). 
The initial claim to be shown now follows by combining Lemma 5.1 and Corollary 5.1.
Indeed, the ideal state ρIdeal we promised, for which (5.1) holds, is produced by putting A
and B′ in state ρ˜TestAE , defined in Lemma 5.1, and then running Steps (2.) and (3.) of the
verification phase. This state is negligibly close to the real state, since by Lemma 5.1, we
were negligibly close to the real state before these operations. Corollary 5.1 ensures that the
bounds for benign Bob as stated in the definition of benignity in Eq. (5.1) are satisfied.
5.3 In the Presence of Noise
In the description of the compiler and in its analysis in the previous section, we assume the
quantum communication to be noise-free. Indeed, in the case of transmission errors, honest
Alice is likely to reject an execution with honest Bob. However, it is straightforward to
generalize the result to noisy quantum communication as follows.
In Step (2.) in the verification phase of Cα(Π), Alice rejects and aborts if the relative
number of errors between xi and xˆi for i ∈ T with θi = θˆi exceeds the error probability φ,
induced by the noise in the quantum communication, by some small ε′ > 0. By Hoeffding’s
inequality [Hoe63], this guarantees that honest Alice does not reject honest Bob, except with
exponentially small probability. Furthermore, proving the security of this “noise-resistant”
compiler goes along the exact same lines as for the original compiler. The only difference is
that when applying Corollary 5.1, the parameter err has to be chosen as err = φ+ ε′, such
that the bounds in Eq. (5.1) hold for
β = h(err + ε) = h(φ+ ε′ + ε) .
Thus, the claim of our compiler-theorem (Theorem 5.1) holds for any β-benign Bob with
β > h(φ) (by choosing ε, ε′ > 0 small enough).
5.4. BOUNDED-QUANTUM-STORAGE SECURITY 65
5.4 Bounded-Quantum-Storage Security
In this section we show that our compiler preserves security in the bounded-quantum-storage
model. Recall that in the BQSM, one of the players, in our case it is Bob, is assumed
be able to store only a limited number of qubits beyond a certain point in the protocol.
BQSM-secure OT- and ID-protocols are known [DFSS07], but can be efficiently broken, if
the memory bound does not hold. Therefore, we show here that applying the compiler
produces protocols with better security, namely the adversary needs large quantum storage
and large computing power to succeed. In Chapter 6, we will then discuss the compiled
protocols with hybrid security in more detail.
Consider a BB84-type protocol Π. For a constant 0 < γ < 1, let Bγbqsm(Π) be the set
of dishonest players B′ that store only γn qubits after a certain point in Π, where n is the
number of qubits sent initially. Protocol Π is said to be unconditionally secure against such
a γ-BQSM Bob, if it satisfies Definition 3.5 with the restriction that the quantification is
over all dishonest B′ ∈ Bγbqsm(Π).
Theorem 5.2 If protocol Π is unconditionally secure against γ-BQSM Bob, then the com-
piled protocol Cα(Π) is unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob, where 0 < α < 1.
Proof. The proof proceeds as the proof for our compiler-theorem (Theorem 5.1). We have a
dishonest B′ that attacks Cα(Π), and we construct a B′◦ that attacks the original protocol Π.
The only difference here is that we let B′◦ generate the common reference string “correctly”
as pkH sampled according to GH.
It follows by construction of B′◦ that out
Cα(Π)
A,B′ = out
Π
A◦,B′◦
. Furthermore, since B′◦ requires
the same amount of quantum storage as B′ but communicates an α-fraction fewer qubits, it
follows that B′◦ ∈ Bγbqsm(Π), if B′ ∈ Bγ(1−α)bqsm (Cα(Π)). Thus, it follows that there exists Bˆ′
such that outΠA◦,B′◦
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ′
. This proves the claim. 
5.5 Composability
Several composition frameworks for the quantum setting have been proposed, for instance,
sequential composability in a classical environment [FS09], sequential composability in a
quantum environment but restricted to the BQSM [WW08], or attempts of generalizing the
universal classical composability framework (UC in [Can01]) to universal quantum compos-
ability [BM04,Unr04,Unr10]. Here, we will briefly investigate our protocols in the particular
composition frameworks, we consider most appropriate for our setting.
5.5.1 Sequential Composition
All our definition for correctness and security of our two-party quantum protocols comply
with the composition framework of [FS09] as described in detail in Section 3.6. In particular,
we will show in the next chapter that all of our quantum protocols pi securely implements
their corresponding ideal functionality F . Thus, according to the Composition Theorems 3.2
and 3.3, we arrive at a situation where an outer protocol Σpi1···pi` , composed of possibly
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different inner sub-protocols pii, is essentially as secure as any hybrid protocol Σ
F1···F` with
sequential calls to the corresponding ideal functionalities Fi. Sequential composition in a
classical environment follows immediately.
5.5.2 General Composition
Our strong simulation-based security approach is clearly closely related to the concept of
universal composability, but our definitions do not imply UC-security. The definitions of
unconditional security leading to sequential composability do not require the running time of
ideal-world adversaries to be polynomial whenever the real-life adversaries run in polynomial
time. Fortunately, by extending our basic commitment construction, we can achieve efficient
ideal-life adversaries. Therewith, we get efficient simulation on both sides without rewinding
any dishonest player.
Note that it might still be the case that our compilation preserves efficiency of the sim-
ulator, namely if protocol Π is secure against dishonest A′ with efficient simulator Aˆ′, then
so is Cα(Π). Although this would be desirable, it does not seem to be the case for our basic
construction for the following reason. In order to show such a result, we would need to
simulate the pre-processing phase against dishonest A′ efficiently and without measuring the
qubits that are not opened during pre-processing. Then after preparation and verification,
we could give the remaining qubits to Aˆ′ to simulate the rest of the protocol as specified
previously. However, the whole point of the pre-processing is to ensure that a real Bob
measures all qubits, unless he can break the binding property of the commitments. Thus,
the only way to resolve this situation is to give the simulator some trapdoor with which it
can make commitments and open them any way it wants, or in other words, to equip the
simulator with the possibility of equivocate its commitments.
With such a equivocability trapdoor, the simulation of the verification phase is straight-
forward. Aˆ′ just waits until A′ reveals the test subset, measures the qubits in the test subset,
and opens the commitments according to the measurement results. Then, Aˆ′ simulates the
protocol with the remaining unopened qubits. Our basic commitment construction, intro-
duced in Section 4.1, does not provide such an equivocability trapdoor. However, we can
extend the scheme as discussed in Section 4.1.4 by first extending our mixed commitment to
the multi-bit crypto-system of [PVW08] and then combining it with an HVZK-Σ-protocol
construction for some quantumly hard NP-relation R. As previously shown, equivocability
emerges in this construction with the simulator’s knowledge of a valid witness w such that
(x,w) ∈ R. In that case, the simulator can compute two accepting conversations for the
Σ-protocol, and therewith, answer both challenges. The extension preserves the different
but indistinguishable dual-modes of the underlying commitment scheme such that the com-
mitted bit can still be extracted by a simulator Bˆ′, decrypting both commitments C0, C1 to
determine, which contains a valid reply in the Σ-protocol.
In [Unr10] a special case of our generic construction, namely the quantum oblivious
transfer protocol of Section 6.1 is related to the quantum-UC context. It is shown that the
protocol statistically quantum-UC-emulates its ideal functionality in the case of corrupted
Alice and corrupted Bob, if it is instantiated with an ideal commitment functionality. Fur-
thermore, it is established that security as specified in [FS09] implies quantum-UC-security
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in the case of our OT-protocol.5 Last, the OT-protocol in its randomized version and when
instantiated by an unconditionally binding commitment scheme implements its correspond-
ing ideal functionality with statistical security in the case of corrupted Bob. Even though
for the last result the protocol is based on an actual commitment, the case considers only a
dishonest Bob, and by using an unconditionally binding scheme in the real world, we would
loose unconditional security against dishonest Alice.
However, by combining our extended construction as described above with the results
of Section 4.1.4 and with [Unr10, Theorem 20], we get the following stronger result that
applies to our generic compiler construction: Let Π be a BB84-type protocol as specified in
Theorem 5.1 and let Cα(Π) be its compilation, instantiated with an extended mixed com-
mitment construction in the CRS-model as described above. Then, Cα(Π) computationally
quantum-UC-emulates its corresponding ideal functionality F for both dishonest players.
5The security we achieve here is called quantum stand-alone security in [Unr10], but we prefer to describe
the statements in the terms used throughout this work.
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Applications
Our compiler, discussed in the previous chapter, can be easily applied to known protocols.
Here, we show two example applications, namely oblivious transfer and password-based iden-
tification. Since the original protocols are BQSM-secure, we also obtain hybrid security by
compilation. These results appeared in [DFL+09]. We then show that the compiled identi-
fication protocol is secure against man-in-the-middle attacks, which was sketch in [DFL+09]
but formal proofs were omitted.
6.1 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious transfer, as introduced in Section 2.4.2, constitutes a highly relevant cryptographic
primitive, which is complete for general two-party computation and reduces to classical
commitment in its quantum variant. As a building block it can be securely used in outer
quantum or classical protocols and extends, for instance, to quantum identification.
6.1.1 Motivation and Related Work
As mentioned already, the idea of introducing a Commit&Open-step to improve the secu-
rity of quantum protocols was suggested in the first quantum OT protocol of Cre´peau
and Kilian [CK88], which—in its original form—proposes a protocol for Rabin–OT, and in
the practical follow-up work of Bennett, Brassard, Cre´peau and Skubiszewska [BBCS91],
implementing 1–2 OT 1. The Commit&Open approach is sketched as a “conceptually easy
fix” [BBCS91, p. 14] in a situation where a dishonest Bob has large quantum storage.
Various partial results for OT in that context followed. For instance, in [Yao95] such a
construction is proven secure against any receiver in the case of noiseless communication.
To make the proof work, however, an ideal black-box commitment scheme is assumed. This
approach was then generalized for noisy channels and perfect string commitments in [May96].
Another approach in the computational setting was taken in [CDMS04]. There it was shown
that a computationally binding quantum string commitment would enforce an apparent
collapse of Bob’s quantum information, which in turn would imply secure OT. The paper
concludes with the open question of how to construct an actual commitment scheme as
required to get an applicable protocol.
Based on our analysis of Section 5.4, we can now rather simply apply our compiler to (a
variant of) the protocol in [BBCS91], and therewith, give a complete proof for a concrete
unconditionally hiding commitment scheme.
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Functionality FOT :
Upon receiving s0 and s1 from Alice and k from Bob, FOT outputs sk to Bob.
Figure 6.1: The Ideal Functionality for String OT.
Protocol 1-2 QOT` :
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends |x〉θ to B. B chooses θˆ ∈R
{0, 1}n and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Post-processing:
1. A sends θ to B.
2. B partitions all positions 1 ≤ i ≤ n in two subsets according to his choice
bit k ∈ {0, 1}: the “good” subset Ik := {i : θi = θˆi} and the “bad” subset
I1−k := {i : θi 6= θˆi}. B sends (I0, I1) in this order.
3. A sends descriptions of f0, f1 ∈R F together with m0 := s0 ⊕ f0(x|I0) and
m1 := s1 ⊕ f1(x|I1).
4. B computes sk = mk ⊕ fk(xˆ|Ik).
Figure 6.2: Basic Protocol for String OT.
6.1.2 The Protocol
The variant we consider here achieves 1–2 OT `. Recall that in such a protocol, the sender A
sends two `-bit strings s0 and s1 to the receiver B. B can select a string to receive, sk, but
he does not learn anything about s1−k. Finally, A does not learn B’s choice bit k. The ideal
oblivious transfer functionality FOT is shown in Figure 6.1.
Our protocol is almost identical to 1–2 OT 1 introduced in [BBCS91], but instead of us-
ing parity values to mask the bits in the last protocol message, we follow the approach
of [DFR+07]. Their BQSM-secure protocol RAND 1-2 QOT` for the randomized version uses
hash-functions that allow for transferring an `-bit string instead of a bit as final message.
Let F denote a suitable family of two-universal hash-functions with range {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}` as specified in Definition 3.3. Note that if the input to the function is smaller than n,
we can pad it with zeros without decreasing its entropy. We further assume that ` = bλnc
for some constant λ > 0. Then, after the modifications described above, we obtain the basic
1-2 QOT` protocol, depicted in Figure 6.2.
Proposition 6.1 Protocol 1-2 QOT` satisfies correctness and achieves unconditional security
against dishonest Alice, according to Definitions 3.4 and 3.6, respectively.
Proof. Correctness for honest players is obvious: B selects one string to receive, which
is masked by the hashed bit-string of outcomes, measured in the matching basis. In the
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positions with non-matching bases, he does not know the outcomes, and therewith he does
not learn anything about s1−k. Finally, A does not learn which is the “good” subset, and
hence, which is B’s choice k.
Security against dishonest Alice is derived in a straightforward way from RAND 1-2 QOT`
of [DFR+07] as follows. Note that in RAND 1-2 QOT`, the receiver measures all his qubits in
one basis, depending on his choice bit k, i.e. θ ∈ [0, 1]k. As described previously in Chapter 5,
our compiler requires measurement in random bases θ ∈R {0, 1}n. Otherwise, the opened
and tested positions during Commit&Open would obviously leak k.
Due to the non-interactivity in RAND 1-2 QOT`, A′ cannot learn B’s choice bit k, so the
protocol is perfectly receiver-secure. More formally, the proof compares the real output to
an ideal output, which is obtained by letting A′ run the protocol with an unbounded receiver
who measures his qubits in A′’s bases θ, samples independent K from the correct distribution,
and sets SK correspondingly. The only difference between the two executions is the point
in time and the choice of bases, in which positions i ∈ I1−k is measured. However, these
parameters do not influence the output states, once K is fixed.
Now, the preparation phase combined with Step (2.) of the post-processing in 1-2 QOT`
is equivalent to B measuring all qubits in the basis, dictated by K. Thus, the same analysis
can be applied to 1-2 QOT`, achieving unconditional security against A′. 
Theorem 6.1 Protocol 1-2 QOT` is unconditionally secure against β-benign Bob for any β <
1
8 − λ2 .
Proof. For any given benign Bob B′, we construct Bˆ′ the following way: Bˆ′ runs locally
a copy of B′ and simulates an execution by running Aˆ up to but not including Step (3.).
Since B′ is benign, Bˆ′ obtains θˆ after the preparation phase. When the simulation of Aˆ
reaches the point just after the announcement of f0 and f1 in Step (3.), Bˆ
′ finds k′ such
that dH(θˆ|Ik′ , θ|Ik′ ) is minimum for k′ ∈ {0, 1}. Bˆ′ then calls FOT with input k′ and obtains
output sk′ . Bˆ
′ sets m′k′ = sk′ ⊕ fk′(x|Ik′ ) and m′1−k′ ∈R {0, 1}` before sending (m0,m1) to
B′. Finally, Bˆ′ outputs whatever B′ outputs.
We now argue that the state output by Bˆ′ is statistically close to the state output by
B′ when executing 1-2 QOT` with the real A. The only difference is that, while Bˆ′ outputs
m′1−k′ ∈R {0, 1}`, B′ outputs m1−k′ = s1−k′ ⊕ f1−k′(x|I1−k′ ). Thus, we simply have to show
that m1−k′ is statistically indistinguishable from uniform in the view of B′.
Note that, since θ and θˆ are independent and θ is a uniform n-bit string, we have that
for any  > 0,
dH(θ, θˆ) >
(1− )n
2
,
except with negligible probability. We can now claim that with overwhelming probability
dH(θ|I1−k′ , θˆ|I1−k′ ) ≥
(1− )n
4
.
Now, since B′ is β-benign, we get with Definition 5.1 that
H∞
(
X|I1−k′
∣∣X|Ik′ = x|Ik′) ≥ (1− )n4 − βn and H0(ρE) ≤ βn .
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Protocol Cα(1-2 QOT`) :
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}m and θ ∈R {+,×}m and sends |x〉θ to B. B chooses θˆ ∈R
{0, 1}m and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Verification:
1. B sends ci := commitpkH((θˆi, xˆi), ri) with randomness ri for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
2. A sends random T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} with |T | = αm. B opens ci ∀ i ∈ T , and A
checks that the openings were correct and that xi = xˆi whenever θi = θˆi. If
all tests are passed, A accepts. Otherwise, she rejects and aborts.
3. A and B restrict x, θ and xˆ, θˆ, respectively, to the remaining n positions i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing:
1. A sends θ to B.
2. B partitions all positions 1 ≤ i ≤ n in two subsets according his choice bit
k ∈ {0, 1}: the “good” subset Ik := {i : θi = θˆi} and the “bad” subset
I1−k := {i : θi 6= θˆi}. B sends (I0, I1) in this order.
3. A sends descriptions of f0, f1 ∈R F together with m0 := s0 ⊕ f0(x|I0) and
m1 := s1 ⊕ f1(x|I1).
4. B computes sk = mk ⊕ fk(xˆ|Ik).
Figure 6.3: Improved Protocol for String OT.
It follows from privacy amplification (Theorem 3.1) that f1−k′(x|I1−k′ ) is statistically indis-
tinguishable from uniform for B′, provided that
`
n
<
1
4
− 2β − ′
for any ′ > 0. Finally, by the properties of exclusive-OR, we can now also conclude that
m1−k′ is statistically close to uniform. Solving the last inequality for β, we obtain
β <
1
8
− λ
2
− 
′
2
,
and Theorem 6.1 follows. 
Informally, the next Corollary 6.1 states that, when compiling the basic protocol 1-2 QOT`,
we obtain an improved protocol Cα(1-2 QOT`) with hybrid security , such that a dishonest Bob
is required to have large quantum computing power and large quantum storage to succeed.
For completeness, Cα(1-2 QOT`) is given explicitly in Figure 6.3.
Corollary 6.1 If λ < 14 , then protocol Cα(1-2 QOT`) is computationally secure against dis-
honest Bob and unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob with γ < 14−2λ. Correct-
ness and unconditional security against dishonest Alice is maintained during compilation.
6.2. PASSWORD-BASED IDENTIFICATION 73
Proof. The corollary is obtained by the following steps: First, we sketch that the analy-
sis of protocol RAND 1-2 QOT` in [DFR+07] can be almost analogously applied to 1-2 QOT`.
Then, we combine this result with our BQSM-theorem (Theorem 5.2). And finally, we apply
Theorem 6.1 with our compiler-theorem (Theorem 5.1). Note that, by definition, all these
transformations do not touch correctness nor unconditional security against A′.
In more detail, the main difference from RAND 1-2 QOT` to 1-2 QOT` is that B measures all
his qubits in the basis corresponding to his choice bit k, i.e. θ ∈ [0, 1]k. Since we require
these measurements to be in random bases θ ∈R {0, 1}n, we loose the non-interactivity and
must include the additional message (I0, I1) from B to A in Step (2.), so that A obtains
the same partitions. However, the partitions are send in fixed order and do not allow to
conclude on the “good” subset Ik. No other message is sent by B. Furthermore, recall that
in randomized OT, A does not input the two messages s0, s1 herself by masking them with
the hashed output of the measurement outcomes. Instead, only these hash-values, generated
uniformly at random during the protocol, are output. However, due to the characteristic of
exclusive-OR, the security properties in this aspect do not change.
Thus, 1-2 QOT` inherits the BQSM-security of RAND 1-2 QOT`, and we can claim that
1-2 QOT` is unconditionally secure against γ-BQSM Bob for all γ strictly smaller than 14 −2λ.
Then, by Theorem 5.2, we obtain unconditional security for Cα(1-2 QOT`) against γ(1−α)-
BQSM Bob.
Last, we know from Theorem 6.1 that 1-2 QOT` is unconditionally secure against a β-
benign Bob for β < 18−λ2 . It follows with Theorem 5.1 that Commit&Open, instantiated by our
dual-mode commitment scheme, leads to quantum-computational security for Cα(1-2 QOT`)
against any B′. 
6.2 Password-Based Identification
Password-based identification is introduced in Section 2.4.3, where we also describe a con-
struction from randomized 1–n OT `, and the therewith inherited OT-security aspects. Secure
identification is highly significant in any authenticated set-up of outer protocols, and may
provide re-usability of the initial user-memorizable passwords, if cleverly implemented.
6.2.1 Motivation and Related Work
There exist various approaches for classical and quantum identification, based on different
techniques, e.g. on zero-knowledge [FS86,FFS87], on password-based key-agreement [KOY01],
and on quantum memory restrictions [DFSS07]. Here, we will subject the quantum identifi-
cation scheme of [DFSS07], denoted in the following by BQSM–QID, to our compiler technique,
yielding more diverse security assumptions. BQSM–QID was proven to be unconditionally se-
cure against arbitrary dishonest Alice and against quantum-memory-bounded dishonest Bob
by using quantum-information-theoretic security definitions. In [FS09] it was then shown that
these security definitions imply simulation-based security as considered here, with respect to
the functionality FID given in Figure 6.4. Actually, the definition and proof from [DFSS07]
guarantee security only for a slightly weaker functionality, which gives some unfair advan-
tage to dishonest Alice in case she guesses the password correctly. However, as discussed
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Functionality FID :
Upon receiving wA, wB ∈ W from Alice and Bob, respectively, FID outputs the bit
y := (wA
?= wB) to Bob. In case Alice is dishonest, she may choose wA =⊥ (where ⊥ 6∈ W),
and (for any choice of wA) the bit y is also output to Alice.
Figure 6.4: The Ideal Functionality for Password-Based Identification.
in [FS09], the protocol from [DFSS07] does implement functionality FID.
6.2.2 The Protocol
Recall that we require from an identification scheme that a user A succeeds in identifying
herself to a server B, if she knows an initial, secret password w. Additionally, a dishonest
user A′ should not succeed with higher probability than at a guess, and similarly, a dishonest
server B′ should be only able to guess A’s password without learning anything beyond the
(in)correctness of his guess. These last requirements provide re-usability of the password. To
achieve security under realistic assumptions, we further want to allow memorizable passwords
with low entropy.
Let W be the set of possible keys, not necessarily large in size, with w ∈ W denoting
the initially shared password. For clarity, we will often use wA and wB to indicate A’s and
B’s input to the protocol, and only accept if wA = wB, which implies equality to w. Let
c :W → {+,×}n be the encoding function of a binary code of length n with |W| codewords
and minimal distance d. Families of codes as required for our subsequent results, correcting
a constant fraction of errors efficiently and with constant information rate are indeed known
[SS96]. And finally, let F and G denote suitable families of (strongly) two-universal hash-
functions, as specified in Definition 3.3, with range F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` and G :W → {0, 1}`,
respectively. Again we stress that we can pad the input to the functions with zero, if it is
smaller than expected.
We cannot directly apply our compiler to the original BQSM–QID, since it is not a BB84-
type protocol. Similar to RAND 1-2 QOT` described in the previous Section 6.1, B does not
measure the qubits in a random basis but in a basis-string c determined by his password
wB ∈ W by c = c(wB). After A’s basis announcement, both players compute set Iw = {i :
θi = c(w)i} with the positions on which they base the last steps of the post-processing.
We briefly sketch now the transformation from BQSM–QID into a BB84-type protocol,
without affecting security and without loosing efficiency. The first step is naturally to let
B measure in random basis θˆ ∈R {+,×}n. The most straightforward next step would be
to include a new message from B to A during post-processing, in which B announces IB =
{i : θˆi = c(w)i}. Then, A sends θ and the remaining post-processing could be conducted
on Iw = {i ∈ IB : θi = θˆi}. Note, however, that this solution here is less efficient than in
the original protocol, since only approx. 1/4 of all measurement outcomes could be used. So
instead, we let Bob apply a random shift κ to the code, which B announces to A in the post-
processing phase, namely θˆ = c(w)⊕κ with κ ∈ {+,×}n and + ≡ 0 and × ≡ 1 for computing
the ⊕-operation. Then, we define c′(w) := c(w)⊕κ. Finally, after A’s announcements of θ the
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Protocol QID :
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends |x〉θ to B. B chooses θˆ ∈R
{0, 1}n and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Post-processing:
1. B computes a string κ ∈ {+,×}n such that θˆ = c(w) ⊕ κ, where we think of
+ as 0 and × as 1 so that ⊕ makes sense. He sends κ to A and we define
c′(w) := c(w)⊕ κ.
2. A sends θ and f ∈R F to B. Both compute Iw := {i : θi = c′(w)i}.
3. B sends g ∈R G.
4. A sends z := f(x|Iw)⊕ g(w) to B.
5. B accepts if and only if z = f(xˆ|Iw)⊕ g(w).
Figure 6.5: Basic Protocol for Password-Based Identification
protocol is completed with the shifted code, i.e., based on positions in Iw := {i : θ = c′(w)i}.
This has the effect that the post-processing is actually based on positions i with θi = θˆi,
and thus, on approx. 1/2 of all qubits as in protocol BQSM–QID. Our resulting protocol QID
is described in Figure 6.5. We show in the following proofs that the modification does not
affect security as given in [DFSS07] (and [FS09]).
Proposition 6.2 Protocol QID satisfies correctness and achieves unconditional security against
dishonest Alice, according to Definitions 3.4 and 3.6, respectively.
Proof. Correctness for honest players is obvious: If both A and B know w, i.e. wA = wB,
they can compute c(w) and c′(w). Following the last steps as supposed to, they conclude
with f(x|Iw)⊕ g(wA) = f(xˆ|Iw)⊕ g(wB).
Security against dishonest A′ is derived in a straightforward way from BQSM–QID as follows.
Recall that in BQSM–QID, B measures all his qubits in one basis, depending on c = c(w). In
QID, the preparation phase combined with Step (1.) of the post-processing, where B sends
κ, can be seen as an equivalent situation from the view of A′. The important positions are
now defined by c′(w), which is however only deducible if c(w) is known in addition, since
otherwise, κ looks completely random. All subsequent steps are exactly as in BQSM–QID,
and thus, the same analysis can be applied to QID. In the following, we will sketch the
intuitive idea thereof. A′ runs the protocol with a memory-unbounded server who measures
his qubits in A′’s bases θ and therefore obtains x. He then computes sj = f(x|Ij )⊕ g(j) for
all codewords j = 1, . . . , |W|, where sw would be expected from A′ for an accepting run of
the protocol. By the strongly universal-two property of g, all sj are pairwise independent,
and thus, it follows that all sj ’s are distinct, except with some negligible probability. Assume
that the accepting message is one of the sj ’s for a random variable w
′, i.e. z = sw′ . A′ will
only succeed, if w′ = w, and A′ does not learn anything beyond that. A further analysis
76 CHAPTER 6. APPLICATIONS
of A′’s state before the final accept/reject-message shows its independence from w, given w′
and conditioned on w′ 6= w and on the pairwise distinction of all sj ’s. And finally, for A′’s
state after the final message it is shown that the event of all distinct sj ’s is independent of
w and w′. Statistical security against A′ follows. 
Theorem 6.2 If c : W → {+,×}n has minimal distance d ≥ δn and is polynomial-time
decodeable, then protocol QID is unconditionally secure against β-benign Bob for any β < δ4 .
Proof. For any given benign Bob B′, we construct Bˆ′ as follows. Bˆ′ runs locally a copy of B′
and simulates Alice’s actions by running A faithfully except for the following modifications.
After the preparation phase, Bˆ′ gets θˆ and κ from B′. It then computes w′ ∈ W such that
c(w′) has minimal Hamming distance to θˆ⊕κ. Note that this can be done in polynomial-time
by assumption on the code. Then, Bˆ′ submits w′ as input wB to FID and receives output
y ∈ {0, 1}. If y = 1, then Bˆ′ faithfully completes A’s simulation using w′ as w. Otherwise, Bˆ′
completes the simulation by using a random z′ instead of z. In the end, Bˆ′ outputs whatever
B′ outputs.
We need to show that the state output by Bˆ′ (respectively B′) above is statistically close
to the state output by B′ when executing QID with real A. For simpler notation, we use w for
honest Alice’s input wA. Note that if w
′ = w, then the simulation of A is perfect and thus
the two states are equal. If w′ 6= w then the simulation is not perfect, as the real A would use
z = f(x|Iw)⊕ g(w) instead of random z′. It thus suffices to argue that f(x|Iw) is statistically
close to random and independent of the view of B′ for any fixed w 6= w′. Note that this is
also what had to be proven in [DFSS07], but under a different assumption, namely that B′
has bounded quantum memory, rather than that he is benign. Nevertheless, we can recycle
part of the proof.
Recall from the definition of a benign Bob that the common state after the preparation
phase is statistically close to a state for which it is guaranteed that H∞(X|I) ≥ dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)−
βn for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and H0(ρE) ≤ βn. By the closeness of these two states, switching
from the real state of the protocol to the ideal state satisfying these bounds, has only a
negligible effect on the state output by Bˆ′. Thus, we may assume these bounds to hold.
Recall that θˆ ⊕ κ is at Hamming distance at most d/2 from c(w′). Since the distance
from here to the (distinct) codeword c(w) is greater than d, we see that θˆ⊕ κ is at least d/2
away from c(w). It follows that c′(w) = c(w) ⊕ κ has Hamming distance at least d/2 from
θˆ. Furthermore, for arbitrary ε > 0 and except with negligible probability, the Hamming
distance between θ|Iw = c′(w)|Iw and θˆ|Iw is at least d/4 − εn. Therefore, we can conclude
that
H∞(X|Iw) ≥ d/4− εn− βn and H0(ρE) ≤ βn .
We require H∞(X|Iw)−H0(ρE)− ` to be positive and linear in n, which is the case here for
parameters
βn ≤ d/8− (ε/2) n− `/2 .
We conclude by privacy amplification that f(x|Iw) and therewith z are close to random and
independent of E, conditioned on w 6= w. This concludes the proof. 
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The next corollary informally states that, when applying our compiler to the basic pro-
tocol QID, we obtain a hybrid-secure protocol Cα(1-2 QOT`). Thus, any dishonest Bob needs
large quantum computing power and large quantum storage to launch a successful attack.
For completeness, we again give Cα(QID) explicitly in Figure 6.6.
Corollary 6.2 If |W| ≤ 2νn, and if c : W → {+,×}n has minimal distance d ≥ δn for
δ > 0 and is polynomial-time decodeable, then protocol Cα(QID) is computationally secure
against dishonest Bob and unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob with γ <
δ
4 − ν. Correctness and unconditional security against dishonest Alice is maintained during
compilation.
Proof. We can show hybrid security by first adapting and connecting the results of [DFSS07]
with our BQSM-Theorem 5.2, and then combining Theorem 6.2 with our compiler theorem
(Theorem 5.1). All definitions preserve correctness and unconditional security against A′.
In more detail, the main difference from BQSM–QID of [DFSS07] to QID is that B measures
all his qubits in the bases corresponding to c = c(wB). Then after A’s basis announcement,
both players base the remaining post-processing on Iw = {i : θi = c(w)i}. In QID instead, B
measures in random bases, computes θˆ = c(w)⊕κ, and announces κ to A. Then after A’s basis
announcements, the protocol is completed based on positions in Iw := {i : θ = c′(w)i} with
c′(w) := c(w) ⊕ κ. Note that both situations however are equivalent. First, the important
positions are those i where θi = θˆi in both cases. And second, κ looks completely random
and is of no value without the knowledge of c(w).
Thus, QID inherits the BQSM-security of BQSM–QID, and we can claim that QID is uncon-
ditionally secure against γ-BQSM Bob for all γ < δ4 − ν. From Theorem 5.2 unconditional
security of Cα(1-2 QOT`) against γ(1−α)-BQSM Bob follows. QID is guaranteed by Theo-
rem 6.2 to achieve unconditional security against a β-benign Bob for β < δ4 and it follows
with Theorem 5.1 that Commit&Open, instantiated by our dual-mode commitment scheme,
yields quantum-computational security for Cα(QID) against any B′. 
6.3 Man-in-the-Middle Security for Identification
In a man-in-the-middle attack, we assume an external adversary who attacks an execution of
the protocol with honest communicating parties, while having full control over the classical
and the quantum communication.
6.3.1 Motivation
The compiled quantum protocols from Sections 6.1 and 6.2 protect against (arbitrary) dis-
honest Alice and against (computationally or quantum-storage bounded) dishonest Bob.
However, in particular in the context of identification, it is also important to protect against
a man-in-the-middle attacker Eve (E). Both, QID and Cα(QID), are insecure in this model.
Eve might measure one of the transmitted qubits, say, in the +-basis, and this way learn
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Protocol Cα(QID) :
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends |x〉θ to B. B chooses θˆ ∈R
{0, 1}n and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Verification:
1. B sends ci := commitpkH((θˆi, xˆi), ri) with randomness ri for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
2. A sends random T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} with |T | = αm. B opens ci ∀ i ∈ T , and A
checks that the openings were correct and that xi = xˆi whenever θi = θˆi. If
all tests are passed, A accepts. Otherwise, she rejects and aborts.
3. A and B restrict x, θ and xˆ, θˆ, respectively, to the remaining n positions i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing:
1. B computes a string κ ∈ {+,×}n such that θˆ = c(w) ⊕ κ, where we think of
+ as 0 and × as 1 so that ⊕ makes sense. He sends κ to A and we define
c′(w) := c(w)⊕ κ.
2. A sends θ and f ∈R F to B. Both compute Iw := {i : θi = c′(w)i}.
3. B sends g ∈R G.
4. A sends z := f(x|Iw)⊕ g(w) to B.
5. B accepts if and only if z = f(xˆ|Iw)⊕ g(w).
Figure 6.6: Improved Protocol for Password-Based Identification
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information on the basis θˆi used by B, and thus on the password w, simply by observing if
B accepts or rejects in the end.1
In [DFSS07] it was shown how to enhance BQSM–QID in order to obtain security (in
the bounded-quantum-storage model) against man-in-the-middle attacks. The very same
techniques can also be used to obtain hybrid security against man-in-the-middle attacks for
Cα(QID). The techniques from [DFSS07] consist of the following two add-on’s to the original
protocol.
1. A test on a random subset of qubits in order to detect disturbance of the quantum
communication.
2. Authentication of the classical communication.
First note that Cα(QID) already does such a check as required in Point (1.), namely in the
verification phase, so this is already taken care of here. Point (2.) requires that Alice and
Bob, in addition to the password, share a high-entropy key k that could be stored, e.g. on a
smart-card. This key will be used for a so-called extractor MAC. Besides being a MAC, i.e.
a message authentication code, such a construction has the additional property that it also
acts as an extractor. This means that if the message to be authenticated has high enough
min-entropy, then the key-tag pair is close to randomly and independently distributed. As
a consequence, the tag gives away (nearly) no information on k, and thus, k can be re-used
in the next execution of the protocol.2 For further details, we refer to [DFSS07,DKRS06].
More specifically, in order to obtain hybrid security against man-in-the-middle attacks
for Cα(QID), A will, in her last move of the protocol, use the extractor MAC to compute
an authentication tag on all the classical messages exchanged plus the string x|Iw . This,
together with the test of a random subset, prevents Eve from interfering with the (classical
and quantum) communication without being detected, and security against Eve essentially
follows from the security against impersonation attacks. Note that including the x|Iw into
the authenticated message guarantees the necessary min-entropy, and as such the re-usability
of the key k.
We emphasize that the protocol is still secure against impersonation attacks (i.e. dishonest
Alice or Bob), even if the adversary knows k, but with slightly weaker parameters due to
the “entropy-loss” within x|Iw , caused by the additional information for authentication and
private error correction that is now available.
6.3.2 The Set-Up
In addition to the previous setting in Section 6.2, we now have the following assumptions.
Let MAC∗ : K ×M → {0, 1}` be the extractor MAC with arbitrary key space K, message
space M and error probability 2−`. Its extractor property guarantees that for any message
M and quantum state E (which may depend on M), the tag T = MAC∗(K,M) of M is such
that ρTKE is 2
−(H∞(M)−H0(ρE)−`)/2-close to 1
2`
I ⊗ ρK ⊗ ρE . Recall that c : W → {+,×}n
1Note that this attack does not immediately apply to the scheme sketched in the previous section, but
similar, however more sophisticated, attacks may still apply.
2This is in sharp contrast to the standard way of authenticating the classical communication, where the
authentication key can only be used a bounded number of times.
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Functionality FID+ :
The ideal functionality FID+ receives pairs of strings (wA, kA) and (wB, kB) from honest
Alice and Bob, and a string wE from Eve, where wA, wB ∈ W and k ∈ K. If wE = wA,
then FID+ sends (correct, kA) to Eve. Otherwise, FID+ sends incorrect. Last, Eve is
asked to input an “override bit” d, and FID+ outputs the bit (wA ?= wB)∧ d to Bob and
to Eve.
Figure 6.7: The Ideal Functionality with Man-in-the-Middle Security.
is the encoding function of a binary code with minimal distance d, and we have strongly
universal-2 classes of hash-functions F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` and G :W → {0, 1}`.
In order to do error correction, let {synj}j∈J be the family of syndrome functions3, cor-
responding to a family C = {Cj}j∈J of linear error correcting codes of size n′ = n/2, where
n = (1−α)m. We require the property that any Cj allows to efficiently correct a φ′′-fraction
of errors for some constant φ′′ > 0. For a random j ∈ J , the syndrome of a string with t
bits of min-entropy is 2−
1
4
(t−2q)-close to uniform given j and any quantum state with max-
entropy at most q. We refer to [DS05, DFSS07, FS08] for the existence of such families and
example constructions. Protocol Cα(QID+) can tolerate a noisy quantum communication up
to any error rate φ < φ′′. We stress that for security against man-in-the-middle attacks, error
correction with φ′′ > 0 needs to be done even if we assume perfect quantum communication
(with φ = 0), as should become clear from the analysis of the protocol given below. Finally,
we let φ′ be a constant such that φ < φ′ < φ′′.
The ideal functionality FID+ is given in Figure 6.7. The following definition captures
unconditional security against a man-in-the-middle attacker, where E gets classical W ′ and
quantum state E as input and both honest players A and B get classical input W and K.
The joint state is then of the form
ρKWW ′E|W ′ 6=W = ρK ⊗ ρW↔W ′↔E|W ′ 6=W .
Note that we require that the adversary’s quantum register E is correlated with the honest
players’ parts only via her classical input W ′, conditioned on W 6= W ′.
Definition 6.1 (Unconditional security against a Man-in-the-middle) A protocol
Π implements an ideal classical functionality F unconditionally securely against a man-in-
the-middle attacker, if for any real-world adversary E, there exists an ideal-world adversary
Eˆ, such that, for any input state as specified above, it holds that the outputs in the real and
the ideal world are statistically indistinguishable, i.e.,
outΠA,B,E
s≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ,Eˆ
.
3Note that we have the following convention: For a bit string y of arbitrary length, synj(y) is to be
understood as synj(y0 · · · 0) with enough padded zeros if its bit length is smaller than n′, and as
(
synj(y
′), y′′
)
,
where y′ consist of the first n′ and y′′ of the remaining bits of y, if its bit length is bigger than n′.
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Computational security against a man-in-the-middle is defined as follows. For a given
value of the security parameter m, the common reference string ω is chosen at first. The
polynomial-size input sampler takes as input m and ω and samples an input state of the
form
ρWAKAWBKBZE = ρWAKAWBKB↔Z↔E ,
where honest Alice gets as input password WA, honest Bob gets WB, and Eve’s quantum
register E is correlated with the honest player’s part only via her classical input Z. In
addition to their passwords WA,WB, the honest players are given high-entropy keys KA,KB.
We restrict the input sampler to choose KA uniformly at random from K and guarantee that
KA = KB whenever WA = WB.
Definition 6.2 (Computational Security against a Man-in-the-middle) A protocol
Π implements an ideal classical functionality F computationally securely against a man-in-
the-middle attacker, if for any poly-time real-world adversary E who has access to the common
reference string ω, there exists a poly-time ideal-world adversary Eˆ, not using ω, such that
for any input sampler as described above, it holds that the outputs in the real and the ideal
world are quantum-computationally indistinguishable, i.e.,
outΠA,B,E
q≈ outF
Aˆ,Bˆ,Eˆ
.
6.3.3 The Protocol
The extended and compiled protocol Cα(QID+) is depicted in Figure 6.8. Corollary 6.3 states
hybrid security against man-in-the-middle attacks, such that a computationally or quantum-
storage bounded Eve can do no better than trying to guess the password. If the guess is
incorrect, she learns (essentially) nothing.
Corollary 6.3 Assume that |W| ≤ 2νn and that c :W → {+,×}n has minimal distance d ≥
δn for δ > 0 and is polynomial-time decodeable. Then, protocol Cα(QID+) is computationally
secure against Eve with β < δ6 , and unconditionally secure against γ(1−α)-BQSM Eve with
γ < δ2 − ν − 2`.
We split the proof of Corollary 6.3 into two parts. First, we show computational security
in Proposition 6.3, and second, we show unconditional security in the bounded-quantum-
storage model in Proposition 6.4.
Proposition 6.3 Let c : W → {+,×}n have minimal distance d ≥ δn and be polynomial-
time decodeable. Then, Cα(QID+) is computationally secure against Eve with β < δ6 , according
to Definition 6.2.
Proof. We start with the real-life execution of Cα(QID+) with honest A and B with respec-
tive inputs (wA, kA) and (wB, kB), and a man-in-the-middle attacker E. We then modify it
step by step without (essentially) changing the common output state, such that in the end
we have a simulation of the protocol as required.
First, we change the action of B in that we assume that B learns in the final step of
Cα(QID+) “by magic” whether one of the classical messages communicated was modified by
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Protocol Cα(QID+)
Preparation:
A chooses x ∈R {0, 1}m and θ ∈R {+,×}m and sends |x〉θ to B. B chooses θˆ ∈R
{0, 1}m and obtains xˆ ∈ {0, 1}m by measuring |x〉θ in bases θˆ.
Verification:
1. B sends ci := commit pkH ((θˆi, xˆi), ri) with randomness ri for i = 1, . . . ,m.
2. A sends random T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} with |T | = αm. B opens ci ∀ i ∈ T , and A
checks that the openings were correct and that xi = xˆi whenever θi = θˆi. A
accepts, if this is the case for all but a φ′-fraction of the tested bits. Otherwise,
she rejects and aborts.
3. A and B restrict x, θ and θˆ, xˆ,respectively, to the remaining n positions i ∈ T¯ .
Post-processing:
1. B computes a string κ ∈ {+,×}n such that θˆ = c(w) ⊕ κ. He sends κ to A
and we define c′(w) := c(w)⊕ κ.
2. A sends θ, f ∈R F , j ∈R J , and syn = synj(x|Iw), where Iw := {i : θi =
c′(w)i}.
3. B sends g ∈R G.
4. A sends z := f(x|Iw) ⊕ g(w) to B. Additionally, she sends the authenti-
cation tag of all previously transmitted classical information, i.e. tag∗ :=
MAC∗k(θ, j, syn, f, g, z, κ, T, test, x|Iw) with test = {(ci, xˆi, θˆi, ri)}i∈T .
5. B uses syn to correct the errors within xˆ|Iw , and he accepts if and only if tag∗
verifies correctly and z = f(xˆ|Iw)⊕ g(w).
Figure 6.8: Extended and Compiled Protocol for Password-Based Identification.
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E and whether wA = wB or not. He accepts the execution if none of the messages was
modified, if wA = wB, and if z verifies correctly. This changes the outcome of the protocol
only by a negligible amount. Indeed, if wA = wB, the restriction on the input sampler
guarantees that kA = kB and the claim follows from the security of the MAC. If wA 6= wB,
then B rejects anyway in both versions, except with negligible probability.
Next, we further change the action of B in that B accepts the execution in the final step
of Cα(QID+) if none of the messages was modified and if wA = wB (without verifying z). We
argue that this modification does not change the common output state, up to a negligible
amount. Note that by Lemma 5.1, we may replace the real state consisting of the qubits
obtained by A and the choice of T and T ′ = {i ∈ T : θi = θˆi} by a negligibly close ideal state
(with the same T and T ′) such that the error rate within T ′, i.e. the fraction of i ∈ T ′ with
xi 6= xˆi, gives an exact upper bound on the error rate outside of T . Thus, it follows that if
A does not reject during verification, then B will recover the correct string x|Iw in the final
step (except with negligible probability) and correctly verify z if and only if wA = wB.
The next modification is that B runs the modified protocol with some “dummy input”
instead of his real input wB, but he still accepts only if wA equals his real input wB and
no transmitted message was modified by E. Since B does not reveal any information on his
input before the last step, this modification does not change the common output state at all.
We write B∗ for this modified B.
As last modification, we choose an unconditionally binding key pkB as reference string,
together with the decryption key sk. The new common output state is computationally
indistinguishable from the previous one by assumption on the commitment keys.
Now, this modified protocol can be simulated by an ideal-life adversary Eˆ via the follow-
ing two arguments.
(1) Eˆ can simulate A as Bˆ′ does in the proof of security against dishonest Bob (see Theo-
rem 6.2) by sampling unconditionally binding key pkB, such that Eˆ also knows the decryption
key sk, extracting wB from B’s commitments, and inquiring the ideal functionality FID+ .
In more detail, upon receiving κ from B, Eˆ attempts to decode the string θˆ ⊕ κ. If this is
successful (a codeword at distance at most d/2 is returned), it computes the password w′
such that c(w′) is the decoded codeword. If decoding fails, Eˆ chooses an arbitrary w′. It then
sends w′ to FID+ .
If the functionality replies by (correct, kA), then Eˆ completes the simulation by following
the protocol with inputs w′ = wA and kA. In that case, the simulation is perfect and the
final outputs are equal.
In case the extracted password w′ does not match wA, Eˆ follows the protocol but uses
random values syn′, tag∗′ and z′. Note that the real A would use z = f(x|IwA ) ⊕ g(wA)
instead of random z′. Thus, we have to argue that f(x|IwA ) is statistically close to random
and independent of the view of E (for any fixed w′). Recall that the common state after the
verification phase is statistically close to a state for which it is guaranteed that H∞(X|I) ≥
dH(θ|I , θˆ|I)− βn for any I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, and H0(ρE) ≤ βn. Hence, switching between these
two states has only a negligible effect on the final output, and thus we may assume these
bounds also to hold here. By the way w′ was chosen, it is guaranteed that θˆ⊕κ has Hamming
distance at most d/2 from c(w′), which is at distance greater than d from c(w). Thus, the
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Hamming distance between θˆ⊕κ and c(w) is at least d/2, except with negligible probability.
The same holds if decoding fails, since θˆ ⊕ κ is at least d/2 away from any codeword and
c(w)⊕κ has distance at least d/2 from θˆ. It follows that the Hamming distance between θ|IwA
and θˆ|IwB is at least (d/4−ε)n. Therefore, we can conclude that H∞(X|IwA ) ≥ d/4−εn−βn.
Finally, note that by the property of the code family as described previously, it follows
that if H∞(X|IwA ) > 2H0(ρE) with a linear gap, then syn is close to uniformly distributed
from E’s point of view. Then, from the extractor property of MAC∗, it follows that tag∗ is
essentially random and independent of k, f, test, T, w,w′, θ and E, conditioned on w 6= w′.
And further, privacy amplification guarantees that f(x|IwA ) is uniformly distributed and
thus z is close to random and independent of E (conditioned on wA 6= w′). Now, given the
two `-bit strings tag∗ and z, the bound on the min-entropy is slightly reduced by 2`.
(2) Eˆ can also simulate modified B∗ up to before the final step, as B∗ uses a “dummy input”. If
simulated A rejects in the verification, or E has modified one of the communicated messages,
then Eˆ sends “override bit” d = 0 to the ideal functionality. Otherwise, it sends d = 1
and therewith learns, whether wA = wB or not. In both cases, Eˆ can easily complete the
simulation for B∗. The claim follows. 
Proposition 6.4 If |W| ≤ 2νn, then protocol Cα(QID+) is unconditionally secure against
γ(1−α)-BQSM Eve with γ < δ2 − ν − 2`, according to Definition 6.1.
Proof. Here, we can reason similarly to the proof in [DFSS07] against a man-in-the-middle.
By the security of the MAC, E cannot modify any classical message without being de-
tected (and the extractor property guarantees re-usability). Therefore, one can show security
against E up to the point before B announces whether to accept the protocol execution or
not.
In order to show security even after B has announced his decision, one can make the
following case distinction. If E modifies the quantum communication in such a way that she
only introduces a few errors in the test set, then she also only introduced a few errors in the
remaining positions, except with small probability. Those positions will be corrected by the
error correction, and thus, B accepts—independent of what w is. In the other case, namely
if E modifies the quantum communication in such a way that she introduces many errors in
the test set, then A rejects already early in the protocol—independent of what w is. Hence,
this case distinction does not depend on w. It follows that B’s announcement of whether he
accepts or rejects gives away no information on w.
Let w′ denote E’s guess on the password. Then, if w′ 6= w, xI|w has d/4 − ν bits of
entropy, given w, w′ and θ. Furthermore, given tag∗ and f(x|Iw), the min-entropy is reduced
by 2`. By the properties of the code family and the privacy amplification property of MAC∗
and the hash-function, we get that syn as well as tag∗ and f are essentially random and
independent, conditioned on w 6= w′, for γ < d/4− ν − 2`. 
Part III
Cryptography in the Quantum
World

c
h
a
p
t
e
r
7
Introduction
In this part of the thesis, we want to investigate classical cryptography in the quantum world,
which means that we consider the security of classical protocols subject to quantum attacks.
This scenario is of practical importance and independent of any progress towards large-scale
quantum computing. In the following sections, we introduce various commitment schemes
and extended variants thereof, which we will use as underlying constructions of the protocols
in the subsequent chapters.
In Chapter 8, we show that a quantum-secure bit commitment, as discussed in Section 7.1,
implies a quantum-secure single coin-flip. Then, we will use the mixed commitments, de-
scribed in Part II, Section 4.1, together with a variation of its extended construction (de-
scribed in Section 7.2) to equip the underlying commitment construction with extraction and
equivocability such that we achieve an efficiently simulatable and more general composable
single coin-flip.
In Chapter 9, we propose a framework for the quantum-secure amplification of the security
degree of coins, where we rely on the mixed commitments of Section 4.1. One step towards a
fully simulatable coin-flipping protocol, however, requires an extended construction allowing
for an untypical way of opening a commitment in that, instead of sending the plaintext, we
do a trapdoor opening (Section 7.3).
In Chapter 10, we show different example applications, where the interactive generation
of coins at the beginning or during outer protocols results in implementations without set-up
assumptions and allows for quantum-secure realizations of classical schemes.
7.1 Regular Bit Commitment
In Chapter 8, we will show a natural and direct translation of standard coin-flipping to
the quantum world. Recall from Section 2.4.1 that commitments imply coin-flipping. More
specifically, we require an unconditionally binding and quantum-computationally hiding bit
commitment scheme from A to B that takes a bit and some randomness r of length ` as input,
i.e. commit : {0, 1} × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}∗. As discussed, the unconditionally binding property
is fulfilled, if it is impossible for any forger F˜ to open one commitment to both 0 and 1,
i.e. to compute r, r′ such that commit (0, r) = commit (1, r′) . Quantum-computationally
hiding is ensured, if no quantum distinguisher D˜ can distinguish between commit (0, r) and
commit (1, r′) for random r, r′ with non-negligible advantage. Note that we will use this
simple notation for the commitments in the following sections. For a specific scheme, the
precise notation has to be naturally adapted.
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For an actual instantiation we can use, for instance, Naor’s commitment based on a
pseudorandom generator [Nao91]. A pseudorandom generator is a function that maps a
short, randomly chosen seed to a long pseudorandom sequence, which is computationally
indistinguishable from a truly random string for any polynomial-time bounded adversary.
Informally speaking, pseudorandomness ensures unpredictability of the next bit in the se-
quence after learning the previous one. There are two main arguments for commitments
based on pseudorandomness. First, this construction does not require any initially shared
information between the players. This aspect is of particular importance, when we later
propose sequential coin-flipping for actually implementing the CRS-model assumption, and
therewith, implementing other functionalities from scratch without any set-up assumptions.
The second reason relates to our claim of quantum security. Given any one-way function,
pseudorandom generators can be constructed, where its security parameter is defined by the
length of the seeding key. A brute-force search through the key space would find all seeds,
and thus, all pseudorandom sequences could be computed. Now, under the assumption of a
quantum-secure one-way function, Grover’s optimal quantum search algorithm provides only
quadratic speed-up for brute-searching. More efficient attacks are not known, and therewith,
we claim that for any poly-time bounded quantum adversary, we achieve quantum-secure
schemes.
More formally [Nao91], let f(n) denote a function with f(n) > n. Then, G : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}f(n) defines a pseudorandom generator, if for all polynomial-time (quantum) distin-
guisher D˜, it holds that
|Pr[D˜(y) = 1]− Pr[D˜(G(s)) = 1]| ≤ ε ,
where y ∈R {0, 1}f(n), s ∈R {0, 1}n, and ε is negligible in the security parameter n. A bit
commitment scheme using pseudorandomness is now constructed as follows. Let a be the
bit to which Alice wants to commit, and let Gi(s) denote the ith bit of the pseudorandom
sequence on seed s. To ensure the binding property, the receiver Bob sends a random vector
RB = (r1, . . . , r3n) where ri ∈R {0, 1} for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3n. Alice selects s ∈R {0, 1}n and sends
the vector RA = (r
′
1, . . . , r
′
3n), where
r′i =
{
Gi(s) if ri = 0
Gi(s)⊕ a if ri = 1 .
To open the commitment, Alice sends s and Bob then verifies that for all i, r′i = Gi(s) for
ri = 0 and r
′
i = Gi(s)⊕ a for ri = 1.
Assuming that a dishonest receiver is polynomial-time bounded, he cannot learn anything
about a. Otherwise, he could be used to construct a distinguisher D˜ between pseudoran-
dom and truly random outputs. This also holds in the quantum world, since the reduction
does not require rewinding. It follows that any quantum-computationally bounded receiver
can only guess a with probability essentially 1/2, so the commitment scheme is quantum-
computationally hiding.
For any (unbounded) dishonest committer, opening a commitment to both values 0 and
1, requires a seed pair (s1, s2), such that sequences G3n(s1) and G3n(s2) agree for all i where
ri = 0 and disagree for all i where ri = 1, i.e. ri = Gi(s1)⊕Gi(s2) for exactly one RB chosen
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by the other player. The probability for the existence of such a pair is at most 22n/23n = 2−n.
It follows that the committer can reveal only one possible a, except with probability less than
2−n, which satisfies statistical binding.
7.2 Extended Construction for Mixed Commitments
We will, also in the context of a single coin-flip, need an extended construction, which is
similar to the extension of Section 4.1.4 but adapted to the case of an underlying commit-
ment from A to B with flavors unconditionally binding and quantum-computationally hiding.
We again aim at providing the respective simulator with a trapdoor for either extraction to
efficiently simulate in case of A′ or equivocability to avoid rewinding B′. As in Section 4.1.4,
we require a Σ-protocol for a (quantumly) hard relation R = {(x,w)} with conversations(
aΣ, cΣ, zΣ
)
. Furthermore, we will also use the keyed dual-mode commitment scheme de-
scribed in Section 4.1.2, based on the multi-bit version of [PVW08] with keys pkH and pkB,
where it holds that pkH
q≈ pkB.
In the real protocol, the common reference string consists of commitment key pkB and an
instance x′ for which it holds that @ w′ such that (x′, w′) ∈ R, where we assume that x q≈ x′.
To commit to bit a, A runs the honest-verifier simulator to get a conversation
(
aΣ, a, zΣ
)
.
She then sends aΣ and two commitments C0, C1 to B, where Ca = commit pkB (z
Σ, ra) and
C1−a = commit pkB (0z
′
, r1−a) with randomness ra, r1−a and z′ = |zΣ|. Then,
(
a, (zΣ, ra)
)
is send to open the relevant commitment Ca, and B checks that
(
aΣ, a, zΣ
)
is an accept-
ing conversation. Assuming that the Σ-protocol is honest-verifier zero-knowledge and pkB
leads to unconditionally binding commitments, the new commitment construction is again
unconditionally binding.
During simulation, Aˆ′ chooses a pkB such that it knows the matching decryption key sk.
Then, it can extract A′’s choice bit a by decrypting both C0 and C1 and checking which
contains a valid zΣ. Again, not both C0 and C1 can contain a valid reply, since otherwise, A
′
would know a w′ such that (x′, w′) ∈ R. In order to simulate in case of B′, Bˆ′ chooses pkH
and x. Hence, the commitment is unconditionally hiding in this simulation. Furthermore,
it can be equivocated, since now ∃ w with (x,w) ∈ R and therefore, C0, C1 can both be
computed with valid replies, i.e. C0 = commit pkH (z
Σ
0, r0) and C1 = commit pkH (z
Σ
1, r1) .
Quantum-computational security against B′ follows from the indistinguishability of the keys
pkB and pkH and the indistinguishability of the instances x and x′, and efficiency of both
simulations is ensured, due to extraction and equivocability.
7.3 Trapdoor Opening for Mixed Commitments
The typical notion of mixed commitment schemes is stronger than we require for our basic
construction of mixed commitments, namely, it postulates trapdoors for both extraction and
equivocability. As previously discussed, it suffices in our basic construction to only rely on
an extraction trapdoor. This aspect is very convenient, since it allows us to weaken the
assumption on its underlying construction, i.e., we can build it from a public-key crypto-
system with regular keys pk and sk as binding commitment key and extraction key, and
require only an indistinguishable hiding key, generated as a random string in the key space.
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This, in turn, offers the possibility of generating the hiding key solely by a precedent interac-
tive coin-flipping procedure without any set-up assumptions. For a more advanced usage of
commitments as in our strong coin-flipping notion in Chapter 9, however, we have (in some
sense) the requirement of equivocability. We want to maintain the interactive generation of
the key at any rate, which means that we do not have enough control of its generation and
even less control to equip it with a trapdoor (as done in Sections 4.1.4 and 7.2).
We therefore develop a special notion of trapdoor opening, where the ability to do a
trapdoor opening is not associated to a special knowledge of the hiding key, but is rather
done by cheating in the opening phase. Specifically, we do the opening not by sending the
plaintext and the randomness, committed to in the first phase but instead by sending only
the plaintext and then doing an interactive proof that this plaintext is indeed what was
committed to. The ability to do trapdoor openings will then be associated with being able
to control the challenge in the interactive proof. We will get this control by using a weak
coin-flipping protocol as sub-protocol. This will be one of the essential steps in bootstrapping
fully simulatable strong coin-flipping from weak coin-flipping.
As before, we denote the mixed string commitment scheme of Section 4.1 by commitpk.
Let κ be the security parameter defining the key space {0, 1}κ and let σ be the secondary
security parameter controlling the soundness error in the interactive proof, which we want to
be negligible in σ when commitpk is unconditionally binding. We equate the plaintext space
{0, 1}` of commitpk with the Galois field F = F2κ . The new extended commitment scheme,
equipped with the possibility to do trapdoor openings, is denoted by COMMITpk. We assume
its plaintext space to be Fσ and denote by sss a secret sharing scheme over F.
Given message m = (m1, . . . ,mσ) ∈ Fσ and randomizer s = (s1, . . . , sσ) ∈ Fσ, let fm,s(X)
denote the unique polynomial of degree 2σ − 1, for which fm,s(−i+ 1) = mi for i = 1, . . . , σ
and fm,s(i) = si for i = 1, . . . , σ. Furthermore, we “fill up” positions i = σ+ 1, . . . ,Σ, where
Σ = 4σ, by letting si = fm,s(i). The shares are now s = (s1, . . . , sΣ). The new commitment
scheme COMMITpk is described in Figure 7.1.
We stress two simple facts about this scheme. First, for any message m ∈ Fσ and any
subset S ⊂ {1, . . . ,Σ} of size |S| = σ, the shares s|S are uniformly random in Fσ, when
S is chosen uniformly at random in Fσ and independent of m. This aspect is trivial for
S = {1, . . . , σ}, as we defined it that way, and it extends to the other subsets using Lagrange
interpolation. And second, if m1,m2 ∈ Fσ are two distinct messages, then sss(m1; s1)
and sss(m2; s2) have Hamming distance at least Σ − 2σ. Again, this follows by Lagrange
interpolation, since the polynomial fm1,s1(X) has degree at most 2σ − 1, and hence, can be
computed from any 2σ shares si using Lagrange interpolation. The same holds for fm2,s2(X).
Thus, if 2σ shares are the same, then fm1,s1(X) and fm2,s2(X) are the same, which implies
that the messages m1 = fm1,s1(−σ+1), . . . , fm1,s1(0) and m2 = fm2,s2(−σ+1), . . . , fm2,s2(0)
are the same.
First note that if the underlying commitment commitpk is unconditionally hiding, then
so is COMMITpk. In the following, we investigate the extraction property of COMMITpk, under
the assumption that we work in the unconditionally binding mode of commitpk. Given any
commitment M =
(
M1, . . . ,MΣ
)
, we extract(
xtrsk(M1), . . . , xtrsk(MΣ)
)
= (s1, . . . , sΣ) = s .
Assume s′ = (s′1, . . . , s′Σ) is the consistent sharing closest to s. That means that s
′ is the
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Commitment Scheme COMMITpk:
Commitment Phase:
1. Let message m ∈ Fσ be the message to get committed to. The commit-
ter samples uniformly random s ∈ Fσ and computes the shares sss(m; s) =
(s1, . . . , sΣ), where si ∈ F.
2. He computes COMMIT pk
(
m, (s, r)
)
=
(
M1, . . . ,MΣ
)
. In more detail, for i =
1, . . . ,Σ, the committer computes Mi = commit pk (si, ri) with shares s =
(s1, . . . , sΣ) and randomness r = (r1, . . . , rΣ).
3. The committer sends (M1, . . . ,MΣ).
Opening Phase:
1. The committer sends the shares s = (s1, . . . , sΣ) to the receiver.
2. If the shares are not consistent with a polynomial of degree at most 2σ − 1,
the receiver aborts. Otherwise, he picks a uniformly random subset S ⊂
{1, . . . ,Σ} of size |S| = σ and sends S to the committer.
3. The committer sends r|S .
4. The receiver verifies that Mi = commit pk (si, ri) for all i ∈ S. If the test fails,
he aborts. Otherwise, he computes the message m ∈ Fσ consistent with s.
Figure 7.1: The Commitment Scheme COMMITpk.
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vector which is consistent with a polynomial fm′,s′(X) of degree at most 2σ− 1 and which at
the same time differs from s in the fewest positions. Note that we can find s′ in poly-time
when using a Reed Solomon code, which has efficient minimal distance decoding. We then
interpolate this polynomial fm′,s′(X), let m
′ = fm′,s′(−σ + 1), . . . , fm′,s′(0), and define m′ to
be the message committed to by COMMITpk. Any other sharing s
′′ = (s′′1, . . . , s′′Σ) must have
Hamming distance at least 2σ to s′. Now, since s is closer to s′ than to any other consistent
sharing, it must, in particular, be closer to s′ then to s′′. This implies that s is at distance
at least σ to s′′.
We will use this observation for proving soundness of the opening phase. To determine
the soundness error, assume that COMMITpk does not open to the shares s
′ consistent with s.
As observed, this implies that
(
xtrsk(M1), . . . , xtrsk(MΣ)
)
has Hamming distance at least
σ to s′. However, when commitpk is unconditionally binding, all Mi can only be opened to
xtrsk(Mi). From the above two facts, we have that there are at least σ values i ∈ {1, . . . ,Σ}
such that the receiver cannot open Mi to si for i ∈ S. Since Σ = 4σ, these σ bad indices
(bad for a dishonest sender) account for a fraction of 14 of all points in {1, . . . ,Σ}. Thus, the
probability that none of the σ points in S is a bad index is at most (34)
σ, which is negligible.
Lemma 7.1 follows.
Lemma 7.1 If pk is unconditionally binding, then the probability that an unbounded cheating
committer can open M = COMMIT pk
(
m, (s, r)
)
to a plaintext different from xtrsk(M) is at
most (34)
σ, assuming that the challenge S is picked uniformly at random and independent of
M .
In the context of simulation, we will use the challenge S as the simulators trapdoor,
allowing him to equivocally open his commitments. In such a simulation, the ideal-world
adversary Sˆ can—by means discussed later—enforce a specific challenge, i.e., it is guaranteed
that this will be the challenge in the opening phase. Thus, for simplicity, we assume here
that it simply gets a fixed challenge S as input. The simulation is described in Figure 7.2.
Lemma 7.2 follows via a hybrid argument, which relies on the quantum-computational indis-
tinguishability in switching unconditionally binding and unconditionally hiding commitment
keys. We omit a proof here but refer to Chapter 9, where the construction will be explicitly
proven within its outer construction.
Lemma 7.2 If m˜ = m, then the transcript of the protocol is identical to that of an honest
commitment to m, followed by an honest opening phase to m, and run with a uniformly
random challenge S.
If m˜ 6= m, then the transcript of the protocol is quantum-computationally indistinguishable
to that of an honest commitment to m˜, followed by an honest opening phase to m˜, and run
with a uniformly random challenge S.
Simulating COMMITpk with Trapdoor S:
1. Sˆ gets as input a uniformly random subset S ⊂ {1, . . . ,Σ} of size σ and an initial
message m ∈ Fσ.
2. Sˆ commits honestly to m ∈ Fσ by M = COMMIT sk
(
m, (s, r)
)
, as specified in the
commitment phase.
3. Sˆ is given an alternative message m˜ ∈ Fσ, i.e., the aim is opening M to m˜.
4. Sˆ lets s|S be the σ messages committed to by M |S . Then it interpolates the unique
polynomial fm˜,s of degree at most 2σ − 1 for which fm˜,s(i) = si for i ∈ S and for
which fm˜,s(−i+ 1) = m˜i for i = 1, . . . , σ. Note that this is possible, as we have ex-
actly 2σ points which restrict our choice of fm˜,s. Sˆ sends s =
(
fm˜,s(1), . . . , fm˜,s(Σ)
)
to the receiver.
5. The receiver sends the challenge S.
6. For all i ∈ S, the sender opens Mi to fm˜,s(i). This is possible, since fm˜,s(i) = si is
exactly the message committed to by Mi when i ∈ S.
Figure 7.2: The Ideal-World Simulation of COMMITpk.
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Quantum-Secure Coin-Flipping
Coin-flipping is introduced in Section 2.4.4 and allows two parties to agree on a uniformly
random bit in a fair way. Security for both parties follows, if neither party can influence the
value of the coin to his advantage. Thus, it enables the parties to interactively generate true
randomness from scratch. The chapter is based on parts of [DL09].
8.1 Motivation and Related Work
We are interested in the standard coin-flipping protocol [Blu81] with classical message ex-
change but we here assume that the adversary is capable of quantum computing. As already
mentioned, bit commitment implies a secure coin-flipping, but even when basing the em-
bedded commitment on a computational assumption that withstands quantum attacks, the
security proof of the entire coin-flipping (and its integration into other applications) could
previously not be translated from the classical to the quantum world.
Typically, security against a classical adversary is argued in such a context by rewinding
the adversary in a simulation. Recall that, in general, rewinding as a proof technique cannot
be directly applied in the quantum world. Based on a recent result of Watrous [Wat09],
which originally allowed to prove unconditionally that quantum zero-knowledge of certain
interactive proofs is possible and that the classical definitions can be translated into the
quantum world, we show the most natural and direct quantum analogue of the classical
security proof for standard coin-flipping.
We want to mention an alternative approach, which was independently investigated but
never published [Smi09]. They propose a classical protocol for zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge secure against quantum adversaries. The protocol consists of a commitment
phase and two zero-knowledge proofs. Instead of opening the commitment, the committer
claims the value of the committed coins and gives the first zero-knowledge proof that the
claim is correct. To simulate this zero-knowledge proof, Watrous’ technique is used. Note
that this approach allows for flipping a string of coins in the commitments, and thus, arrives
at a coin-flipping protocol with round complexity independent of the length of the flipped
string at first. However, the required zero-knowledge proof has round complexity depending
on the security parameter, i.e. how many proofs must be completed to achieve a negligible
soundness error. Finally, the coin-string is used as key to encode the witness and the second
zero-knowledge proof is given that this statement is actually true. As encryption scheme,
they suggest a scheme with similar properties as in our mixed commitment constructions—
but at least to our best knowledge, the question of its actual secure implementation was left
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Protocol COIN:
1. A chooses a ∈R {0, 1} and computes commit (a, r) . She sends commit (a, r) to B.
2. B chooses b ∈R {0, 1} and sends b to A.
3. A sends open (a, r) and B checks if the opening is valid.
4. Both compute coin = a⊕ b.
Figure 8.1: The Coin-Flipping Protocol.
Functionality FCOIN :
Upon receiving requests start from Alice and Bob, FCOIN outputs uniformly random
coin to Alice. It then waits to receive Alice’s second input > or ⊥ and outputs coin or
⊥ to Bob, respectively.
Figure 8.2: The Ideal Functionality for a Coin-Flip.
open.
We stress that we aim at establishing coin-flipping as a stand-alone tool that can be used
in several contexts and different generic constructions. Some example applications thereof
are discussed in Chapter 10, including an independently proposed zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge. In order to include coin-flipping securely in other applications, we conclude this
chapter by proving the basic construction secure under sequential composition and propose
an extended construction for general composability.
8.2 The Protocol
The standard coin-flipping protocol COIN is shown in Figure 8.1, allowing players A and
B to interactively generate a random and fair coin in one execution without any set-up
requirements. As underlying commitment scheme, we use the unconditionally binding and
quantum-computationally hiding scheme described in Section 7.1 with security parameter n.
We will use its simpler notation here, namely commit (a, r) with input a ∈ {0, 1}, randomness
r ∈ ` and output in {0, 1}∗. To indicate the opening phase, where A sends a and r, we will
write open (a, r) . The corresponding ideal coin-flipping functionality FCOIN is depicted in
Figure 8.2. Note that dishonest A′ may refuse to open commit (a, r) in the real world after
learning B’s input. For this case, FCOIN allows her a second input ⊥, modeling the abort of
the protocol.
Proposition 8.1 Protocol COIN satisfies correctness, according to Definition 3.4.
Correctness is obvious by inspection of the protocol: If both players are honest, they
independently choose random bits a and b. These bits are then combined via exclusive
disjunction, resulting in a uniformly random coin.
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Simulation Aˆ′ :
1. Upon receiving commit (a, r) from A′, Aˆ′ sends start and then > to FCOIN as first
and second input, respectively, and receives a uniformly random coin.
2. Aˆ′ computes a and r from commit (a, r) .
3. Aˆ′ computes b = coin⊕ a and sends b to A′.
4. Aˆ′ waits to receive A′’s last message and outputs whatever A′ outputs.
Figure 8.3: The Ideal-World Simulation against dishonest Alice.
Theorem 8.1 Protocol COIN is unconditionally secure against any unbounded dishonest Al-
ice according to Definition 3.6, provided that the underlying commitment scheme is uncon-
ditionally binding.
Proof. We construct an ideal-world adversary Aˆ′, such that the real output of the protocol
is statistically indistinguishable from the ideal output produced by Aˆ′, FCOIN and A′. The
ideal-world simulation is depicted in Figure 8.3.
First note that a, r and commit (a, r) are chosen and computed as in the real protocol.
From the statistically binding property of the commitment scheme, it follows that A′’s choice
bit a is uniquely determined from commit (a, r) = c, since for any c, there exists at most
one pair (a, r) such that c = commit (a, r) , except with probability negligible in the security
parameter n. Hence in the real world, A′ is unconditionally bound to her bit before she learns
B’s choice bit, which means a is independent of b. Therefore in Step (2.), the simulator can
correctly (but not necessarily efficiently) compute a (and r). Note that, in the case of
unconditional security, we do not have to require the simulation to be efficient. However,
we show in Section 8.3.2 how to extend the underlying commitment in order to extract A′’s
inputs. This extraction requires a extraction trapdoor and yields an efficient simulation in
the CRS-model. Finally, due to the properties of XOR, A′ cannot tell the difference between
the random b computed from the ideal, random coin in the simulation in Step (3.) and the
randomly chosen b of the real world. It follows that the simulated output is statistically
indistinguishable from the output in the real protocol. 
To prove security against any dishonest quantum-computationally bounded B′, we will
follow the lines of argument as in Section 3.6.3, in particular Definition 3.7, with slight
modifications. More specifically, we do not require a common reference string, so we can
omit this part of the definition. Thus, we show that there exists an ideal-world simulation
Bˆ′ with output quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the output of the protocol
in the real world. For the ideal world, we consider the poly-size input sampler, which takes
as input only the security parameter and produces a valid input state ρUZV ′ = ρU↔Z↔V ′ as
specified in Section 3.6.3.
In a simulation against a classical adversary, a classical poly-time simulator would work
as follows. It inquires coin from FCOIN, chooses random a and r, and computes b′ = coin⊕a
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as well as commit (a, r) . It then sends commit (a, r) to B′ and receives B′’s choice bit b.
If b = b′, the simulation was successful. Otherwise, the simulator rewinds B′ and repeats
the simulation. For a security proof against any quantum adversary, we construct a poly-
time quantum simulator proceeding similarly to its classical analogue. However, it requires
quantum registers as work space and relies on Watrous’ quantum rewinding lemma (see
Lemma 3.2). Recall from Section 3.5.2 that Watrous constructs the quantum simulator
for a Σ-protocol, i.e. a protocol in three-move form, where the verifier flips a single coin
in the second step and sends this challenge to the prover. Since these are the essential
aspects also in our protocol COIN, we can apply Watrous’ quantum rewinding technique
(with slight modifications) as a black-box to our protocol. We also follow his notation and
line of argument here. For a more detailed description and proofs, we refer to [Wat09] and
Section 3.5.2.
Theorem 8.2 For p0 ≥ 14 , protocol COIN is quantum-computationally secure against any
poly-time bounded dishonest Bob (according to Definition 3.7 but with the modification de-
scribed above), provided that the underlying commitment scheme is quantum-computationally
hiding.
Proof. Let |ψ〉 denote B′’s n-qubit auxiliary input. Let W denote B′’s auxiliary input
register, containing |ψ〉. Let V and B denote B′’s work space, where V is an arbitrary
polynomial-size register and B is a single qubit register. A’s classical messages are considered
in the following as being stored in quantum registers A1 and A2. In addition, the quantum
simulator uses registers R, containing all possible choices of a classical simulator, and G,
representing its guess b′ on B′’s message b in the second step. Finally, let X denote a working
register of size k, which is initialized to the state |0k˜〉 and corresponds to the collection of all
registers as described above except W .
The quantum rewinding procedure is implemented by a general quantum circuit Rcoin
with input (W,X,B′, coin). As a first step, it applies a unitary (n, k)-quantum circuit Q
to (W,X) to simulate the conversation, obtaining registers (G, Y ). Then, a test takes place
to observe whether the simulation was successful. In that case, Rcoin outputs the resulting
quantum register. Otherwise, it quantumly rewinds by applying the reverse circuit Q† on
(G, Y ) to retrieve (W,X) and then a phase-flip transformation on X before another iteration
of Q is applied. Note that Rcoin is essentially the same circuit as R described in [Wat09]
(and Section 3.5.2), but in our application it depends on the value of a given coin, i.e., we
apply R0 or R1 for coin = 0 or coin = 1, respectively.
In more detail, Q transforms (W,X) to (G, Y ) by the following unitary operations:
(1.) It constructs a superposition over all possible random choices of values in the real
protocol, i.e.,
1√
2`+1
∑
a,r
|a, r〉R|commit (a, r) 〉A1
∣∣b′ = coin⊕ a〉
G
|open (a, r) 〉A2 |0〉B
∣∣∣0k∗〉
V
|ψ〉W ,
where k∗ < k. Note that the state of registers
(
A1, G,A2
)
corresponds to a uniform
distribution of possible transcripts of the interaction between the players.
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(2.) For each possible commit (a, r) , it simulates B′’s possible actions by applying a unitary
operator to
(
W,V,B,A1
)
with register A1 as control, i.e.,
1√
2`+1
∑
a,r
|a, r〉R|commit (a, r) 〉A1
∣∣b′〉
G
|open (a, r) 〉A2 |b〉B
∣∣∣φ˜〉
V
∣∣∣ψ˜〉
W
,
where φ˜ and ψ˜ describe modified quantum states. Note that register B now includes
B′’s reply b.
(3.) Finally, a CNOT-operation is applied to pair
(
B,G
)
with B as control to check whether
the simulator’s guess of B′’s choice was correct. The result of the CNOT-operation is
stored in register G.
1√
2`+1
∑
a,r
|a, r〉R|commit (a, r) 〉A1
∣∣b′ ⊕ b〉
G
|open (a, r) 〉A2 |b〉B
∣∣∣φ˜〉
V
∣∣∣ψ˜〉
W
.
Note that the qubit in register G gives the information about success or failure of the sim-
ulated run, and the other registers are combined in the residual n + k − 1-qubit register
Y .
Since the commitment scheme in the protocol is only quantum-computationally hiding,
we must allow for small perturbations in the quantum rewinding procedure, according to
Lemma 3.2 : Bound ε indicates B′’s advantage over a random guess on the committed value
with q = 1/2 (and therefore, his advantage to bias the outcome), due to his computing power,
i.e. ε = |p − 1/2|. From the hiding property of the commitment scheme, it follows that ε
is negligible in the security parameter n. Thus, we can argue that probability p is close to
independent of the auxiliary input. As a lower bound on the success probability, we chose
p0 ≥ 1/4, which matches our setting.
Thus, we have circuit Q as described above and our setting achieves the given bounds.
Lemma 3.2 applies. We can now construct an ideal-world quantum simulator Bˆ′ (see Fig-
ure 8.4), interacting with B′ and the ideal functionality FCOIN and executing Watrous’ quan-
tum rewinding algorithm. We then compare the output states of the real process and the
ideal process. In case of indistinguishable outputs, quantum-computational security against
B′ follows.
First note that the superposition constructed as described above in circuit Q in Step (1.)
corresponds to all possible random choices of values in the real protocol. Furthermore,
the circuit models any possible strategy of quantum B′ in Step (2.), depending on control
register |commit (a, r) 〉A1 . The CNOT-operation on (B,G) in Step (3.), followed by a standard
measurement of G, indicate whether the guess b′ on B′’s choice b was correct. If that was
not the case (i.e. b 6= b′ and measurement result 1), the system gets quantumly rewound by
applying reverse transformations (3)-(1), followed by a phase-flip operation. The procedure
is repeated until the measurement outcome is 0 and hence b = b′. Watrous’ technique then
guarantees that, for negligible advantage ε and a lower bound p0 ≥ 14 , ε′ is negligible. Thus,
the final output of the simulation is close to the “good” state of a successful simulation.
More specifically, the output ρ(ψ) of Rcoin has square-fidelity close to 1 with state |φgood(ψ)〉
of a successful simulation, i.e.
〈φgood(ψ)|ρ(ψ)|φgood(ψ)〉 ≥ 1− ε′ ,
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Simulation Bˆ′ :
1. Bˆ′ gets B′’s auxiliary quantum input W and working registers X.
2. Bˆ′ sends start and then > to FCOIN. It receives a uniformly random coin.
3. Depending on the value of coin, Bˆ′ applies the corresponding circuit Rcoin with
input W,X,B′ and coin.
4. Bˆ′ receives output register Y with |φgood(ψ)〉 and “measures the conversation” to
retrieve the corresponding
(
commit (a, r) , b, open (a, r)
)
. It outputs whatever B′
outputs.
Figure 8.4: The Ideal-World Simulation against dishonest Bob.
where ε′ = 16 ε log2(1/ε)/(p20 (1−p0)2). Last, note that all operations in Q (and therewith in
Rcoin) can be performed by polynomial-size circuits, and thus, the simulator has polynomial
size (in the worst case). It follows that the output of the ideal simulation is indistinguishable
from the output in the real world for any quantum-computationally bounded B′. 
8.3 Composability
As already discussed in the previous part, there are several composition frameworks proposed
for the quantum setting, but for sequential composition we will argue along the lines of our
security framework (Section 8.3.1). In Section 8.3.2, we will use an extend commitment
construction to achieve a more general composability in the CRS-model. Note that only
sequential composition allows us to do coin-flipping from scratch.
8.3.1 Sequential Composition
Recall that we prove correctness and security for our single coin-flip according to the security
framework as described in Section 3.6, with the one modification that we do not assume
a common reference string in the simulation against a dishonest Bob (see Theorem 8.2).
However, we can still apply the Composition Theorems I and II (Theorems 3.2 and 3.3),
where we also omit the reference string in the latter. We will state the composition result
explicitly here.
Corollary 8.1 Let pii = Π
COIN
A,B and Fi = FCOIN, and let ΣF1···F` be a classical two-party
hybrid protocol which makes at most ` = poly(n) calls to the functionalities. Then, for every
i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, each protocol pii is a statistically secure implementation of Fi against A and
a computationally secure implementation of Fi against Bpoly.
It holds that there exists an ideal-world adversary Aˆ′ ∈ A such that
outΣ
pi1···pi`
A′,B
s≈ outΣF1···F`
Aˆ′,B′ ,
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Functionality F`−COIN :
1. Upon receiving requests start from both Alice and Bob, F`−COIN outputs uniformly
random h ∈R {0, 1}` to Alice.
2. It then waits to receive her second input > or ⊥ and outputs h or ⊥ to Bob,
respectively.
Figure 8.5: The Ideal Functionality for Sequential `-bit Coin-Flipping.
and an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly such that for every efficient input sampler, we have
outΣ
pi1···pi`
A,B′
q≈ outΣF1···F`
Aˆ,Bˆ′ .
The ideal functionality for sequential coin-flipping, i.e. F`−COIN = ΣF1···F` , is depicted in
Figure 8.5. Note that F`−COIN is in fact derived from composing the functionality FCOIN of
a single coin-flip sequentially but interpreted more directly, e.g. it does not output the bits
one after another but as a string, and thus, does not output the precedent coins in case of
an intermediate abort.
8.3.2 General Composition
For our coin-flipping protocol without set-up, we cannot claim universal composability. We
do not require (nor obtain) an efficient simulator in case of unconditional security against
dishonest Alice and furthermore, we allow rewinding in case of dishonest Bob. These two
aspects contradict the universal composability framework.
Efficient simulation requires some trapdoor information in the commitment construction,
which is available only to a simulator, so that it is able to extract dishonest Alice’s choice bit
efficiently. Therefore, we have to extend the commitment scheme by including an extraction
trapdoor. To circumvent the necessity of rewinding dishonest Bob, we further extend the
scheme with respect to equivocability, i.e., the simulator can now construct a valid com-
mitment, which can later be opened to both bit values as desired. Note that with such
requirements, the CRS-model seems unavoidable.
An appropriate extended construction is proposed in Section 7.2. The real-world key
consists of commitment key pkB and (invalid) instance x′. During simulation against A′, Aˆ′
chooses pkB with matching decryption key sk and therefore, it can extract A′’s choice bit a
by decrypting both commitments C0 and C1. In both worlds, the commitment is uncondi-
tionally binding. During simulation against B′, Bˆ′ chooses commitment key pkH and (valid)
instance x. Hence, the commitment is unconditionally hiding and can be equivocated by
using w to compute two valid replies in the underlying Σ-protocol. Quantum-computational
security in real life follows from the indistinguishability of the keys pkB and pkH and the
indistinguishability of the instances x and x′, and efficiency of both simulations is ensured
due to extraction and equivocability.
Again, by combining our extended construction in the CRS-model providing efficient
simulations on both sides with the results of Section 7.2 and [Unr10, Theorem 20], we get
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the following result that Π COINA,B computationally quantum-UC-emulates its corresponding ideal
functionality FCOIN for both dishonest players. In the next Chapter 9, we will show another
method of achieving fully simulatability in the plain model without any set-up assumption,
when both players are poly-time bounded.
c
h
a
p
t
e
r
9
Amplification Framework for
Strong Coins
Here, we present a framework that amplifies weak security requirements on coins into very
strong properties, with the final result of a quantum-secure and fully simulatable coin-flipping
protocol, which can be implemented in the plain model from scratch. The results in this
chapter are joint work with Nielsen [LN10].
9.1 Motivation
Coin-Flipping of a single coin is in itself an intriguing and prolific primitive in cryptographic
protocol theory. Its full potential is tapped in the possibility of flipping a string of coins, which
opens up for various applications and implementations without any set-up assumptions. We
will later in Chapter 10 discuss some examples thereof.
In this chapter, we first investigate the different degrees of security that a string of
coins can acquire. Then, we propose and prove constructions that allow us to amplify the
respective degrees of security such that weaker coins are converted into very strong ones in
a straightforward way.1 Our method only assumes mixed commitment schemes, which we
know how to construct with quantum security, no other assumptions are put forward. Our
final result is a coin-flipping protocol, which is fully simulatable in polynomial time, even
against poly-sized quantum adversaries on both sides, and which can be implemented with
quantum-computational security in the plain model from scratch.
Our method of amplifying the security of coin-flipping also applies to potential constant
round coin-flipping. Such a strong and efficient construction would require a basic quantum-
secure coin-flip protocol with long outcomes (in constant round), and poly-time simulatability
on one side. Its construction, however, is still a fascinating open problem in the quantum
world.
1For the sake of clarity, we note that we use the (intuitive) literal interpretation of “weak” and “strong”
coins related to their degrees of security, which differs from their definitions in the quantum literature (see
also Section 2.4.4).
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9.2 Security Notions
We denote a generic protocol with a λ-bit coin-string as output by Πλ−COINA,B , corresponding to
an ideal functionality Fλ−COIN. Recall that the outcome of such a protocol is c ∈ {0, 1}λ∪{⊥},
i.e., either an λ-bit string or an error message.2 We will use several security parameters,
indicating the length of coin-strings for different purposes. The length of a coin-flip yielding
a key and a challenge are denoted by κ and σ, respectively, and the length of a final coin-flip
is indicated by `, i.e., we allow that λ is a function of the respective parameter, e.g. λ(κ),
but we write κ instead.
Throughout this chapter, we restrict both players Alice and Bob to the families Apoly and
Bpoly of classical polynomial-time strategies, i.e. for the honest case, we require A, Aˆ ∈ Apoly
and B, Bˆ ∈ Bpoly, as well as for possibly quantum dishonest entities, we demand A′, Aˆ′ ∈ Apoly
and B′, Bˆ′ ∈ Bpoly. We want to stress here that, in contrast to previous chapters, both
players are poly-time bounded. This means, in particular, that the ideal functionality is
defined symmetric such that always the respective dishonest party has an option to abort.
For clarity, we will explicitly show the ideal functionalities in the case of both players being
honest (Figure 9.1) and in the case of dishonest Alice and honest Bob (Figure 9.2). The
latter then also applies to honest Alice and dishonest Bob by simply switching sides and
names.
Functionality Fλ−COIN with honest players:
Upon receiving requests start from both Alice and Bob, Fλ−COIN outputs uniformly
random h ∈R {0, 1}λ to Alice and Bob.
Figure 9.1: The Ideal Functionality for λ-bit Coin-Flipping (without Corruption).
Functionality Fλ−COIN with dishonest Alice:
1. Upon receiving requests start from both Alice and Bob, Fλ−COIN outputs uni-
formly random h ∈R {0, 1}λ to Alice.
2. It then waits to receive her second input > or ⊥ and outputs h or ⊥ to Bob,
respectively.
Figure 9.2: The Ideal Functionality for λ-bit Coin-Flipping (with Corruption).
Recall that the joint output representation of a protocol execution is denoted by outΠA,B
with Π = Πλ−COINA,B and given here for the case of honest players. The same notation with
F = Fλ−COIN and Aˆ, Bˆ applies in the ideal world as outFAˆ,Bˆ, where the players invoke the
ideal functionality Fλ−COIN and output whatever they obtain from it. We need an additional
2We want to stress that throughout the chapter, a reference to any coin-flip is understood as one run of
coin-flipping with a coin-string outcome.
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notation here, describing the outcome of a protocol run between e.g. honest A and B, namely
c← Πλ−COINA,B .
We will define three flavors of security for coin-flipping protocols, namely uncontrollable
(uncont), random and enforceable (force). The two sides can have different flavors. Then, if
a protocol Πλ−COINA,B is, for instance, enforceable against Alice and random against Bob, we
write pi(force,random), and similarly for the eight other combinations of security. Note that
for simplicity of notation, we will then omit the indexed name as well as the length of the
coin, as they are clear from the context. Similar to the ideal functionality for the case of
dishonest Alice, we define all three flavors for Alice’s side only, as the definitions for Bob are
analogue. The flavors are defined along the lines of the security framework introduced in
Section 3.6 but with adaptions to reflect the particular context here. Recall that U ′, Z, and
V denote dishonest Alice’s quantum and classical input, and honest Bob’s classical input,
respectively. Note that an honest player’s input is empty but models the invocation start.
Any input state ρU ′ZV is restricted to ρU ′ZV = ρU ′↔Z↔V , such that Alice’s quantum and
Bob’s classical part are only correlated via Alice’s classical Z. We assume again a poly-size
input sampler, which takes as input the security parameter, and then produces a valid input
state ρU ′ZV = ρU ′↔Z↔V (and analogous ρUZV ′ in case of dishonest Bob).
We stress that we require for all three security flavors and for all c ∈ {0, 1}λ that
Pr [c← Πλ−COINA,B ] = 2−λ ,
which implies that when both parties are honest, then the coin is unbiased. Below we only
define the extra properties required for each of the three flavors.
We call a coin-flip uncontrollable against Alice, if she cannot force the coin to hit some
negligible subset, except with negligible probability.
Definition 9.1 (Uncontrollability against dishonest Alice) We say that the protocol
Πλ−COINA,B implements an uncontrollable coin-flip against dishonest Alice, if it holds for any
poly-sized adversary A′ ∈ Apoly with inputs as specified above and all negligible subsets Q ⊂
{0, 1}λ that the probability
Pr [c← Πλ−COINA′,B : c ∈ Q] ∈ negl (κ) .
Note that we denote by Q ⊂ {0, 1}λ a family of subsets {Q(κ) ⊂ {0, 1}λ(κ)}κ∈N for security
parameter κ. Then we call Q negligible, if |Q(κ)|2−λ(κ) is negligible in κ. In other words, we
call a subset negligible if it contains a negligible fraction of the elements in the set in which
it lives.
We call a coin-flip random against Alice, if she cannot enforce a non-uniformly random
output string in {0, 1}λ, except by making the protocol fail on some chosen runs. That means
she can at most lower the probability of certain output strings compared to the uniform case.
Definition 9.2 (Randomness against dishonest Alice) We say that protocol Πλ−COINA,B
implements a random coin-flip against dishonest Alice, if it holds for any poly-sized ad-
versary A′ ∈ Apoly with inputs as specified above that there exists an event E such that
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Pr [E] ∈ negl (κ) and for all x ∈ {0, 1}λ it holds that
Pr [c← Πλ−COINA′,B : c = x | E¯] ≤ 2−λ .
It is obvious that if a coin-flip is random against Alice, then it is also an uncontrollable coin-
flip against her. We will later discuss a generic transformation going in the other direction
from uncontrollable to random coin-flipping.
We call a coin-flip enforceable against Alice, if it is possible, given a uniformly random c,
to simulate a run of the protocol hitting exactly the outcome c, though we still allow that
the corrupted party forces abort on some outcomes.
Definition 9.3 (Enforceability against dishonest Alice) We call a protocol Πλ−COINA,B
enforceable against dishonest Alice, if it implements the ideal functionality Fλ−COIN against
her.
In more detail, that means that for any poly-sized adversary A′ ∈ Apoly, there exists an
ideal-world adversary Aˆ′ ∈ Apoly that simulates the protocol with A′ as follows. Aˆ′ requests
output h ∈ {0, 1}λ from Fλ−COIN. Then it simulates a run of the coin-flipping protocol with
A′ and tries to enforced output h. If Aˆ′ succeeds, it inputs > as A′’s second input to Fλ−COIN.
In that case, Fλ−COIN outputs h. Otherwise, Aˆ′ inputs ⊥ to Fλ−COIN as second input and
Fλ−COIN outputs ⊥. The simulation is such that the ideal output is quantum-computationally
indistinguishable from the output of an actual run of the protocol, i.e.,
outΠA′,B
q≈ outF
Aˆ′,Bˆ ,
where Π = Πλ−COINA′,B and F = Fλ−COIN.
Note that an enforceable coin-flip is not necessarily a random coin-flip, as it is allowed
that the outcome of an enforceable coin-flip is only quantum-computationally indistinguish-
able from uniformly random, whereas a random coin-flip is required to produce truly random
outcomes on the non-aborting runs.
We defined an enforceable coin-flip against dishonest Alice to be a coin-flip, simulatable
on her side and implementing the corresponding ideal functionality against her. The same
result with switched sides also holds for any poly-time bounded Bob. Thus, we obtain a
coin-flip protocol, for which we can simulate both sides in polynomial time. Corollary 9.1
follows.
Corollary 9.1 Let Πλ−COINA,B be an enforceable coin-flip against both parties Alice and Bob
with A ∈ Apoly and B ∈ Bpoly, i.e. Πλ−COINA,B = pi(force,force). Then pi(force,force) is a fully
poly-time simulatable coin-flipping protocol for the ideal functionality Fλ−COIN with quantum-
computational indistinguishability between the real and the ideal output.
Combining the part regarding simulatability in Corollary 8.1, where we again omit the
common reference string, in contrast to the original Composition Theorem II (Theorem 3.3),
with the results of Corollary 9.1, we can show that each protocol pi(force,force) is a computa-
tionally secure implementation of Fλ−COIN against both Apoly and Bpoly.
Corollary 9.2 Protocol pi(force,force) composes sequentially.
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9.3 Amplification Theorems
We now propose and prove theorems, which allow us to amplify the security strength of
coins. Ultimately, we aim at constructing a strong coin-flipping protocol pi(force,force) with
outcomes of any polynomial length ` in λ from any weaker coin-flip protocol, i.e., either
from a protocol pi(force,random) producing one-bit outcomes (Section 9.3.1), or from a protocol
pi(force,uncont) giving outcomes of length κ, as described in Section 9.3.2. In both cases, the
first step towards pi(force,force) is to build a protocol pi(force,random) with outcomes of length
`.
We want to stress that if the underlying protocol already produces `-bit outcomes and
is constant round, then the resulting protocol pi(force,force) will also be constant round. If
we start from a protocol only producing constant-sized outcomes, then pi(force,force) will use
O(`) times the number of rounds used by the underlying scheme.
We note here that we do not know of any candidate protocol with flavor (force, uncont)
but not (force, random). However, we consider it as a contribution in itself to find the weak-
est security notion for coin-flipping that allows to amplify to the final strong (force, force)
notion using a constant round reduction.
9.3.1 From Short Outcomes to Long Outcomes
To obtain long coin-flip outcomes, we can repeat a given protocol pi(force,random) with one-bit
outcomes ` times in sequence to get a protocol pi(force,random) with `-bit outcomes. A candidate
for pi(force,random) with one-bit outcomes is the protocol of Chapter 8, which is—in terms of
this context—enforceable against one side in poly-time and random on the other side, with
empty event E according to Definition 9.2, and the randomness guarantee even withstanding
an unbounded adversary. The protocol was argued to be sequentially composable according
to Corollary 8.1.
Note that this protocol is previously described and proven as pi(random,force). However,
due to the symmetric coin-flip definitions here and the restriction of entities to families of
classical polynomial-time strategies, we can easily switch sides between A and B.
9.3.2 From (force, uncont) to (force, random)
Assume that we are given a protocol pi(force,uncont), that only guarantees that Bob cannot
force the coin to hit a negligible subset (except with negligible probability). We now amplify
the security on Bob’s side from uncontrollable to random and therewith obtain a protocol
pi(force,random), in which Bob cannot enforce a non-uniformly random output string, except
by letting the protocol fail on some occasions. The stronger protocol pi(force,random) is given
in Figure 9.3. The underlying commitment commit denotes the commitment algorithm of
the keyed mixed string commitment scheme as described in Section 4.1. Recall that commit
does not require actual unconditionally hiding keys, but rather it suffices to use uniformly
random strings from {0, 1}κ, which unconditionally hide the plaintext, except with negligible
probability. The possibility of using random strings ensures that most keys of the given
domain are in that sense unconditionally hiding keys.
Proposition 9.1 Protocol pi(force,random) satisfies correctness, according to Definition 3.4.
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Protocol pi(force,random):
1. A and B run pi(force,uncont) to produce a public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. A samples a ∈R {0, 1}`, commits to it with A = commit pk (a, r) and randomizer
r ∈R {0, 1}`, and sends A to B.
3. B samples b ∈R {0, 1}` and sends b to A.
4. A opens A towards B.
5. The outcome is c = a⊕ b.
Figure 9.3: Amplification from (force, uncont) to (force, random).
Correctness is obvious by inspection of the protocol. If both players are honest, they
independently choose random strings a and b. The result of these strings combined by the
XOR-operation gives a uniformly random coin c of length `.
Theorem 9.1 If pi(force,uncont) is enforceable against Alice and uncontrollable against Bob,
then protocol pi(force,random) is enforceable against Alice and random for Bob.
Proof (Enforceability against Alice). In case of corrupted A′, Aˆ′ samples (pk, sk)← GB
as input. It then requests a uniformly random value h from F`−COIN. It runs pi(force,uncont)
with A′, in which Aˆ′ enforces the outcome pk in the first step. When A′ sends commitment
A, Aˆ′ uses sk to decrypt A to learn the unique string a that A can be opened to. Aˆ′
computes b = h⊕ a and sends b to A′. If A′ opens commitment A correctly, then the result
is c = a⊕ b = a⊕ (h⊕ a) = h as desired. In case she does not open correctly, Aˆ′ aborts with
result ⊥. Otherwise, Aˆ′ outputs whatever A′ outputs.
Since h is uniformly random and independent of A and a, it follows that b = h ⊕ a is
uniformly random and independent of A, exactly as in the protocol. Therefore, the transcript
of the simulation has the same distribution as the real protocol, except that pk is uniform
in X and not in {0, 1}κ. This is, however, quantum-computationally indistinguishable, as
otherwise, A′ could distinguish random access to samples from X from random access to
samples from {0, 1}κ. The formal proof proceeds through a series of hybrids as described in
full detail in the proof for Theorem 9.2 in the next Section 9.3.3.
The above two facts, that first we hit h when we do not abort, and second that the tran-
script of the simulation is quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol,
show that the resulting protocol is enforceable against Alice and simulatable on Alice’s side
for functionality F`−COIN, according to Definition 9.3 combined with Theorem 9.3. 
Proof (Randomness against Bob). For any B′, pk is uncontrollable, i.e. pk ∈ {0, 1}κ \
X , except with negligible probability, as X is negligible in {0, 1}κ. This, in particular, means
that the commitment A is perfectly hiding the value a. Therefore, a is uniformly random and
independent of b, and thus, h = a ⊕ b is uniformly random. This proves that the resulting
coin-flip is random against Bob, according to Definition 9.2. 
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Protocol pi(force,force):
1. A and B run pi(force,random) to produce a random public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. A computes and sends commitments COMMIT pk
(
a, (s, r)
)
= (A1, . . . , AΣ) to B. In
more detail, A samples uniformly random a, s ∈ Fσ. She then computes sss(a; s) =
(a1, . . . , aΣ) and Ai = commit pk (ai, ri) for all i = 1, . . . ,Σ.
3. B samples uniformly random b ∈ {0, 1}` and sends b to A.
4. A sends secret shares (a1, . . . , aΣ) to B. If (a1, . . . , aΣ) is not consistent with a
polynomial of degree at most (2σ − 1), B aborts.
5. A and B run pi(random,force) to produce a challenge S ⊂ {1, . . . ,Σ} of length |S| = σ.
6. A sends r|S to B.
7. B checks if Ai = commit pk (ai, ri) for all i ∈ S. If that is the case, B computes
message a ∈ Fσ consistent with (a1, . . . , aΣ) and the outcome of the protocol is
c = a⊕ b. Otherwise, B aborts and the outcome is c = ⊥ .
Figure 9.4: Amplification from (force, random) to (force, force).
9.3.3 From (force, random) to (force, force)
We now show how to obtain a coin-flipping protocol, which is enforceable against both
parties. Then, we can also claim by Corollary 9.1 that this protocol is a strong coin-flipping
protocol, poly-time simulatable on both sides for the natural ideal functionality F`−COIN. The
protocol pi(force,force) is described in Figure 9.4.
Note that the final protocol makes two calls to a subprotocol with random flavor on
one side and enforceability on the other side, but where the sides are interchanged for each
instance, i.e. pi(force,random) and pi(random,force). That means that we switch the players’ roles
as well as the direction of the messages. Furthermore, note that we use here the possibility
of trapdoor openings in our extended commitment construction COMMIT, based on secret
sharing and mixed commitments, as described in detail in Section 7.3.
Proposition 9.2 Protocol pi(force,force) satisfies correctness, according to Definition 3.4.
Again, correctness can be trivially checked, first by observing that honest players inde-
pendently input uniformly random strings a and b, and second by verifying that these strings
combined by XOR result in a uniformly random coin c of length `.
Theorem 9.2 If pi(force,random) is enforceable against Alice and random against Bob, then
protocol pi(force,force) is enforceable against both Alice and Bob.
Proof (Enforceability against Alice). If A′ is corrupted, Aˆ′ samples (pk, sk) ← GB as
input and enforces pi(force,random) in the first step to hit the outcome pk. It then requests
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value h from F`−COIN. When A′ sends commitments (A1, . . . , AΣ), Aˆ′ uses sk to extract a′
with
(
a′1, . . . , a′Σ
)
=
(
xtrsk(A1), . . . , xtrsk(AΣ)
)
. Aˆ′ then sets b = h⊕ a′, and sends b to A′.
Then Aˆ′ finishes the protocol honestly. In the following, we will prove that the transcript is
quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol and that if c 6= ⊥, then
c = h, except with negligible probability.
First, we show indistinguishability. The proof proceeds via a hybrid argument.3 Let D 0
denote the distribution of the output of the simulation as described. We now change the
simulation such that, instead of sending b = h ⊕ a′, we simply choose a uniformly random
b ∈ {0, 1}` and then output the corresponding h = a′ ⊕ b. Let D 1 denote the distribution of
the output of the simulation after this change. Since h is uniformly random and independent
of a′ in the first case, it follows that then b = h ⊕ a′ is uniformly random. Therefore, the
change to choose a uniformly random b in the second case actually does not change the
distribution at all, and it follows that D 0 = D 1.
By sending a uniformly random b, we are in a situation where we do not need the
decryption key sk to produce D 1, as we no longer need to know a′. So we can now make
the further change that, instead of forcing pi(force,random) to produce a random public key
pk ∈ X , we force it to hit a random public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ. This produces a distribution
D 2 of the output of the simulation. Since D 1 and D 2 only differ in the key we enforce
pi(force,random) to hit and the simulation is quantum poly-time, there exists a poly-sized circuit
Q, such that Q(U(X )) = D 1 and Q(U({0, 1}κ)) = D 2, where U(X ) and U({0, 1}κ) denote
the uniform distribution on X and the uniform distribution on {0, 1}κ, respectively. As
U(X ) and U({0, 1}κ) are quantum-computationally indistinguishable, and Q is poly-sized,
it follows that Q(U(X )) and Q(U({0, 1}κ)) are quantum-computationally indistinguishable,
and therewith, D 1 q≈ D 2.
A last change to the simulation is applied by running pi(force,random) honestly instead
of enforcing a uniformly random pk ∈ {0, 1}κ. Let D 3 denote the distribution obtained
after this change. As given in Definition 9.3, real runs of pi(force,random) and runs enforcing
a uniformly random value are quantum-computationally indistinguishable. Using a similar
argument as above, where Q is the part of the protocol following the run of pi(force,random),
we get that D 2 q≈ D 3. Finally by transitivity, it follows that D 0 q≈ D 3. The observation
that D 0 is the distribution of the simulation and D 3 is the actual distribution of the real
protocol concludes the first part of the proof.
We now argue the second part, i.e., if c 6= ⊥, then c = h, except with negligible prob-
ability. This follows by arguing soundness of the commitment scheme COMMIT, according
to Lemma 7.1. Recall that, if pk ∈ X , then the probability that A′ can open any A to a
plaintext different from xtrsk(A) is at most (
3
4)
σ when S is picked uniformly at random
and independent of A. The requirement on S is however guaranteed (except with negligible
probability) by the random flavor of the underlying protocol pi(random,force) producing S. This
concludes the proof of enforceability against Alice, as given in Definition 9.3. 
3Briefly, a hybrid argument is a proof technique to show that two (extreme) distributions are compu-
tationally indistinguishable via proceeding through several (adjacent) hybrid distributions. If all adjacent
distributions are pairwise computationally indistinguishability, it follows by transitivity that the two end
points are so as well. We want to point out that we are not subject to any restrictions in how to obtain the
hybrid distributions as long as we maintain indistinguishability.
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Simulation Bˆ′ for pi(force,force):
1. Bˆ′ requests h from F`−COIN and runs pi(force,random) honestly with B′ to produce a
uniformly random public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. Bˆ′ computes COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
= (A1, . . . ,AΣ) for uniformly random a
′, s ∈ Fσ
and sends (A1, . . . , AΣ) to B
′.
3. Bˆ′ receives b from B′.
4. Bˆ′ computes a = b ⊕ h. It then picks a uniformly random subset S ⊂ {1, . . . ,Σ}
with |S| = σ, and lets a′|S be the σ messages committed to by A|S . Then, it
interpolates the unique polynomial f of degree at most (2σ−1) for which f(i) = a′i
for i ∈ S and for which f(−i + 1) = ai for i ∈ {1, . . . ,Σ} \ S. Finally, it sends
(f(1), . . . , f(Σ)) to B′.
5. During the run of pi(random,force), Bˆ′ enforces the challenge S.
6. Bˆ′ sends r|S to B′.
7. Bˆ′ outputs whatever B′ outputs.
Figure 9.5: Simulation for Bob’s force in pi(force,force).
Proof (Enforceability against Bob). To prove enforceability against corrupted B′,
we construct a simulator Bˆ′ as shown in Figure 9.5. It is straightforward to verify that the
simulation always ensures that c = h, if B′ does not abort. However, we must explicitly argue
that the simulation is quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol.
Indistinguishability follows by first arguing that the probability for pk /∈ {0, 1}κ \ X
is negligible. This follows from X being negligible in {0, 1}κ and pk produced with flavor
random against B′ by pi(force,random) being uniformly random in {0, 1}κ, except with negligible
probability.
Second, we have to show that if pk ∈ {0, 1}κ \ X , then the simulation is quantum-
computationally close to the real protocol. This can be shown via the following hybrid
argument. Let D 0 be the distribution of the output of the simulation and let D 1 be the
distribution of the output of the simulation where we send all a′i for all i = {1, . . . ,Σ} at
the end of Step (4.). Since commitments by commit pk (·, ·) are unconditionally hiding in
case of pk ∈ {0, 1}κ \ X , commitments by COMMIT pk
(·, ·) are unconditionally hiding as well.
Furthermore, both a′ and a are uniformly random, so we obtain statistical closeness between
(a′, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
) and (a, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
). Note further that distributions D 0
and D 1 can be produced by a poly-sized circuit applied to either (a′, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
)
or (a, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
, it holds that D 0 q≈ D 1.
Now, let D 2 be the distribution obtained by not simulating the opening via the trapdoor,
but instead doing it honestly to the value committed to, i.e. (a′, r). We still use the challenge
S from the forced run of pi(random,force) though. However, for uniformly random challenges,
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real runs are quantum-computationally indistinguishable from simulated runs, and we get
D 1 q≈ D 2.
Next, letD 3 be the distribution of the output of the simulation where we run pi(random,force)
honestly instead of enforcing outcome S. We then use the honestly produced S′ in the proof
in Step (6.) instead of the enforced S. We can do this, as we modified the process leading
to D 2 towards an honest opening without any trapdoor, so we no longer need to enforce a
particular challenge. Under the assumption that pi(random,force) is enforceable against B′, and
observing that real runs are quantum-computationally indistinguishable from runs enforcing
uniformly random outcomes, we obtain D 2 q≈ D 3.
Finally, we get by transitivity that D 0 q≈ D 3 and conclude the proof by observing that
after our changes, the process producing D 3 is the real protocol. This concludes the proof
of enforceability against Bob, according to Definition 9.3 with switched sides. 
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Applications
Coin-flipping as a stand-alone tool allows us to use it rather freely in several contexts. Shared
randomness is a crucial ingredient in many cryptographic implementations. Applications in
the common-reference-string-model, that assumes a random public string before communi-
cation, achieve great efficiency and composability, and many protocols have been proposed
in the model. In this chapter, we will discuss example applications that rely on shared ran-
domness. Two applications relate to the context of zero-knowledge. First, we show a simple
transformation from non-interactive zero-knowledge to interactive quantum zero-knowledge.
This result appeared in [DL09]. Then, we propose a quantum-secure zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge, which is interesting also in that the construction relies not only on initial random-
ness but also on enforceable randomness as discussed in Chapter 9. This construction is part
of the results in [LN10]. Last, we discuss the interactive generation of a common reference
string for the proposed lattice-based instantiation of the compiler construction, proposed in
Chapter 5 and applied in Chapter 6. This result appeared in [DFL+09] and [DL09].
10.1 Interactive Quantum Zero-Knowledge
Zero-knowledge proofs, as described in Section 2.4.5, are an important building block for
larger cryptographic protocols, capturing the definition of convincing the verifier of the va-
lidity of a statement with no information beyond that.
10.1.1 Motivation and Related Work
As in the classical case, where ZK protocols exist if one-way functions exist, quantum
zero-knowledge (QZK) is possible under the assumption that quantum one-way functions
exist. In [Kob03], Kobayashi showed that a common reference string or shared entangle-
ment is necessary for non-interactive quantum zero-knowledge. Interactive quantum zero-
knowledge protocols in restricted settings were proposed by Watrous in the honest-verifier
setting [Wat02] and by Damg˚ard et al. in the CRS-model [DFS04], where the latter intro-
duced the first Σ-protocols for QZK withstanding even active quantum attacks. In [Wat09],
Watrous then proved that several interactive protocols are zero-knowledge against general
quantum attacks.
It has also been shown that any honest-verifier zero-knowledge protocol can be made
zero-knowledge against any classical and quantum verifier [HKSZ08]. In more detail, they
showed how to transform a Σ-protocol with stage-by-stage honest-verifier zero-knowledge
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into a new Σ-protocol that is zero-knowledge against all verifiers. Special bit commitment
schemes are proposed to limit the number of rounds, and each round is viewed as a stage
in which an honest-verifier simulator is assumed. Then, by using a technique of [DGW94],
each stage can be converted to obtain zero-knowledge against any classical verifier. Finally,
Watrous’ quantum rewinding lemma is applied in each stage to prove zero-knowledge also
against any quantum verifier. We now show a simple transformation from non-interactive
(quantum) zero-knowledge to interactive quantum zero-knowledge by combining the coin-flip
protocol with any non-interactive ZK protocol. Note that a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof system can be trivially turned into an interactive honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof
system by just letting the verifier choose the reference string, and therefore, this consequence
of our result also follows from [HKSZ08]. However, our proof is much simpler and the coin-
flipping is not restricted to a specific zero-knowledge construction. In addition, we obtain the
corollary that if there exist mixed commitments, then we can achieve interactive quantum
zero-knowledge against any poly-sized quantum adversary without any set-up assumptions.
10.1.2 Formal Definition of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
In Section 2.4.5, we gave an intuitive introduction to zero-knowledge proof systems. Here,
we make this description formal. Recall that a zero-knowledge proof for set L on common
input x yields no other knowledge than the validity of membership x ∈ L. An interactive
proof system must fulfill completeness and soundness, as given in Definitions 10.1 and 10.2,
and is quantum zero-knowledge (IQZK), if in addition Definition 10.3 holds. Note that in
the following, we let A be the prover and let B denote the verifier.
Definition 10.1 (Completeness) If x ∈ L, the probability that (A,B) rejects x is negligible
in the length of x.
Definition 10.2 (Soundness) If x /∈ L, then for any unbounded prover A′, the probability
that (A′,B) accepts x is negligible in the length of x.
Definition 10.3 (Zero-Knowledge) An interactive proof system (A,B′) for language L
is quantum zero-knowledge, if for any quantum verifier B′, there exists a simulator Sˆ with
output quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real output, i.e.,
outSˆ
q≈ outpi(x,ω)A,B′ ,
on common input x ∈ L and arbitrary additional (quantum) input to B′.
According to [BFM88], the interaction between prover and verifier can be replaced by a
common reference string. Then, there is only a single message sent from prover to verifier,
who makes the final decision weather to accept or not. More precisely, both parties A and B
get common input x. A common reference string ω of size κ allows the prover A, who knows
a witness w, to give a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof pi(ω, x) to a (possibly quantum)
verifier, poly-time bounded in κ. For simplicity, we consider the proof of a single theorem of
size smaller than n (and n ≤ κ, i.e. Lκ = {x ∈ L | |x| ≤ κ}. The extension to a more general
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notion is rather straightforward (see [BFM88] for details).
Completeness and soundness hold as defined above, but we explicitly state the definitions
as given in [BFM88] and adapted to our context.
Definition 10.4 (Completeness in NIZK) There exists a constant c > 0 such that for
all x ∈ Lκ, the acceptance probability is overwhelming, i.e.,
Prcomplete = Pr [ω ← {0, 1}nc , pi(x, ω)← A(ω, x,w) : B(ω, x, pi(x, ω)) = 1] > 1− ε
where ε is negligible in n (and κ).
Definition 10.5 (Soundness in NIZK) There exists a constant c > 0 such that for all
x /∈ Lκ and for all provers A′, the acceptance probability is negligible, i.e.,
Prsound = Pr [ω ← {0, 1}nc , pi(x, ω)← A′(ω, x) : B(ω, x, pi(x, ω)) = 1] ≤ ε′
where ε′ is negligible in n (and κ).
The non-interactive zero-knowledge requirement is simpler than for general zero-knowledge
for the following reason. Since all information is communicated mono-directional from prover
to verifier in the protocol, the verifier does not influence the distribution in the real world.
Thus, in the ideal world, we require a simulator that only outputs pairs that are (quan-
tum) computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of pairs (ω, pi(x, ω)) in the real
world, where pi is generated with uniformly chosen ω and random x.1 In other words, we
can eliminate the quantification over all B′ in the zero-knowledge definition.
Definition 10.6 (Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge) There exist a constant c > 0 and
a simulator Sˆ with output quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real output,
i.e.,
outSˆ(x)
q≈ outpi(x,ω)A,B′ ,
where outSˆ(x) = {ω ← {0, 1}|x|c , pi(x, ω)← A(x, ω) : (ω, pi(x, ω))}.
10.1.3 The Transformation
We obtain a generic transformation of non-interactive zero-knowledge into interactive quan-
tum zero-knowledge as follows. In each invocation, protocol COIN generates a truly random
coin even in the case of a malicious quantum B′. A string of such coins, obtained by sequen-
tial composition as described in Section 8.3.1 by the ideal functionality in Figure 8.5, is then
used as reference string in any (NIZK)-subprotocol with properties as defined previously.
The final protocol IQZK is shown in Figure 10.3. To prove that it is an interactive quan-
tum zero-knowledge protocol, we first construct an intermediate protocol IQZKFκ−COIN (see
Figure 10.1) that runs with the ideal functionality Fκ−COIN. Then we prove that IQZKFκ−COIN
satisfies completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge according to Definitions 10.1 - 10.3.
To complete the proof, the calls to Fκ−COIN are replaced with actual invocations of Πκ−COINA,B ,
and we arrive at IQZK.
1Indistinguishability, in turn, implies that the proof construction withstands quantum-computationally
bounded verifiers.
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protocol IQZKFκ−COIN:
(COIN)
1. A and B invoke Fκ−COIN. If A aborts by sending ⊥ as second input, B aborts the
protocol. Otherwise, A and B set ω = h.
(NIZK)
2. A sends pi(x, ω) to B. B checks the proof and accepts or rejects accordingly.
Figure 10.1: Intermediate Protocol for IQZK.
Claim 10.1 Protocol IQZKFκ−COIN satisfies completeness, according to Definition 10.1.
Proof. From the ideal functionality Fκ−COIN it follows that ω is uniformly random. Then by
Definition 10.4 of any (NIZK)-subprotocol, we know that, for x ∈ Lκ, B accepts, except with
negligible probability (in the length of x. Thus, completeness for the IQZKFκ−COIN follows. 
Claim 10.2 Protocol IQZKFκ−COIN satisfies soundness, according to Definition 10.2.
Proof. Assume that x /∈ Lκ. Any dishonest A′ might stop IQZKFκ−COIN at any point during
execution. For example, she can block the output in Step (1.) or she can refuse to send a
proof pi in (NIZK). Furthermore, A′ can use an invalid ω (or x) for pi. In all of these cases, B
will abort without even checking the proof.
Therefore, A′’s best strategy is to “play the entire game”, i.e. to execute IQZKFκ−COIN
without making obvious cheats. A′ can only convince B in the (NIZK)-subprotocol of a pi for
any given (i.e. normally generated) ω with a probability that is negligible in the length of x
(see Definition 10.5). Therefore, the probability that A′ can convince B in the full IQZKFκ−COIN
in case of x /∈ Lκ is also negligible and its soundness follows. 
Claim 10.3 Protocol IQZKFκ−COIN is an interactive zero-knowledge proof, according to Defi-
nition 10.3.
Proof. We construct a simulator Sˆ
IQZKFκ−COIN , interacting with dishonest B
′ and a simulator
SˆNIZK. As given in Definition 10.6, such a simulator generates, on input x ∈ L, a randomly
looking ω together with a valid proof pi for x (without knowing witness w). Sˆ
IQZKFκ−COIN ,
described in Figure 10.2, receives a random string ω˜ from SˆNIZK, which now replaces the
coin-string h produced by Fκ−COIN in protocol IQZKFκ−COIN . By assumption on SˆNIZK, this
is quantum-computationally indistinguishable for B′. Thus, the simulated proof pi(ω, x) is
indistinguishable from a real proof, which proves that the IQZKFκ−COIN is zero-knowledge. 
It would be natural to think that IQZK could be proven secure simply by showing that
IQZKFκ−COIN implements some appropriate functionality and then use a composition theorem
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Simulation Sˆ
IQZKFκ−COIN :
1. Sˆ
IQZKFκ−COIN gets input x and invokes SˆNIZK with x to receives pi(ω, x).
2. Let ω = h. Sˆ
IQZKFκ−COIN sends h to B
′.
3. Sˆ
IQZKFκ−COIN sends pi(ω, x) to B
′ and outputs whatever B′ outputs.
Figure 10.2: The Simulation of the Intermediate Protocol for IQZK.
protocol IQZK:
(COIN) A and B run Πκ−COINA,B and set ω = h.
(NIZK) A sends pi(ω, x) to B. B checks the proof and accepts or rejects accordingly.
Figure 10.3: Interactive Quantum Zero-Knowledge.
from Section 3.6. Recall, however, that a zero-knowledge protocol—which is not necessarily
a proof of knowledge—cannot be modeled by a functionality in a natural way. Instead, we
prove the standard properties of a zero-knowledge proof system explicitly and therewith the
following Theorem 10.1.
Theorem 10.1 (Interactive Quantum Zero-Knowledge) Protocol IQZK is an interac-
tive proof system, satisfying completeness and soundness. Since, for any quantum verifier
B′, there exists a simulator SˆIQZK with output quantum-computationally indistinguishable from
the real output, we additionally achieve quantum zero-knowledge.
Proof. From the analysis of protocol COIN, its sequential composability, and the indistin-
guishability from the ideal functionality Fκ−COIN, it follows that if both players are honest
ω is a random common reference string of size κ and the acceptance probability of the
(NIZK)-subprotocol as given previously holds. Completeness of IQZK follows.
To show soundness, we again only consider the case where A′ executes the entire protocol
without making obvious cheats, since otherwise, B immediately aborts. Assume that A′ could
cheat in IQZK, i.e., B would accept an invalid proof with non-negligible probability. Then we
could combine A′ with simulator Aˆ′ of protocol COIN (Figure 8.3) to show that IQZKFκ−COIN
was not sound. This, however, is inconsistent with the previously given soundness argument
in the proof of Claim 10.2, and thus proves by contradiction that IQZK is sound.
To further prove that the interactive proof system is also quantum zero-knowledge, we
compose a simulator SˆIQZK of simulator SˆIQZKFκ−COIN (Figure 10.2) and simulator Bˆ
′ of protocol
COIN (Figure 8.4). In more detail, SˆIQZK gets classical input x as well as quantum input W
and X. It then receives a valid proof pi and a random string ω from SˆNIZK. ω is split into
coin1 . . . coink. For each coini, it will then invoke Bˆ
′ to simulate one coin-flip execution with
118 CHAPTER 10. APPLICATIONS
coin = coini as result. In other words, whenever Bˆ
′ asks FCOIN to output a bit (Step (2.),
Figure 8.4), it instead receives this coini. We see that the transcript of the simulation is
indistinguishable from the transcript of the protocol IQZK for any quantum-computationally
bounded B′. This concludes the proof. 
We conclude this section by the corollary, immediately following from the previous proof
and stating that quantum-secure commitments, as defined in Section 7.1, imply interactive
quantum zero-knowledge.
Corollary 10.1 If there exist quantum-secure commitment schemes, then we can obtain
interactive quantum zero-knowledge against any quantum adversary P′ ∈ Ppoly without any
set-up assumptions.
10.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is a special case of zero-knowledge proof systems,
introduced in Section 2.4.5. Here, we propose a quantum-secure construction based on
witness encoding, which we define in the context of simulation.
10.2.1 Motivation and Related Work
Recall that the purpose of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge is to verify in classical
poly-time in the length of the instance, whether w is a valid witness for instance x in
relation R, i.e. (x,w) ∈ R. We call R an NP-relation, as the language L(R) = {x ∈
{0, 1}∗| ∃w s.t. (x,w) ∈ R} is seen to be an NP-language. Interestingly, such a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge, in contrast to zero-knowledge proofs, can be modeled by an
ideal functionality.
Our protocol is based on a witness encoding scheme, providing a certain degree of ex-
tractability and simulatability, defined in Section 10.2.2. We want to stress that the ex-
tractability requirement resembles special soundness in proof systems, which are secure in
the classical world and typically come along with a knowledge error negligible in the length
of the challenge. We have to reformulate this aspect in stronger terms in the quantum world,
since special soundness seems to be impossible to use in the quantum realm, due to the
restrictions within rewinding. However, we obtain a similar result also with knowledge error
negligible in the length of the challenge.
Furthermore, our construction requires a mixed bit commitment (see Section 4.1) and
two calls to the coin-flip protocol pi(force,force), described in Figure 9.4, Chapter 9, which is
poly-time simulatable for both sides even against quantum adversaries. Since this protocol
only assumes mixed commitments as well, we get the corollary that if there exists a mixed
commitment scheme, then we can construct a classical zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
against any poly-sized quantum adversary. This is of particular interest, as the problems of
rewinding in the quantum realm complicate implementing proofs of knowledge from scratch.
As already mentioned in Chapter 8, the unpublished approach of [Smi09] suggest another
solution for this concept. Instead of composing the coin-string from single coins, they use a
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string commitment with special opening and compose the subsequent zero-knowledge proof.
The coin-string is used as key to encode the witness and the second zero-knowledge proof is
given to prove it.
10.2.2 Simulatable Witness Encodings of NP
We first specify a simulatable encoding scheme for binary relationR ⊂ {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗, which
consists of five classical poly-time algorithms (E,D, S, J, Eˆ). Then, we define completeness,
extractability and simulatability for such a scheme in terms of the requirements of our zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge.
Let E : R × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n denote an encoder, such that for each (x,w) ∈ R, the
n-bit output e ← E(x,w, r′) is a random encoding of w, with randomness r′ ∈ {0, 1}m and
polynomials m(|x|) and n(|x|). The corresponding decoder D : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗
takes as input an instance x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and an encoding e ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs w ← D(x, e)
with w ∈ {0, 1}∗.
Next, let S denote a selector with input s ∈ {0, 1}σ (with polynomial σ(|x|)) specifying
a challenge, and output S(s) defining a poly-sized subset of {1, . . . , n} corresponding to
challenge s. We will use S(s) to select which bits of an encoding e to reveal to the verifier.
For simplicity, we use es to denote the collection of bits e|S(s).
We denote with J the judgment that checks a potential encoding e by inspecting only
bits es. In more detail, J takes as input instance x ∈ {0, 1}∗, challenge s ∈ {0, 1}σ and the
|S(s)| bits es, and outputs a judgment j ← J(x, s, es) with j ∈ {abort, success}.
Finally, the simulator is called Eˆ. It takes as input instance x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and challenge
s ∈ {0, 1}σ and outputs a random collection of bits t|S(s) ← Eˆ(x, s). Again for simplicity, we
let t|S(s) = ts. Then, if this set has the same distribution as bits of an encoding e in positions
S(s), the bits needed for the judgment to check an encoding e can be simulated given just
instance x (see Definition 10.9).
Definition 10.7 (Completeness) If an encoding e ← E(x,w, r) is generated correctly,
then success← J(x, s, es) for all s ∈R {0, 1}σ.
We will call an encoding e admissible for x, if there exist two distinct challenges s, s′ ∈
{0, 1}σ for which success← J(x, s, es) and success← J(x, s′, es′).
Definition 10.8 (Extractability) If an encoding e is admissible for x, then
(
x,D(x, e)
) ∈
R.
We want to stress that extractability is similarly defined to the special soundness property
of a classical Σ-protocol, which allows to extract w from two accepting conversations with
different challenges. Such a requirement would generally be inapplicable in the quantum
setting, as the usual rewinding technique is problematic and in particular in the context here,
we cannot measure two accepting conversations during rewinding in the quantum world.
Therefore, we define the stronger requirement that if there exist two distinct answerable
challenges for one encoding e, then w can be extracted given only e. This condition works
nicely in the quantum world, since we can obtain e without rewinding, as we will show in
our quantum-secure proof construction.
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Functionality FZKPK(R):
1. On input (x,w) from Alice, FZKPK(R) sets j = success if (x,w) ∈ R. Otherwise, it
sets j = abort.
2. FZKPK(R) outputs (x, j) to Alice and Bob.
Figure 10.4: The Ideal Functionality for a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge.
Definition 10.9 (Simulatability) For all (x,w) ∈ R and all s ∈R {0, 1}σ, the distribution
of e← E(x,w, r′) restricted to positions S(s) is identical to the distribution of ts ← Eˆ(x, s),
i.e.,
D(es) = D(ts) .
There are several commit&open proofs for NP. One can, for instance, start from the
commit&open protocol for circuit satisfiability, where the bits of the randomized circuit
committed to by the sender is easy to see as a simulatable encoding of a witness being
a consistent evaluation of the circuit to output 1. The challenge in the protocol is one
bit e and the prover replies by showing either the bits corresponding to some positions
S′(0) or positions S′(1). The details can be found in [BCC88]. This gives us a simulatable
witness encoding for any NP-relation R with σ = 1, using a reduction from NP to circuit
simulatability. By repeating it σ times in parallel we get a simulatable witness encoding for
any σ. For i = 1, . . . , σ, compute an encoding ei of w and let e = (e1, . . . , eσ). Then for
s ∈ {0, 1}σ, let S(s) specify that the bits S′(si) should be shown in ei and check these bits.
Note, in particular, that if two distinct s and s′ passes this judgment, then there exists i such
that si 6= s′i, so ei passes the judgment for both si = 0 and si = 1, which by the properties
of the protocol for circuit satisfiability allows to compute a witness w for x from ei. One can
find w from e simply by trying to decode each ej for j = 1, . . . , σ and check if (x,wj) ∈ R.
10.2.3 The Protocol
We now construct a quantum-secure zero-knowledge proof of knowledge from prover A to veri-
fier B. Recall that we are interested in theNP-language L(R) = {x ∈ {0, 1}∗ | ∃w s.t. (x,w) ∈
R}, where A has input x and w, and both A and B receive positive or negative judgment of
the validity of the proof as output. We assume in the following that on input (x,w) /∈ R,
honest A aborts. The final protocol ZKPK(R) is describe in Figure 10.5.
As already mentioned, unlike zero-knowledge proofs, proofs of knowledge can be modeled
by an ideal functionality, given as FZKPK(R) in Figure 10.4. FZKPK(R) can be thought of as a
channel which only allows to send messages in the language L(R). It models zero-knowledge,
as it only leaks instance x and judgment j but not witness w. Furthermore, it models a
proof of knowledge, since Alice has to know and input a valid witness w to obtain output
j = success.
Protocol ZKPK(R) is based on our fully simulatable coin-flip protocol pi(force,force), which
we analyze here in the hybrid model by invoking the ideal functionality of sequential coin-
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Protocol ZKPK(R) :
1. A and B invoke Fκ−COIN to get a commitment key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. A samples e ← E(x,w, r′) with randomness r′ ∈ {0, 1}m and commits position-
wise to all ei for i = 1, . . . , n, by computing random commitments Ei =
COMMIT pk
(
ei, ri
)
with randomness r ∈ {0, 1}n. She sends x and all Ei to B.
3. A and B invoke Fσ−COIN to flip a challenge s ∈R {0, 1}σ.
4. A opens her commitments to all es.
5. If any opening is incorrect, B outputs abort. Otherwise, he outputs j ← J(x, s, es)
with j ∈ {success, abort}.
Figure 10.5: Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge.
flipping twice (but with different output lengths). Note that in the hybrid model, a simulator
can enforce a particular outcome to hit also when invoking the ideal coin-flipping functional-
ity. We can then use Definition 9.3 to replace the ideal functionality by the actual protocol
pi(force,force).
One call to the ideal functionality Fκ−COIN with output length κ is required to instantiate a
mixed bit commitment scheme COMMIT as discussed in Section 7.3. Recall that it is therewith
possible to sample an unconditionally binding key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ along with an extraction key
sk. Since such keys are quantum-computationally indistinguishable from random values in
{0, 1}κ, the latter serves us as unconditionally hiding instantiations of COMMIT. The second
call to the functionality Fσ−COIN produces σ-bit challenges for a simulatable witness encoding
scheme with (E,D, S, J, Eˆ) as specified in the previous Section 10.2.2.
Theorem 10.2 (Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge) For any simulatable witness en-
coding scheme (E,D, S, J, Eˆ), satisfying completeness, extractability, and simulatability ac-
cording to Definitions 10.7 - 10.9, and for negligible knowledge error 2−σ, protocol ZKPK(R)
is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and securely implements FZKPK(R).
Completeness is obvious. A honest party A, following the protocol with (x,w) ∈ R and
any valid encoding e, will be able to open all commitments in the positions specified by any
challenge s. Honest Bob then outputs J(x, s, es) = success.
Proof (Security against dishonest Alice). To prove security in case of corrupted A′,
we construct a simulator Aˆ′ that simulates a run of the actual protocol with A′ and FZKPK(R).
The proof is then twofold. First, we show indistinguishability between the distributions
of simulation and protocol. And second, we verify that the extractability property of the
underlying witness encoding scheme (see Definition 10.8) implies a negligible knowledge error.
Note that if A′ sends abort at any point during the protocol, Aˆ′ sends some input (x′, w′) /∈ R
to FZKPK(R) to obtain output (x, j) with j = abort, and the simulation halts. Otherwise, the
simulation proceeds as shown in Figure 10.6.
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Simulation Aˆ′ for ZKPK(R) :
1. Aˆ′ samples a random key pk along with the extraction key sk. Then it enforces pk
as output from Fκ−COIN
2. When Aˆ′ receives x and (E1, . . . , En) from A′, it extracts e =
(xtrsk(E1), . . . , xtrsk(En)).
3. Aˆ′ completes the simulation by following the protocol honestly. If any opening of
A′ is incorrect, Aˆ′ aborts. Otherwise, Aˆ′ inputs
(
x,D(x, e)
)
to FZKPK(R) and receives
(x, j) back. Aˆ′ outputs the final state of A′ as output in the simulation.
Figure 10.6: Simulation against dishonest Alice.
Note that the only difference between the real protocol and the simulation is that Aˆ′ uses
a random public key pk sampled along with an extraction key sk, instead of a uniformly
random pk ∈ {0, 1}κ. It then enforces Fκ−COIN to hit pk. However, by assumption on the
commitment keys and by the properties of the ideal coin-flipping functionality, the transcripts
of simulation and protocol remain quantum-computationally indistinguishable under these
changes.
Next, we analyze the output in more detail. It is clear that whenever honest B would
output abort in the actual protocol, also Aˆ′ aborts, namely, if A′ does deviate in the last steps
of protocol and simulation, respectively. Furthermore, Aˆ′ accepts if and only if (x,D(x, e)) ∈
R or in other words, the judgment of the functionality is positive, denoted by jF = success.
It is therefore only left to prove that the case of jF = abort but jJ = success is
negligible, where the later denotes the judgment of algorithm J(x, s, es) as in the protocol.
In that case, we have (x,D(x, e)) /∈ R. This means that w is not extractable from D(x, e),
which in turn implies that (xtrsk(E1), . . . , xtrsk(En)) = e is not admissible. Thus, there are
no two distinct challenges s and s′, in which A′ could correctly open her commitment to e. It
follows by contradiction that there exists at most one challenge s which A′ can answer. We
produce s ∈ {0, 1}σ uniformly at random, from which we obtain an acceptance probability
of at most 2−σ. Thus, we conclude the proof with negligible knowledge error, as desired.

Proof (Security against dishonest Bob). To prove security in case of corrupted B′,
we construct simulator Bˆ′ as shown in Figure 10.7. Our aim is to verify that this simulation
is quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real protocol. The key aspect will
be the simulatability guarantee of the underlying witness encoding scheme, according to
Definition 10.9.
The proof proceeds via a hybrid argument. Let D 0 be the distribution of the simulation
as described in Figure 10.7. Let D 1 be the distribution obtained from the simulation but
with the following change: We inspect FZKPK(R) to get a valid witness w for instance x, and
let e ← E(x,w, r′) be the corresponding encoding. Note that this is possible as a thought
experiment for any adjacent distribution in a hybrid argument. From e we then use bits es
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Simulation Bˆ′ for ZKPK(R) :
1. Bˆ′ invokes Fκ−COIN to receive a uniformly random pk.
2. Bˆ′ samples a uniformly random challenge s ∈ {0, 1}σ and computes ts ← Eˆ(x, s).
Bˆ′ then computes commitments Ei as follows: For all i ∈ S(s), it commits to the
previously sampled ts via Ei = COMMIT pk
(
ti, ri
)
. For all other positions i ∈ S¯
(where S¯ = {1, . . . , n} \ S(s)), it commits to randomly chosen values t′i ∈R {0, 1},
i.e. Ei = COMMIT pk
(
t′i, ri
)
. It sends x and all Ei to B
′.
3. Bˆ′ forces Fσ−COIN to hit s.
4. Bˆ′ opens Ei to ti for all i ∈ S(s), i.e. to all ts.
5. Bˆ′ outputs whatever B′ outputs.
Figure 10.7: Simulation against dishonest Bob.
for the same S(s) as previously, instead of bits ts sampled by Eˆ(x, s). All other steps are
simulated as before. By the simulatability of the encoding scheme (Definition 10.9), it holds
that the bits ts in D 0 and the bits es in D 1 have the same distribution. Thus, we obtain
D 0 = D 1.
We further change the simulation in that we compute the bits in all positions i ∈ S¯ by ei
of the encoding e defined in the previous step. Again, all other steps of the simulation remain
unchanged. Let D 2 denote the new distribution. The only difference now is that for i ∈ S¯,
the commitments Ei are to the bits ei of a valid e and not to uniformly random bits t
′
i. This,
however, is quantum-computationally indistinguishable to B′ for pk ∈R {0, 1}κ, as COMMIT is
quantum-computationally hiding towards B′. Note that pk is guaranteed to be random by
an honest call to Fκ−COIN and recall that we do not have to open the commitments in these
positions. Hence, we get that D 1 q≈ D 2.
Note that after the two changes, leading to distributions D 1 and D 2, the commitment
step and its opening now proceed as in the actual protocol, namely, we commit to the bits
of e ← E(x, e, r′) and open the subset corresponding to S(s). The remaining difference
to the real protocol is the enforcement of challenge s, whereas s is chosen randomly in
the protocol. Now, let D 3 be the distribution of the modified simulation, in which we
implement this additional change of invoking Fσ−COIN honestly and then open honestly to
the resulting s. Note that both processes, i.e., first choosing a random s and then enforcing
it from Fσ−COIN, or invoking Fσ−COIN honestly and receiving a random s, result in a uniformly
random distribution on the output of Fσ−COIN. Thus, we obtain D 2 = D 3.
By transitivity, we conclude that D 0 q≈ D 3, and therewith, that the simulation is
quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the actual protocol. 
We conclude this section by the corollary that follows straightforward from the above
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construction and proof and states that mixed commitments, as defined in Section 7.3, imply
classical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge against any poly-sized quantum adversary.
Corollary 10.2 If there exist mixed commitment schemes, then we can construct a classical
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge against any quantum adversary P′ ∈ Ppoly without any
set-up assumptions.
10.3 Generation of Commitment Keys
Here, we briefly describe the initial generation of a common reference string for the proposed
lattice-based instantiation of the generic compiler, introduced in Chapter 5, according to the
specific requirements of its underlying mixed commitment scheme, discussed in Section 4.1.
10.3.1 Motivation
The compiler is constructed in the CRS-model to achieve high efficiency. We now aim at
circumventing the CRS-assumption to achieve the potential of allowing the implementation of
complete protocols in the quantum world without any set-up assumptions. More specifically,
we integrate the generation of a common reference string from scratch based on our quantum-
secure coin-flipping, which will then be used during compilation as commitment key. We want
to stress, however, that implementing the entire process comes at the cost of a non-constant
round construction, added to otherwise very efficient protocols under the CRS-assumption.
10.3.2 The Generation
Recall that the argument for computational security in Section 5.2 proceeds along the follow-
ing lines. After the preparation phase B commits to all his measurement bases and outcomes.
The keyed dual-mode commitment scheme has the special properties that the key can be
generated by one of two possible key-generation algorithms GH or GB. Depending on the
key in use, the scheme provides both flavors of security. Namely, with key pkH generated
by GH, respectively pkB produced by GB, the commitment scheme is unconditionally hid-
ing respectively unconditionally binding. Furthermore, the commitment is secure against a
quantum adversary and it holds that pkH
q≈ pkB. In the real-world protocol, B uses the un-
conditionally hiding key pkH to maintain unconditional security against any unbounded A′.
To argue security against a computationally bounded B′, an information-theoretic argument
involving the simulator Bˆ′ is given (in the proof of Theorem 5.1) to prove that B′ cannot
cheat with the unconditionally binding key pkB. Security in real life then follows from the
quantum-computational indistinguishability of pkH and pkB.
We want to repeat that we can even weaken the assumption on the hiding key in that
we do in fact not require an actual unconditionally hiding key, if the public-key encryption
scheme guarantees that a random public key looks pseudo-random to poly-time quantum
circuits. As discussed in Section 4.1, the lattice-based crypto-system of Regev [Reg05],
which is considered to withstand quantum attacks, is a good candidate to construct such a
dual-mode commitment scheme. The public key of a regular key pair can be used as the
unconditionally binding key pkB′ in our commitment scheme for the ideal-world simulation,
10.3. GENERATION OF COMMITMENT KEYS 125
and for the real protocol, an unconditionally hiding commitment key pkH′ can simply be
constructed by uniformly choosing numbers in the same domain.
The idea is now the following. Let k denote the length of a regular key pkB′. We add
(at least) k executions of our protocol COIN as a first step to the compiler-construction to
generate a uniformly random sequence coin1 . . . coink. These k random bits produce a pkH
′
as sampled by GH, except with negligible probability. Hence, in the real world, Bob can use
key coin1 . . . coink = pkH
′ for committing with ci = commit pkH′ (θˆi, xˆi), ri) on all positions
i. Since an ideal-world adversary Bˆ′ is free to choose any key, it can generate (pkB′, sk′),
i.e., a regular public key together with a secret key according to Regev’s crypto-system. For
the security proof, write pkB′ = coin1 . . . coink. In the simulation, Bˆ′compile (as described
in the proof of Theorem 5.1) first invokes Bˆ′coin (Figure 8.4) for each coinj to simulate one
coin-flip with coinj as result. Whenever Bˆ
′
coin asks FCOIN to output a bit, it instead receives
this coini. Then Bˆ
′
compile has the possibility to decrypt dishonest B
′’s commitments ci =
commit pkB′ ((θˆi, xˆi), ri) during simulation, which binds B
′ unconditionally to his committed
measurement bases and outcomes. Finally, since we proved in the analysis of protocol COIN
that pkH′ is a uniformly random string, Regev’s proof of semantic security applies, namely
that a random public key, chosen independently from a secret key, is indistinguishable to
a regular key and that such encodings carry essentially no information about the message.
Thus, we obtain pkH′
q≈ pkB′ and quantum-computational security in real life follows.
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